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Essays in Accounting and Finance
Thomas Rauter
Abstract
This dissertation studies real effects of disclosure regulation and topics at the intersection
of accounting and banking. It consists of three papers.
The notion that mandating disclosure stimulates desirable and discourages undesirable
behavior by the disclosing party is an important motivation for financial reporting and
transparency regulation. However, there is relatively little evidence on the real effects of
mandatory disclosure that directly speaks to this motivation. In “Disclosure Regula-
tion, Corruption, and Investment: Evidence from Natural Resource Extrac-
tion”, I investigate the real effects of mandatory extraction payment disclosures, which
require European oil, gas, and mining firms to publicly disclose their payments to foreign
host governments in a granular report on their corporate website. Extraction payment
disclosures are substantially more disaggregated compared to previous payment records,
allowing activist groups to identify payment discrepancies and exert societal pressure on
extractive firms. I exploit plausibly-exogenous variation in the adoption of extraction
payment reports across European countries and firms’ fiscal-year ends to disentangle the
disclosure effects from concurrent but unrelated macroeconomic and regulatory changes.
Using manually-collected host country data on firms’ extractive activities abroad, I docu-
ment that disclosing companies increase their payments to foreign host governments but
decrease investments relative to tightly-matched, non-disclosing competitors from around
the world. The effects are particularly strong for large firms and for firms that sell their
products directly to end consumers. Moreover, I find that extraction payment reports
are associated with investment reallocations within disclosing firms and across disclosing
and non-disclosing companies. I contribute to the prior literature by showing that social
responsibility disclosures can have sizeable real effects at the micro level, especially if the
threat of public shaming by specialized activist groups disciplines companies not to engage
in illicit practices. However, I do not find that extraction payment disclosures are asso-
ciated with improved measures of corruption at the aggregate host country level, which
i
questions recent unilateral efforts by Western countries to address foreign policy objectives
by imposing disclosure regulation on only a subset of companies in the global marketplace.
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 triggered a vigorous debate about the role of fair value ac-
counting and revived discussions about procyclicality in banking. While there is evidence
that fair value accounting did not play a major role during the crisis, there is still the
concern that fair value accounting contributes to instability by inflating credit bubbles via
procyclical leverage. In “Procyclicality of U.S. Bank Leverage” (Journal of Account-
ing Research (2017)), Christian Laux and I investigate the determinants of procyclical
book leverage for U.S. commercial and savings banks in light of the current debate about
the link between accounting and financial stability. Our evidence is not consistent with the
notion that fair value accounting contributes to procyclical leverage or that historical cost
accounting reduces procyclicality. Overall, we conclude that the business model of banks
is more important for procyclical leverage than accounting or bank regulation.
A large literature examines the economic benefits of private information production by
banks within lending relationships. However, lending relationships are also valuable to
banks outside of specific firm-creditor ties. In practice, lenders frequently advertise their
participation in syndicated loan transactions through “tombstone announcements” in fi-
nancial magazines to raise their public profile and use existing lending relationships as a
marketing tool to attract new borrowers. Despite anecdotal evidence that banks value the
public recognition from high profile transactions, there is little evidence on how lending rela-
tionships with prestigious firms shape debt contracting. In “Fishing with Pearls: The
Value of Lending Relationships with Prestigious Firms”, Alexander Mu¨rmann,
Christoph Scheuch, and I provide novel evidence of banks establishing lending relation-
ships with prestigious firms to signal their quality and attract future business. Using
unique survey data on firm-level prestige, we show that lenders compete more intensely
for prestigious borrowers and offer lower upfront fees to initiate lending relationships with
prestigious firms. We also find that banks expand their lending after winning prestigious
clients. Prestigious firms benefit from these relationships as they face lower costs of bor-
rowing even though prestige has no predictive power for credit risk. Our results are robust
to matched sample analyses and a regression discontinuity design.
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Disclosure Regulation, Corruption, and Investment:
Evidence from Natural Resource Extraction*
Thomas Rauter
May 2018
Abstract
I investigate the real effects of mandatory extraction payment disclosures, which require
European oil, gas, and mining firms to publicly disclose their payments to foreign host
governments in a granular report on their corporate website. Extraction payment dis-
closures are substantially more detailed compared to previous payment records, allowing
activist groups to identify payment discrepancies and exert societal pressure on extractive
firms. Using manually-collected host country data on firms’ extractive activities abroad
and exploiting the staggered, plausibly-exogenous adoption of extraction payment reports
across European countries and firms’ fiscal year ends, I document that disclosing compa-
nies increase their payments to host governments but decrease and reallocate investments
relative to tightly-matched, non-disclosing competitors from around the world. The effects
are particularly strong for large firms and for firms that sell their products directly to end
consumers. My results suggest that social responsibility disclosures can have sizeable real
effects, especially if public shaming by specialized activist groups disciplines companies not
to engage in illicit practices. In contrast, extraction payment disclosures are not associated
with improved measures of corruption at the aggregate host country level, which questions
unilateral disclosure mandates aimed at addressing foreign policy objectives.
JEL-Classification: G14; G38; K22; L71; M41; M48; O10
Keywords: Real Effects; Disclosure Regulation; Corruption; Public Shaming;
Corporate Social Responsibility
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1 Introduction
Policymakers increasingly require firms to publicly disclose information about corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR). An important motivation for CSR disclosures is to equip
interested parties with information to exert societal pressure on companies and discourage
illegitimate firm behavior (EY (2013); Fung et al. (2007)). Despite its regulatory motiva-
tion and popularity as a policy tool, we know little about the real effects of CSR disclosures
and their underlying economic mechanisms (Leuz and Wysocki (2016)).1
In this paper, I examine the real effects of mandatory extraction payment disclosures,
which require European oil, gas, and mining firms (henceforth, “extractive firms”) to pub-
licly disclose their payments to foreign host governments in a granular report on their
corporate website (“PGD regulation”).2 The key difference between these disclosures and
previously available payment records is that the information in extraction payment reports
is substantially more detailed. Unlike before, firm-level payments are not only disaggre-
gated by the receiving host country government, but also by extractive project and payment
type. While the underlying payment information is generated by firms’ financial report-
ing systems and reconciled with financial statements, extraction payment disclosures are
published independently from the annual filings on a different date.
By nature of their business, extractive companies frequently venture abroad to extract
oil, gas, or minerals in foreign host countries that are well endowed with natural resources.
Firms compensate host countries for the resource extraction and official extraction agree-
ments determine the payments that companies make to foreign governments.3 Extractive
payments are an essential source of government income for (poor) countries (Collier (2007)).
However, policymakers and economists are concerned that host countries do not obtain a
fair share of extractive sector revenues, thereby limiting the extent to which natural re-
source endowments stimulate economic development in these nations (Humphreys et al.
1I define real effects as situations in which the disclosing person or reporting entity changes its behavior
in the real economy as a result of the disclosure mandate (Leuz and Wysocki (2016)).
2Throughout this paper, I use the terms “extraction payment disclosures” and “PGD regulation”
interchangeably.
3Depending on the stage of the project lifecycle, extractive companies make different kinds of payments
such as royalties, license fees, or signature bonuses. Open Oil (2012) and Resource Contracts (2014)
summarize the different stages of the extractive project lifecycle. Global Witness (2017) provides a detailed
description of each payment type including examples.
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(2007); Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)). For one, host country officials frequently negoti-
ate corrupt deals with extractive companies (Global Witness (2017)). The notion is that
extractive firms bribe government bureaucrats to receive payment concessions in excess
of the illicit kickback (Financial Times (2012); EY (2014)). Indeed, the OECD (2014)
estimates that 19 percent of all foreign bribery cases occur in the oil, gas, and mining
industries, which is higher than in any other sector.4 For another, extractive companies
employ aggressive payment avoidance strategies by underreporting extractive revenues or
overreporting project costs.5
To fight corrupt business practices and improve extractive revenue collection, policy-
makers in Europe passed legislation that requires oil, gas, and mining companies to provide
a yearly report containing detailed project-level information on firms’ payments to foreign
host countries (European Commission (2013)). The recent decision by the U.S. govern-
ment to roll back PGD regulation for American oil, gas, and mining firms (CNN (2017))
triggered a vigorous policy debate about the benefits and costs of extraction payment dis-
closures. Proponents argue that the higher disaggregation of extractive payments in PGD
reports allows a wide range of interested parties (e.g., NGOs, civil society) to better moni-
tor extractive activities, identify payments that are “too low” (red flags), and exert public
pressure by contacting journalists to encourage media coverage or lobbying anti-corruption
agencies to investigate. Prior information, for example about project-specific extraction
quantities and royalty rates, only allowed activist groups to determine the payments that
firms are expected to make to foreign governments, but not how much companies actually
pay to host countries.6 This previously missing information is now publicly available in
extraction payment disclosures. Once watchdogs expose extractive revenue losses, public
4There are many incidents where government bureaucrats sold licenses to extractive companies at
below market prices in exchange for private benefits. Prominent examples include Exxon Mobil in Nigeria
(Global Witness (2016)) or Equatorial Guinea (New York Times (2016)). Even if extractive companies
make appropriate market-based payments, government bureaucrats frequently divert extractive revenues
away from government ledgers into private offshore accounts. See, for instance, Shell in Nigeria (Global
Witness (2017)) or BP in Angola (Global Witness (1999)).
5A common way for extractive firms to underreport revenues is to sell commodities to themselves at
below market prices such that they pay royalties and taxes on only a fraction of the true value of the
resource. See, for example, Sasol in Mozambique (Citi Press (2017)) or Cameco in Canada (Financial Post
(2016), CPA Canada (2017)).
6Tax terms and royalty rates are provided in national legislation and model contracts. If this is not
the case, project-specific extraction terms are often publicly accessible in contract repositories such as
http://resourcecontracts.org.
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shaming can discipline companies not to engage in illicit practices and make higher pay-
ments to host governments because of fears that societal pressure could result in a backlash
against the firm from customers and investors (Dyck et al. (2008)). In fact, Global Witness,
the world’s largest activist group against corruption and exploitation in extractive indus-
tries, has recently developed a handbook on how to use information contained in extraction
payment reports to identify revenue losses (Global Witness (2017)). Tests discussed in this
guide include verifying royalty payments based on supplementary data, comparing payment
implied commodity prices with international market values, or confirming the government
receipt of high risk one-time signature or production bonuses.7 In contrast, opponents of
extraction payment disclosures argue that PGD regulation may have unintended conse-
quences since extraction payment disclosures are currently only effective for European and
Canadian firms such that high proprietary costs may induce disclosing companies to cut
investment because non-disclosing competitors can use PGD reports to learn about at-
tractive extraction opportunities (e.g., Verrecchia (1983); Darrough and Stoughton (1990);
Wagenhofer (1990)).
I use a generalized difference-in-differences design to investigate changes in extractive
payments and corporate investment around the introduction of extraction payment disclo-
sures. PGD regulation has several desirable features from a research-design perspective.
First, different European countries implemented extraction payment disclosures at differ-
ent points in time since the regulation was enacted in the form of a European directive
and member countries must transpose any European directive into national law within a
relatively short, predetermined time window of 2 to 3 years (Christensen et al. (2016)).
This staggered adoption allows me to control for concurrent but unrelated market-wide
events, which alleviates concerns that my results are spuriously driven by other economic
shocks or institutional changes (Leuz and Wysocki (2016)). Second, within any European
country, the adoption of PGD regulation across extractive firms depends on the date of
the fiscal year end since companies have to publish their payment reports 6 to 11 months
7For example, the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) used Weatherly International’s PGD
report to detect that the UK mining company did not make royalty payments for two extraction projects
in Namibia that had been in production during 2015. NRGI pressured Weatherly International to provide
an explanation, which resulted in the payment of additional USD 400,000 since the firm had “overlooked”
these royalty obligations (Global Witness (2017)).
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after the end of each financial year. One challenge with identifying the causal effects of ex-
traction payment disclosures based on variation in implementation dates between countries
is that these dates may not be randomly assigned and that correlated omitted country-
level factors could impact legislators’ transposition timing (Ball (1980); Mulherin (2007);
Christensen et al. (2017)). I address this endogeneity concern by comparing extractive
companies that are headquartered within the same country but become subject to PGD
regulation at different points in time because of plausibly-exogenous variation in firms’
fiscal year ends (similar to Daske et al. (2008)).
I estimate the effects relative to non-disclosing extractive firms from around the world
and use coarsened exact matching to construct my control sample based on pre-treatment
financial characteristics. All my specifications include natural resource-by-time fixed effects
to absorb variation in extractive payments and corporate investment resulting from changes
in commodity prices. Moreover, I add foreign country-by-year fixed effects to control
for time-varying host country characteristics that could differentially impact my outcome
variables across treated and control firms (e.g., GDP growth).
I begin my empirical analysis by investigating the effect of PGD regulation on extractive
payments to foreign host countries. To this end, I manually construct a novel dataset
covering information on extractive payment practices by multinational oil, gas, and mining
firms for 13 host countries before and after extraction payment disclosures become effective.
This data differs from the information provided in PGD reports since it is compiled by host
countries (not firms) and only available at the firm - host country - year level. The data
is not disaggregated by extractive project and type of payment because this information
is not available in the pre-PGD disclosure period. In my empirical tests, I investigate the
effect of PGD reports on the coarser extractive payments that are available both before
and after the European Commission introduced PGD regulation.
I document an increase in extractive payments for disclosing companies relative to
matched control firms once PGD regulation becomes effective. The coefficient magni-
tude in my most conservative specification implies that extractive companies increase their
transfers to foreign host governments by 0.086 standard deviations once they start prepar-
ing extraction payment disclosures. The increase in extractive payments is in line with
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the notion that disclosing firms engage less in payment avoidance and corrupt business
practices since (they anticipate that) interested parties such as NGOs might use the newly
available information in PGD reports to identify extractive revenue losses and exert public
pressure on them in response.
Next, I examine the impact of PGD regulation on extractive payment gaps. A payment
gap is the relative percentage difference between the amount that extractive firms send to
host governments and the amount that bureaucrats officially book into government ledgers.
Payment gaps are highly correlated with corruption measures at the host country level and
indicate embezzlement of extractive revenues by government officials (Natural Resource
Governance Institute (2017)).8 I do not find that PGD regulation is significantly associated
with reductions in payment gaps, suggesting that extraction payment disclosures are not
effective in preventing the diversion of extractive revenues from official government ledgers
into private offshore accounts. While NGOs might successfully use extraction payment
disclosures to discipline firms by shaming them in their home countries, it is arguably
much more difficult for Western activist groups to prevent foreign government officials
from misappropriating resource revenues in autocratic and corrupt host countries or to
force extractive firms to pass the pressure on to foreign government bureaucrats.
Extraction payment disclosures likely impact firms’ investment policies. Since disclosing
firms increase their transfers to foreign host governments, the net present value of resource
extraction projects declines and affected companies may invest less. Moreover, extrac-
tion payment disclosures might impose substantial proprietary costs on disclosing firms
since non-disclosing competitors may use the payment reports to learn about profitable
extraction opportunities. Disclosing firms may cut investments because of the increased
competition for extraction projects and lower ex-post returns on investment (e.g., Verrec-
chia (1983); Darrough and Stoughton (1990); Wagenhofer (1990)). Consistent with these
predictions, I find that European extractive companies cut capital expenditures relative to
control firms once PGD regulation becomes effective.9 I further provide evidence that this
8For example, the correlation between extractive payment gaps and the Corruption Perceptions Index
by Transparency International (scale from 0 to 100; higher values indicate lower corruption) equals -0.156
(p-value: 0.00).
9I document a similar but somewhat weaker decline for disclosing firms’ return on assets.
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relative decline is driven by the reallocation of investments across firms from disclosing
companies to unregulated competitors. Moreover, disclosing companies reallocate some
investments within the firm as they withdraw capital in Africa and (Central) Asia but
increase their operational footprint in Latin America. However, the partial substitution
of extraction projects between continents is not sufficient to compensate for the overall
decline in investments at the consolidated group level.10
My difference-in-differences design critically depends on the assumption that the trends
in outcome variables for disclosing and non-disclosing firms would have been the same in
the absence of PGD regulation (Roberts and Whited (2012)). I assess the validity of this
parallel-trends assumption by comparing the evolution of my dependent variables across
treated and control firms during the pre-adoption period and find that the trends are
virtually identical. Moreover, my outcome variables respond sharply right after extraction
payment disclosures become effective, which alleviates the concern that other confounding
factors drive the results since remaining omitted variables would need to be correlated with
the dependent variable and the entire distribution of PGD adoption dates across European
countries and firms, which seems implausible.
Having established my main results, I next provide evidence that the increased threat
of public shaming by nonprofit activist groups is a likely channel for the observed real ef-
fects. Shaming works particularly well if end consumers purchase directly from extractive
companies (e.g. via gas stations) because customers can instantly punish firms for illegit-
imate actions by not buying their products (BBC (2010); The Telegraph (2010)). Using
hand-collected data on the main distribution channel of each extractive firm, I indeed find
that the increase in payments and decline in investments is particularly strong for com-
panies that sell their products in direct-to-consumer markets. Moreover, extractive sector
NGOs focus their campaigns on large firms because potential rewards to host countries are
highest for large scale extraction projects (The Guardian (2015); Independent (2016)) and
funding by trusts, foundations, and governments critically depends on successful investiga-
10In Sections 4.4 and 5.3, I conduct extensive sensitivity analyses and show that my results are robust to
(i) the inclusion of lagged dependent variables (to control for the possibility of mechanical mean reversion),
(ii) the exclusion of non-European firms, (iii) different definitions of my dependent variables, (iv) alternative
ways of clustering standard errors, and (v) several resource type definitions.
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tions that implicate large, well-known companies. Consistent with this campaigning focus,
I find that the real effects of extraction payment disclosures are especially pronounced
among large companies. Finally, misreporting by extractive companies and collusion with
government bureaucrats is arguably worst in corrupt environments (Shleifer and Vishny
(1993); Collier (2007)), an argument for which I find somewhat weaker empirical support.
While disclosing firms cut slightly more investments in corrupt geographic segments, I do
not find differences in payment effects across highly and less corrupt host countries.
Related Literature. I make three contributions relative to the existing literature.
First, I add to the literature on CSR reporting, which mainly examines price effects in
capital markets.11 Christensen et al. (2017) study real effects and find that the inclusion of
mine safety records in SEC filings is associated with decreases in mining-related citations,
injuries, and labor productivity. They document that the increased dissemination of safety
issues through financial reports is an important mechanism for their results.12 In contrast,
I investigate the real consequences of social responsibility reporting in a setting where CSR
disclosures are published in a separate, stand-alone report and argue that public shaming
by NGOs is a likely explanation for the observed real effects. My paper is conceptually
related to Dyreng et al. (2016), who also focus on the shaming channel and document
that large companies in the United Kingdom engage less in tax avoidance in response to
increased pressure by nonprofit activist groups to disclose their subsidiary locations in tax
havens. I add to the findings of Dyreng et al. (2016) by providing evidence that public
shaming can even impact companies’ core economic activities (e.g., investment) and lead
to sizeable capital reallocations across and within firms (Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Breuer
(2017); Choi (2017); Granja (2017)).
Second, I contribute to the economics and finance literature examining the impact of
anticorruption regulation.13 Several studies find that legislative changes which prohibit
11See, for example, Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Ghoul et al. (2011), Servaes and Tamayo (2013), Lys et al.
(2015), Friedman and Heinle (2016), Khan et al. (2016), Ioannou and Serafeim (2017), Lins et al. (2017),
and Manchiraju and Rajgopal (2017).
12Leuz and Wysocki (2016) survey the empirical accounting literature on real effects of disclosure.
Kanodia (2006) and Kanodia and Sapra (2016) provide an analytical framework to study real effects of
accounting disclosure. Jin and Leslie (2003) and Christensen et al. (2017) study real effects of public
information disclosure in non-accounting settings.
13Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Bardhan (1997); Svensson (2003) provide surveys of the corruption liter-
ature more generally.
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the bribery of foreign government officials (e.g., U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.K.
Bribery Act, OECD Antibribery Convention) reduce foreign direct investments by Western
companies in corrupt countries (Hines (1995); Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2017); Zeume
(2017)). I document similar effects in response to transparency-enhancing anticorruption
initiatives and add to the existing literature by focusing on disclosure regulation instead
of changes in legal penalties.
Third, I contribute to an emerging literature that examines the economic consequences
of mandatory extraction payment disclosures in oil, gas, and mining industries. Healy
and Serafeim (2016), Johannesen and Larsen (2016), and Hombach and Sellhorn (2017)
document negative abnormal returns for extractive firms around the announcements of
PGD regulation in the U.S. and Europe, consistent with investors expecting costly changes
in extractive issuers’ business activities.14 I contribute to this literature by examining
the ex-post real effects of extraction payment disclosures and the underlying economic
mechanism.15 My results suggest that PGD regulation weakens the competitive position
of disclosing firms, which is consistent with the ex-ante reduction in firm value. Moreover,
in supplementary tests I do not find that extraction payment disclosures are associated
with improved measures of corruption and economic development at the aggregate host
country level. Combined, these findings question recent unilateral efforts by large Western
countries to address foreign policy objectives by imposing disclosure regulation on only a
subset of companies in the global marketplace.
2 Institutional Setting
By nature of their business, extractive companies frequently venture abroad to extract
oil, gas, or minerals in foreign host countries that are well endowed with natural resources.
14Healy and Serafeim (2016) also document that oil and gas companies almost never voluntarily provided
information about payments to foreign host governments in the years leading up to mandatory PGD
regulation and that a previous industry self-regulated transparency initiative adopted by host countries is
associated with decreases in country corruption ratings.
15As an extension, I also investigate liquidity and price effects around the actual publication dates of
PGD reports for a subsample of UK extractive firms. I find that PGD disclosures are associated with
short-term decreases in information asymmetry (bid-ask spreads) up to one week after the publication of
the extraction payment report. In contrast, I do not find significant stock market reactions around the
publication dates.
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Oil, gas, and mining firms compensate host countries for the resource extraction. Once a
company has successfully acquired an extraction license in a foreign host country, an offi-
cial extraction agreement is set up between the country and the company. This contract
specifies the terms of the resource extraction process and governs the official payments that
the company makes to the host country. Extractive companies make different kinds of pay-
ments, including royalties, license fees, corporate income taxes, production entitlements,
and one-time bonuses.16
Economists and policymakers are concerned that host countries do not obtain a fair
share of extractive sector revenues, thereby limiting the extent to which natural resource
endowments stimulate economic development in these nations (Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012)). For one, host country officials frequently negotiate corrupt deals with extractive
companies (Collier (2007)). The notion is that extractive firms bribe government bu-
reaucrats to receive payment concessions in excess of the illicit kickback (Financial Times
(2012)). In this context, even tiny concessions per unit of extracted resource translate
into exceptionally high returns to bribery because of nine- or ten-digit extraction volumes
in typical oil, gas, and mining projects (Humphreys et al. (2007)). The combination of
high returns to bribery, weak institutional environments in many resource rich countries,
and frequent interactions with government officials make the extractive sector particularly
prone to corruption (EY (2014)). Indeed, the OECD (2014) estimates that 19 percent
of all foreign bribery cases occur in the oil, gas, and mining industries, which is higher
than in any other sector. For another, government bureaucrats frequently divert extrac-
tive revenues away from official government ledgers into private offshore accounts even
if extractive companies make appropriate market-based payments. Moreover, extractive
companies employ aggressive payment avoidance strategies by underreporting extractive
revenues or overreporting project costs (Global Witness (2017)).
In response to these concerns, the European Parliament and EU Council passed new
Accounting and Transparency Directives (Directives 2013/34/EU and 2013/50/EU), which
16Global Witness (2017) provides a detailed description of each payment type including examples.
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require companies in the oil, gas, and mining industries to publicly disclose their payments
to foreign host governments in a granular report on their corporate website. Extractive
firms also upload the report to the electronic filing platform of their national securities
regulator. These disclosure requirements apply to all listed and large, unlisted extrac-
tive companies in the European Union, Norway, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. The
regulatory objective of these disclosures is to reduce corruption and stimulate economic
development in foreign host countries (European Commission (2013)). The idea is that
PGD reports allow a wide range of interested parties (e.g., NGOs, civil society) to better
monitor extractive activities, identify payments that are “too low” (red flags), and exert
public pressure on companies. Once watchdogs expose extractive revenue losses, public
shaming can discipline firms not to engage in illicit practices and make higher payments
to host countries because of fears that societal pressure could result in a backlash against
the firm from customers and investors.
Extractive firms are required to prepare extraction payment disclosures on an annual
basis. The reports are almost always published separately from the annual filings on a
different date, typically within 6 to 11 months of the firm’s fiscal year end. In the report,
extractive payments are broken down in detail by (i) the receiving government institution,
(ii) extractive project, and (iii) payment type. Audit firms review extraction payment
disclosures every year. In 2018, the EU decides whether or not PGD reports will become
part of the regular financial statement audit.
Extraction payment reports differ from previously available payment disclosures in two
ways. First, information about firm-level extractive payments was dispersed across several
reports by different host countries prior to PGD regulation. Specifically, nations that par-
ticipate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”) publish payments
by companies that extract natural resources in the given host country on a firm-year basis.
In contrast, PGD reports are a one stop information source on extractive payments by
a particular company across all host countries the firm operates in. Prior to mandatory
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extraction payment disclosures, firms did not voluntarily provide payment information,
neither in their annual filings nor in separate stand-alone reports (Healy and Serafeim
(2016)). Second, the payment information contained in PGD reports is much more disag-
gregated compared to previous payment disclosures. Unlike before, firm-level payments to
governments are not only partitioned by the receiving host country institution, but also
by extractive project and payment type. This additional layer of disaggregation is crucial
for the monitoring of extractive firms and host governments as it allows interested parties
to identify extractive revenue losses.
Policymakers enacted PGD regulation in the form of two European directives in June
2013. Member countries must transpose any European directive into national law within a
relatively short, predetermined time window of 2-3 years, which results in country-specific
effective dates. However, the regulatory act itself is held constant across jurisdictions.
Within a given member country, the adoption of PGD regulation across extractive compa-
nies depends on firms’ fiscal year ends.
3 Data
3.1 Effective Dates of Extraction Payment Disclosures
I obtain the adoption dates of the staggered roll-out of PGD regulation across Europe
from the European Commission. For each member country, I cross-validate the implemen-
tation dates with official notifications in federal law gazettes. These notifications specify
the entry-into-force dates at which the disclosure directives were transposed into national
law and indicate the first fiscal year in which PGD laws became effective for extractive
companies that are listed or registered in the particular country. Table 1 summarizes the
implementation of PGD regulation across Europe. Extraction payment disclosures first be-
came effective in Norway for fiscal years starting on or after January 1, 2014. The United
Kingdom and Romania followed in 2015. In all remaining countries, extraction payment
12
disclosures became mandatory for fiscal years starting on or after January 1, 2016, resulting
in an adoption window of three years.17 Within each country, there is significant variation
in the adoption of PGD regulation across extractive firms due to varying fiscal year end
dates. For each company in my sample, I verify whether the firm actually prepared a PGD
report and manually collect data on the time period it covers.
3.2 Extractive Payments and Payment Reconciliation Data
I obtain micro-level data on extraction payments in foreign host countries from the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (hereafter, “EITI”). The EITI is an NGO
based in Oslo, Norway, which promotes the open and accountable management of extractive
resources through a global standard that host countries can implement. Countries adopt
the EITI standard because of better access to international aid and cheaper funding by
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other financial institutions. Once
a nation implements the EITI standard, it has to annually deliver an EITI Report, which
describes the country’s natural resource value chain in detail. This report includes a
reconciliation of extractive payments on a firm-year-host country basis, which covers data
on (i) payments made by extractive firms and (ii) payments received by the government.
The reconciliation is typically reviewed by a big 4 accounting firm, which independently
gathers the required payment data from the extractive firms on the one hand and the
receiving host government institution on the other hand. The reconciliation covers all
extractive companies that are active in a particular host country. If firms refuse to deliver
the required data, host countries are required to impose fines on non-complying firms, which
include both monetary and reputational penalties. For example, non-complying firms in
Liberia are “shamed” by publicly displaying their names and logos on the main streets of
17At first sight, the variation in effective dates across Europe might seem limited given that all countries
implemented PGD regulation in 2016, except for Norway, the United Kingdom, and Romania. However,
there is significantly more variation once one focuses on the importance of each country for the European
extractive sector as a whole. In particular, roughly 60% of all European extractive firms are registered
or listed in the United Kingdom. Norway is the country with the second highest number of oil, gas,
and mining firms (10%). The remaining 30% of extractive firms are evenly spread out across the other
European countries.
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Monrovia, the country’s capital city. As a result, reporting compliance by extractive firms
is high, typically above 90%.
I manually collect payment-level data from EITI reconciliation reports for 13 African,
Asian, European, and Latin American host countries between 2010 and 2015.18 Each
of the 13 host countries in my sample covers data from extractive companies that are
headquartered in Europe, the U.S., Australia, South Africa, China, or other countries.
Adoption of the EITI standard by host countries is voluntary. As a result, corrupt
and poorly governed countries might not implement the standard. I assess this potential
sample selection issue by comparing the average Transparency International corruption
rating of the 13 countries in my sample with its global average (covering 187 countries)
and find that they are almost identical and not statistically significant from each other.
Nevertheless, the sample could still be selected based on other, potentially unobservable
host country characteristics. However, to the extent that the EITI does not cover the most
poorly governed countries in which the real effects of extraction payment disclosures are
arguably most pronounced, my inferences are conservative as the sample selection biases
my estimates towards zero.
3.3 Firm Fundamentals and Host Country Characteristics
I collect financial statement data for listed extractive firms between 2010 and 2017 from
Compustat Global, Compustat North America, and Worldscope Geographic Segments. I
restrict my analysis to firms with a 2-digit NAICS code of 21 (“Mining, Quarrying, and
Oil and Gas Extraction”) or a 3-digit NAICS code of 324 (“Petroleum and Coal Products
Manufacturing”). Finally, I obtain country-level data on corruption, resource output,
governance quality, economic growth, and inflation from Transparency International, the
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, respectively.
I truncate all continuous and unbounded variables at the 1st and 99th percentile to
18Specifically, I obtain micro-level payment data for Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Liberia, Mauri-
tania, Myanmar, Norway, Seychelles, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, and Zambia.
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mitigate the impact of extreme values due to data errors. Tables 2, IA4, and IA5 provide
descriptive statistics for my regression variables. In Appendix A1, I define all variables I
use in my empirical analysis and indicate their respective data source.
4 Effects on Extractive Payments and Payment Gaps
4.1 Conceptual Underpinnings
I begin my empirical analysis by investigating the relation between PGD regulation and
the amount of extractive payments that oil, gas, and mining firms make to foreign host
governments.
Policymakers emphasize that extraction payment disclosures facilitate monitoring. The
payment information contained in extraction payment disclosures is substantially more
disaggregated compared to previously available payment records: Firm-level payments to
governments are not only partitioned by the receiving host country institution, but also by
extractive project and payment type. This additional layer of disaggregation is crucial for
NGOs in monitoring extractive firms and host governments. Previously available informa-
tion, for example about project-specific extraction quantities and royalty or tax rates, only
allowed NGOs to determine the payments that firms should make to host governments
(Global Witness (2017)). The missing piece of information was how much companies ac-
tually pay to host countries on a project and payment-type level. This information is now
publicly available in extraction payment disclosures. As a result, PGD reports empower
NGOs to identify payment discrepancies (“red flags”) and exert public pressure on ex-
tractive firms and corrupt host governments by contacting journalists to encourage media
coverage, sending letters to the company and the relevant government institution, asking
politicians to raise the issue in parliament, or lobbying anti-corruption agencies to inves-
tigate (Dyck et al. (2008)). Once NGOs expose extractive revenue losses, public pressure
can discipline firms and governments not to engage in aggressive payment avoidance or
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corrupt practices, resulting in higher extractive payments for the host country.
Embezzlement of extractive payments by host country bureaucrats is an important type
of corruption in natural resource extraction. Specifically, the notion is that government
officials who oversee resource revenues pocket a certain amount of the payments made by
extractive firms (payment gap). As a result, host countries only receive a fraction of the
payments that were initially sent off by oil, gas, and mining firms. PGD reports provide
better information to track the trail of money from paying firms to receiving host gov-
ernment institutions. For instance, the detailed payment disaggregation by project and
payment type now enables NGOs to cross-verify the government receipt of high risk one-
time payments such as signature or production bonuses and thereby prevent the diversion
of extractive revenues away from government ledgers into private offshore accounts of the
bureaucrats in charge (Global Witness (2017)). The increased detection probability of em-
bezzlement by the politician may result in smaller payment gaps, irrespective of whether
the politician substitutes this reduction in private benefits with a different type of corrup-
tion that is not visible or detectable via PGD reports. However, if governance structures
in foreign host countries are weak (for example in oppressive authoritarian regimes), the
additional information contained in extraction payment reports may not help NGOs to
hold government officials accountable.
4.2 Empirical Model and Identification Strategy
I use a Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimator to identify the effects of PGD on pay-
ment amounts and payment gaps in foreign host countries. The DD research design com-
pares changes in my outcome variables before and after the adoption of PGD regulation
across disclosing and not (yet) disclosing firms that extract the same type of natural re-
source in the same host country in the same year across all host countries. Figure 1
provides a graphical illustration of my identification strategy. Specifically, I examine the
impact of disaggregated information provided by PGD disclosures on the coarser extractive
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payments recorded in EITI reports that are available both before and after the European
Commission introduced PGD regulation. I estimate the following OLS regression model:
yi,hc,t = αhc,t + αi(,hc) + αr,t + β · PGDi,t + γ′ · Xi,t + i,hc,t . (1)
The dependent variable yi,hc,t is either the extractive payment made by firm i to host
country hc in year t divided by the firm’s lagged total assets or the gap between payments
made and payments received by the government, normalized by the former. PGDi,t is an
indicator variable equal to one beginning in the year in which the disclosure regulation
becomes effective for the respective European oil, gas, or mining firm. Given the staggered
implementation of PGD regulation across Europe, different European extractive firms get
treated at different points in time. Non-European companies headquartered in the U.S.,
Australia, South Africa, China, and other countries do not get treated and serve as an
unaffected control group.19
Xi,t is a vector of control variables at the parent company level, which includes firm size,
the fraction of tangible assets, return on assets, leverage, and Tobin’s Q. The staggered
adoption of PGD regulation allows me to use (high-dimensional) time fixed effects, which
alleviates concerns that my results are driven by concurrent but unrelated market-wide
events, such as macroeconomic shocks. Specifically, I include country-by-year fixed effects
αhc,t to control for time-varying host country characteristics (e.g., GDP growth) that could
differentially affect my outcome variables across treated and control firms, thereby biasing
my inferences. αr,t conditions the DD design on time-varying trends that are common
to each type of natural resource, such as changes in commodity prices. I assign firms to
resource types based on their three-digit NAICS industry subsector classification.20 My
classification approach results in resource types such as “Oil and Gas Extraction” (three-
19I exclude Canadian firms from my control group since Canada introduced extraction payment disclo-
sures in 2017.
20Compustat (Global) specifies the NAICS code for companies headquartered both in and outside of
North America.
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digit NAICS code 211) or “Mining” (212). In Sections 4.4 and 5.3, I find that my results
remain robust when I use a finer resource type definition based on the six-digit NAICS
code, which specifies the main natural resource extracted for each firm in my sample (e.g.,
212221: “Gold Ore Mining”). Moreover, I add parent or subsidiary fixed effects αi(,hc)
to control for time-invariant firm characteristics (in each host country). As extractive
payments by the same firm might be correlated across host countries, I adjust standard
errors for within group clusters at the level of the parent company’s headquarter country
(Bertrand et al. (2004); Petersen (2009)).
4.3 Baseline Results
Table 3 reports the results of regression model (1) for extractive payments. In column
(1), I do not control for financial characteristics of the parent company. I find that PGD is
strongly positively associated with the amount of extractive payments (coefficient: 0.026;
t-statistic: 2.59). Disclosing companies may make higher payments to host governments
compared to non-disclosing firms because they operate larger extraction projects (e.g.,
higher royalties and license fees), have better investment opportunities, or are less finan-
cially constrained at the time when PGD regulation becomes effective. To alleviate the
concern that my results are spuriously driven by these variables, I control for the parent
company’s size, fraction of tangible assets, return on assets, leverage, and Tobin’s Q.21 In
column (2), I find that the coefficient of PGD remains stable and is not attenuated (co-
efficient: 0.027; t-statistic: 2.34).22 A second concern is that imbalances in the empirical
distributions of covariates between treated and control firms bias my statistical inferences
and introduce model dependence (Ho et al. (2007)). Indeed, in Panel A of Table IA3, I
21Due to a lack of data, I cannot control for time-varying project characteristics such as the current
stage of the project lifecycle or the yearly extraction volume. The subsidiary fixed effect only conditions
on time-invariant project features such as the (average) size of the extraction project. As a result, the
magnitude of my estimates needs to be interpreted carefully.
22The negative and statistically significant OLS estimate of Return on Assets may seem counterintuitive
as it suggests that more profitable extractive companies make smaller payments to host governments. As
this estimate is not causally identified, one plausible explanation for the negative association may be that
firms which engage in payment avoidance need to make fewer transfers to host governments and thus have
a higher return on assets (reverse causality).
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document that disclosing extractive firms are substantially larger and more profitable than
non-disclosing companies (multivariate L1 distance of 0.822). To improve the estimation
of my treatment effects, I coarsen exact match control to disclosing firms based on their
size and return on assets in 2013 before the first European country implemented extraction
payment disclosures.23 Panel A of Table IA3 shows that the matching reduces the multi-
variate covariate imbalance from 0.822 to 0.245. I find that in the coarsened exact matched
sample, the estimate of PGD remains statistically significant at the 95th confidence level
but becomes smaller (columns (3) and (4) of Table 3). The coefficient magnitude of 0.01
(t-statistic: 2.22) implies that extractive companies increase their transfers to foreign host
governments by 0.086 standard deviations (0.01 / 0.116) or £83.86 million once they start
disclosing payments in PGD reports. My results are in line with the notion that disclosing
firms engage less in payment avoidance and corrupt business practices since (they antic-
ipate that) interested parties such as NGOs use the newly available information in PGD
reports to identify extractive revenue losses and exert public pressure on them in response.
One key identifying assumption of my staggered DD design is that payment trends
across disclosing and non-disclosing firms would have been the same in the absence of
PGD regulation (Roberts and Whited (2012)). In Figure 2, I plot the treatment effects in
event time to assess this parallel trends assumption. I find that the coefficients of PGD are
close to zero and statistically insignificant in the time periods leading up to the disclosure
regulation, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied. Moreover, extractive
payments increase sharply once PGD regulation becomes effective. Given these treatment
dynamics, remaining threats to identification would need to come from omitted variables
that are correlated with the entire distribution of PGD effective dates across Europe and
concurrent changes in extractive payments. Although this is not impossible, it does not
seem to be very likely.
In Table 4, I investigate the impact of PGD regulation on extractive revenue embez-
23I restrict the coarsened exact matching to the parent’s size and return on assets because (i) these
variables are least balanced and (ii) my sample becomes too small if I add more covariates (below 100
observations).
19
zlement. Both in the full and the coarsened exact matched sample, I find that extraction
payment disclosures are not significantly associated with relative payment gaps. The re-
sults suggest that PGD reports are not effective in preventing the diversion of extractive
revenues from official government ledgers into private offshore accounts of the bureaucrats
in charge. NGOs might successfully use extraction payment disclosures to discipline firms
by shaming them in their home countries. However, it is arguably much more difficult for
Western watchdogs to prevent foreign government officials from misappropriating resource
revenues in autocratic and corrupt host countries or to force extractive firms to pass the
pressure on to foreign government bureaucrats.
4.4 Robustness
In Table 5, I present several robustness tests for the main results reported in Tables
3 and 4. First, I consider alternative ways to cluster my standard errors. In the baseline
specifications, I choose to make conservative inferences and use clusters at the level of the
parent company’s headquarter country (t-statistics: 2.34 in full sample and 2.43 in CEM
sample). To alleviate the concern that the small number of clusters (around 25) leads
to an overrejection of the null hypothesis (Bertrand et al. (2004); Cameron and Miller
(2015); Imbens and Kolesa`r (2016)), I cluster standard errors by 97 parent companies
and find that my results are robust (t-statistics: 1.85 and 2.22). Extractive payments are
likely autocorrelated within firms since projects are long lived and extraction volumes only
change gradually over the project lifecycle. Moreover, unilateral foreign policy measures
promoting investment and resource extraction in particular host countries over several years
might also result in serially correlated payments. To account for this autocorrelation, I
cluster standard errors by 76 home-host country pairs and find that my inferences remain
unchanged (t-statistics: 2.22 and 2.44).
Under the second heading of Table 5, I use alternative definitions for my dependent
variables. One concern is that the normalization of extractive payments by lagged parent
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assets may give rise to a spurious positive association with PGD regulation if firms start
new projects around the introduction of extraction payment disclosures because payments
increase more quickly than total assets percentage-wise. I address this concern by estimat-
ing a log-linear model of the amount of extractive payments. The magnitude of the PGD
effect becomes larger, in part because the log specification picks up the skewed distribution
of extractive payments more easily than the normalized payment variable. Overall, the re-
sults and inferences are similar to those in the main analysis. In Table 4, I use the relative
payment gap as my dependent variable conditional on the gap being weakly greater than
zero. One could argue that this definition of a payment gap is too narrow since extractive
firms occasionally report lower payments than receiving host governments to downplay the
collaboration with certain countries. In the bottom part of Table 5, I show that my (null)
results are robust to a broader payment gap definition that is based on a dummy variable
which equals one if firms report higher payments than host governments.
Third, I use a finer industry classification to assign extractive companies to resource
types. One potential concern with my baseline empirical model is that the classification
based on firms’ three-digit NAICS code is relatively coarse and that my resource type-by-
time fixed effect does not properly absorb all confounding variation in extractive payments
and corporate investment resulting from price changes in individual commodities. I allevi-
ate this concern by using a finer resource type definition based on firms’ six-digit NAICS
code, which specifies the main natural resource for each parent company in my sample
(e.g., 212221: “Gold Ore Mining”). The results mirror those of Table 3 and 4.
4.5 The Shaming Channel
The increase in payments following PGD regulation is consistent with the argument that
extraction payment disclosures allow interested parties, particularly NGOs, to publicly ex-
pose revenue red flags and thereby discipline extractive companies to make higher transfers
to host governments. Specifically, the notion is that management is willing to make higher
21
payments because of fears that public pressure could result in a backlash against the firm
from customers and investors. In Table 6, I perform several cross-sectional tests to validate
this shaming mechanism.
Shaming works particularly well if end consumers purchase directly from extractive
companies (e.g. via gas stations) because they can instantly punish firms for illegitimate
actions by not buying their products.24 In contrast, it is more difficult for consumers to
exert pressure if end products only contain certain extractive components that firms sell
via wholesale distribution channels because consumers cannot easily distinguish socially
responsible from burdened goods. To formally assess this argument, I hand collect data
on the main distribution channel of each extractive firm from annual filings. In column
(1), I document that the increase in extractive payments is economically more pronounced
among companies that sell their products in direct-to-consumer markets (coefficient: 0.032;
t-statistic: 2.20) than for firms that distribute via wholesale channels (coefficient: 0.023;
t-statistic: 2.00).
Extractive sector NGOs such as Global Witness focus their campaigns on large firms
because potential investigation rewards to host countries are highest for large scale extrac-
tion projects (The Guardian (2015); Independent (2016)). Moreover, NGOs are commonly
resource constrained and continued funding by trusts, foundations, and governments crit-
ically depends on successful investigations that generate media attention and implicate
large, well-known companies. In contrast, the cost of an investigative campaign is rela-
tively fixed (e.g., salary of campaigner). Consistent with the campaigning focus on large
firms, I document that the increase in payments is particularly strong for large extractive
companies (coefficient: 0.030; t-statistic: 2.11).
The coefficient differences in these cross-sectional size and product market tests are
economically large. However, I aknowledge that they are not statistically significant (p-
values of F-tests > 0.10) and readers should therefore interpret these results with caution.
24For example, BP faced substantial declines in gasoline sales following consumer boycotts orchestrated
by NGOs in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (BBC (2010); The
Telegraph (2010)).
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Misreporting by extractive companies and collusion with government bureaucrats is
arguably worst in corrupt host countries (Shleifer and Vishny (1993)). If NGOs focus on
monitoring extractive activities in corrupt environments, payments should increase more
drastically in corrupt nations. However, in column (3) of Table 6, I do not find econom-
ically or statistically significant differences in payment increases between highly and less
corrupt host countries. One explanation for this null result is that the intensity of NGO
monitoring and, more generally, the enforcement environment in firms’ home countries is
more important for disciplining extractive companies than local conditions abroad. I will
investigate and explicitly test for this channel in a future version of my paper.
Analogous to the results in Tables 4 and 5, I do not find that extractive payment gaps
are significantly associated with any of the interaction terms in columns (4) to (6).
5 PGD Regulation and Corporate Investment
5.1 Predictions, Empirical Strategy, and Main Results
In this section, I investigate the effects of PGD regulation on corporate investment.
Since PGD reports allow interested parties to identify extractive revenue losses and ex-
ert public pressure, disclosing firms engage less in payment avoidance and make higher
transfers to foreign host governments. As a result, the net present value of resource ex-
traction projects decreases and disclosing companies may invest less. Moreover, extraction
payment disclosures might impose substantial proprietary costs on disclosing firms since
non-disclosing competitors may use the detailed payment reports to learn about profitable
extraction projects and opportunities. Because of the increased competition for extraction
projects and lower ex-post returns on investment, disclosing companies may cut investment
ex-ante (Verrecchia (1983); Wagenhofer (1990); Aghion and Howitt (1992)).
I adapt my empirical model to study the effects of extraction payment disclosures
on quarterly parent-level investments and estimate the following between country DD
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specification based on the staggered adoption of PGD regulation across Europe:
yi,t = αi + αj,t + β · PGDi,t + γ′ · Xi,t + γ′ · Xc,t + i,t . (2)
The dependent variable yi,t is the quarterly capital expenditure by extractive company i
in quarter t, divided by lagged total assets. PGDi,t is an indicator variable equal to one
beginning in the quarter in which extraction payment disclosures become effective for the
particular European oil, gas, or mining firm. I use non-disclosing extractive firms from the
U.S., Australia, South Africa, India, and China as a control group.
Xi,t is a vector of balance sheet characteristics, which includes firm size, asset turnover,
the fraction of tangible assets, return on assets, leverage, Tobin’s Q, and the fraction
of liquid assets (cash). Xc,t controls for country-specific macroeconomic conditions and
includes the growth rate and lagged level of real GDP, industrial production, and the
producer price index. I condition my investment analysis on invariant firm and home
country characteristics αi/c and include resource type-by-quarter fixed effects αj,t. I cluster
standard errors at the firm instead of the country level since the small number of country
clusters (below 20) would otherwise inflate statistical significance (e.g., Cameron and Miller
(2015)).
In column (1) of Table 7, I document that the association between extraction pay-
ment disclosures and corporate investment is negative but not statistically significant (t-
statistic: -1.11). To alleviate concerns that this insignificance is the result of bias due
to imbalances in the empirical distributions of covariates between disclosing and control
firms (Ho et al. (2007)), I again coarsen exact match my sample based on firms’ balance
sheet characteristics at the end of 2013. Panel B of Table IA3 reports that this approach
significantly improves the match between treatment and control groups as the multivari-
ate covariate imbalance decreases from 0.891 to 0.460. In the coarsened exact matched
sample in column (2), I find that the negative estimate of PGD becomes highly statis-
tically significant (t-statistic: -2.94). One plausible explanation for the poor match and
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null result in the full sample is that disclosing firms are larger and fundamentally different
from small, non-disclosing extractive firms. Indeed, in column (3), I find that large disclos-
ing firms invest significantly less than their large, non-disclosing counterparts (coefficient:
-0.007; t-statistic: -2.68). In contrast, there is no significant difference in investments be-
tween smaller disclosing companies and their non-disclosing benchmark group (coefficient:
-0.002; t-statistic: -0.43), which includes a substantial fraction of very small businesses.
Once I coarsen exact match the sample in column (4) and thereby remove these small, non-
comparable firms, the coefficient of PGD * Mid/Small also becomes significant (coefficient:
-0.040; t-statistic: -2.42). Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that (large) extractive
companies invest less relative to unregulated competitors once PGD regulation becomes
effective.
Mean reversion in corporate investment is an alternative explanation for the observed
empirical pattern and a potential threat to identification. Specifically, extractive firms
might heavily invest in foreign host countries using illicit business practices. Given a fixed
detection probability, a number of scandals will come to light. As a response, national
policymakers might decide to accelerate the implementation of PGD regulation and at the
same time investment naturally reverts back to the mean. In this case, extraction payment
disclosures would not causally impact investment but rather be associated with it through
firms’ past investment activities. I examine this possibility in column (5) by controlling for
lagged values of corporate investment (lags 1 to 5) and find that my results are virtually
unchanged.
More generally, one concern with identifying the causal effects of extraction payment
disclosures based on variation in implementation dates across European countries is that
these dates are not exogenous and that omitted country-level factors which impact invest-
ment could also drive legislators’ transposition timing (Christensen et al. (2017); Mulherin
(2007)). I address this endogeneity concern by drawing on the fact that within each Eu-
ropean country, the adoption of PGD regulation across extractive companies depends on
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firms’ fiscal year end dates since payment reports have to be published within 6 to 11
months of the last financial year. Specifically, I estimate the following within country-year
specification, which exploits variation across plausibly-exogenous fiscal year end dates:
yi,t = αi + αj,t + αc,t + β · PGDi,t + γ′ · Xi,t + i,t . (3)
The key difference between specifications (2) and (3) is that I replace my macroeconomic
controls with country-by-quarter fixed effects αc,t, which condition the analysis on time-
varying, country specific factors that could influence when national legislators decide to
transpose PGD regulation.
In Table 8, I report the estimates of my within country-year analysis. I document that
my findings are almost identical and slightly stronger than the main results (e.g., coefficient
in column (4): -0.044; t-statistic: -3.13), suggesting that my baseline inferences are not
spuriously driven by omitted country-level factors.
The key identifying assumption for consistency of my DD estimator is that the average
change in corporate investment would have been the same for both the treatment and
control groups in the absence of PGD regulation (Roberts and Whited (2012)). While
there is no formal test to examine the counterfactual treatment effect, I can assess the
validity of this parallel trends assumption. I visualize the estimated treatment effects over
my entire sample period by including separate indicators for each quarter before and after
extraction payment disclosures become effective, except for quarter t-1 which I use as a
benchmark period (Christensen et al. (2017)). In Figure 3, I find that the treatment effects
of my within country-year estimator are economically and statistically indistinguishable
from zero during the pre-disclosure period, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption
is satisfied. Consistent with the results in Table 8, corporate investment drops sharply
for large extractive firms in t=0 when extraction payment disclosures become effective,
which alleviates the concern that other confounding factors might influence investments
and thereby threaten the internal validity of my analysis. The decrease in investments is
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statistically significant until the end of the sample period. In contrast, small and medium-
sized companies do not seem to alter their investment behavior around the onset of the
treatment.25
In Figure 4, I plot the average residualized capital expenditures from model (3) for
large disclosing firms and non-disclosing competitors over time to investigate whether the
relative investment decrease is driven by capital reallocations across firms or mere declines
in extractive activities by European oil, gas, and mining companies.26 In order to com-
pare average capital expenditures within the same calendar quarter across treatment and
control groups, I focus on investment changes around the year 2015 since the majority
of European extractive firms became subject to PGD regulation at the beginning of that
year.27 Figure 4 shows that treated firms invest more than their non-disclosing competitors
in the years leading up to the disclosure regulation. The similar evolution of average in-
vestments in the pre-disclosure period again indicates that the parallel trends assumption
is satisfied. However, the investment patterns of both groups reverse as soon as extraction
payment disclosures become effective. While disclosing firms reduce their capital expendi-
tures, non-disclosing competitors increase their investment activities. Taken together, this
evidence suggests that extraction payment disclosures reallocate investments across firms
from disclosing companies to unregulated competitors.
5.2 Investment Profitability
Next, I investigate the impact of extraction payment disclosures on firms’ return on
assets (“ROA”). PGD regulation disciplines disclosing companies to make higher payments
to foreign host countries. As a result, firms retain a lower share of the project’s net
cash flows and the ROA should decline correspondingly. Before PGD regulation became
25In unreported results, I find equivalent treatment dynamics for the between country specification
(model (2)).
26For ease of exposition, I also normalize average investments by subtracting the mean and dividing by
the standard deviation of each group.
27My results are virtually identical if I compare investments in event time and use weighted averages
to construct synthetic control groups for each quarter.
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effective, extractive firms frequently bribed foreign host country bureaucrats to make them
accept the underpayment (Global Witness (2017)). Even if companies bribe less in the
PGD disclosure regime and make higher official payments to governments, net transfers
to host countries likely increased since extractive firms generally engage in corruption to
receive payment reliefs in excess of the bribe payments.
In Table 9, I examine the effect of PGD regulation on companies’ investment profitabil-
ity and reestimate my between- (Panel A) and within-country (Panel B) specifications
using the quarterly ROA as a dependent variable. Both in the full (column (1)) and the
coarsened exact matched sample (column (2)), I do not find that the ROA of disclosing ex-
tractive companies changes significantly once PGD regulation becomes effective. However,
the average treatment effect hides an interesting cross-sectional heterogeneity. Whereas
the ROA of large extractive firms drops significantly by 2 to 3 percentage points per quar-
ter (t-statistics: -2.83 in Panel A-column (3) and -3.37 in Panel B-column (3)), smaller
companies do not experience a decline in their investment profitability. These effects get
attenuated and become statistically insignificant in the coarsened exact matched sample
(column (4)), which could either be the result of a bias-free estimation or the 81% smaller
sample. In column (5), I include lagged values of the ROA and find that the results in
the full sample are not driven by mean reversion following a surge in profitable extraction
projects. Finally, I plot the treatment effects of my ROA regressions in event time (Figure
5) and document event-time dynamics which suggest that the parallel trends assumption
is valid. Overall, I find that PGD regulation is negatively associated with the investment
profitability of large extractive firms. However, since this result is sensitive to whether I
use coarsened exact matching or not, I caution that the evidence should be interpreted
carefully.
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5.3 Robustness Tests
In Table 10, I assess the sensitivity of the investment and ROA results I presented
in Tables 7 to 9. First, I consider alternative sample compositions. In my main sample,
62 of the 67 extractive companies that provide a PGD disclosure list their payments to
host governments in a stand-alone report which they publish separately from the annual
filings. The remaining five companies (Total, OMV, Galp Energia, Maurel & Prom, and
Kenmare Resources) embed extraction payment information into their annual report. I
exclude these five firms from the sample to assess whether my inferences are potentially
confounded by unrelated information contained in the annual filings of these companies
and find that my results are virtually the same. In the main analysis, I use non-European
extractive companies that are not directly affected by PGD regulation as a control group.
However, my identification strategy relies on the strong assumption that European and
non-European extractive firms have parallel investment and ROA trends in the absence of
extraction payment disclosures. To alleviate the concern that my DD estimates are biased
due to a violation of the parallel trends assumption, I replicate my analysis excluding
companies from non-European countries. The results are very similar to those reported in
Tables 7 to 9. I further examine the possibility of biased inferences resulting from limited
comparability of treatment and control groups across countries by re-estimating the within
country-year specification only for extractive firms in the United Kingdom. While the
investment effects for large extractive firms remain robust in the UK sample (coefficient:
-0.011; t-statistic: -2.20), the ROA results attenuate and become statistically insignificant
(coefficient: 0.007; t-statistic: 0.74).
Under the second heading of Table 10, I choose an alternative way to cluster my stan-
dard errors. In Tables 7 to 9, I adjust standard errors for within cluster correlation at the
firm instead of the home country level because the small number of home country clusters
(below 20) could lead to an over rejection of the null hypothesis (see, for example, Cameron
and Miller (2015)). For robustness, I do not condition the size of my within country sample
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on the existence of macroeconomic controls in the between country specifications (which
increases the sample to 15,965 observations) and cluster standard errors by 50 headquar-
ter countries. I find that my inferences remain unchanged and that my results get even
stronger as the negative, main coefficient of PGD in both the investment and ROA models
becomes statistically significant (t-statistics of -2.35 and -2.55).
Third, I use a finer resource type definition based on firms’ main natural resource
extracted (six-digit NAICS code) to address the concern that the resource type-by-quarter
fixed effect in my baseline specification (three-digit NAICS code) is too coarse to absorb
all confounding variation resulting from price changes in individual commodities. I find
that the investment results are virtually identical. However, the ROA effects attenuate
and become statistically insignificant. Overall, my main inferences are robust to a variety
of different sampling and research design choices.
5.4 Channels of the PGD-Investment Relation
In Table 11, I perform several cross-sectional tests to uncover the economic mecha-
nism(s) driving the inverse relation between extraction payment disclosures and corpo-
rate investment. First, I differentiate whether companies sell their products in direct-to-
consumer or wholesale markets. Consistent with the cross-sectional payment results in
Section 4.5, I find that the decreases in investments and ROA are concentrated among
firms that plausibly increase their extractive payments because they directly cater to end
consumers who can punish these companies for illegitimate actions by not buying their
products. Again, public shaming seems to be at the heart of these results.
Next, I examine the extent to which the investment effects of PGD regulation depend
on the actual publication of extraction payment reports. The public release of payment in-
formation is likely instrumental for the disciplining role of PGD regulation for two reasons.
For one, interested parties such as NGOs can only use extraction payment reports to iden-
tify revenue red flags and exert pressure on firms once the disclosures are out in the public
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domain. For another, disclosing firms start internalizing the proprietary costs of PGD
regulation when payment reports are published and competitors can use the disclosures to
learn about profitable extraction projects (Verrecchia (1983); Wagenhofer (1990); Aghion
and Howitt (1992)). In contrast, extractive companies may already adjust their payment
and investing behavior when PGD regulation becomes effective but before the first report
is published because firms anticipate that their (illicit) practices will show up in extraction
payment disclosures one year down the road. To assess the relative timing of my investment
effects, I add the variable PGD Published to specifications (2) and (3), which equals one
beginning in the quarter in which the firm publishes its first extraction payment report.
In Panel A of Table 11, I find that disclosing firms start cutting investments relative to
control firms once extraction payment disclosures enter into force even before these firms
release their PGD report (e.g., coefficient of PGD in column (3): -0.041; t-statistic: -5.89).
The decrease in corporate investment more than doubles after the publication of firms’
extraction payment reports (coefficient of PGD Published : -0.068; t-statistic: -3.22). In
Panel B of Table 11, I document that the relative decline in ROA starts materializing
only after the public release of the extraction payment information. Overall, the results of
my investment analyses are mainly concentrated in the post-publication period, which is
consistent with both a shaming and proprietary cost channel.
While the coefficient differences in my cross-sectional investment analyses are econom-
ically sizeable, many of them are not statistically significant. Therefore, readers should
interpret this evidence cautiously.
The results in Section 5 suggest that large disclosing firms invest less at the consolidated
group level than unregulated competitors once extraction payment disclosures become ef-
fective. In Table 12, I reestimate my main tests at the subsidiary level using Worldscope
data on extractive investments by geographic segment between 2010 and 2017.28 The
analysis at the geographic segment level allows me to examine the type of host country in
28I thank Lisa Yao Liu and Christoph Scheuch for helping me to construct this global segment-level
dataset.
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which disclosing firms cut investment. Furthermore, the tests help me assess whether dis-
closing companies partially substitute the investment decrease in one geographic segment
with increased investment activities in another segment. I estimate specification (1) using
yearly segment-level investments (normalized by lagged segment assets) as the dependent
variable.
The results of my segment analysis mirror those of the main regressions. In Table
12, I find that large extractive companies cut segment-level investments by 6.6 percentage
points (pp.) once PGD regulation becomes effective (t-statistic in column (3): -3.43). The
decrease in investments is economically slightly larger in corrupt (coefficient: -0.068; t-
statistic: -2.49) than in less corrupt host countries (coefficient: -0.064; t-statistic: -2.62).
In column (5), I document that while disclosing firms move out of Africa (-15.8 pp.) and
Asia (-8.4 pp.), they increase their operational footprint in Latin America (+4.6 pp.).
Overall, the substitution of projects between continents is not sufficient to compensate the
net decrease in investments at the parent company level.
6 Supplementary Analyses
6.1 Exogeneity of PGD Implementation Timing
My identification strategy critically depends on the assumption that the transposition
timing of PGD regulation across European countries is random and not driven by omit-
ted variables that are directly or indirectly tied to the behavior of extractive companies
(Roberts and Whited (2012)).
One way to assess the exogeneity of PGD’s implementation timing across Europe is
to investigate what determines the transposition length of the disclosure directive on a
country level. I obtain country characteristics as well as implementation details of the
Market Abuse and Transparency Directives from Christensen et al. (2016). Moreover,
I collect country-specific transposition statistics for all past European directives from the
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webpages of the European Commission. Similar to Christensen et al. (2016), I find that the
time it takes individual European countries to transpose PGD regulation into national law
is mainly determined by how fast or slow a country is at transposing directives in general
(Table IA1). First, a country’s average implementation delay across all previous directives
positively predicts PGD transposition length.29 Second, southern European countries take
on average 6 months longer to transpose PGD regulation. Third, the implementation
length of past disclosure directives such as the European Transparency Directive of 2007
is weakly, positively associated with the transposition time of PGD regulation. Finally,
the importance of a country’s extractive sector does not seem to predict the speed of
national transposition. Taken together, the results in Table IA1 suggest that countries’
implementation timing across different directives is persistent, which is in line with the
idea that country-specific effective dates of PGD regulation are plausibly exogenous.
6.2 Aggregate Effects of Extraction Payment Disclosures
One question that still remains unanswered is what are the aggregate effects of ex-
traction payment disclosures for host countries? Does improved monitoring of disclosing
firms at the micro-level translate into economic net benefits at the aggregate level or is the
effectiveness of PGD regulation limited given that it only applies to European extractive
firms? To shed light on this question, I estimate the following within host country OLS
model:
yhc,t = αhc + αt + β · PGD Intensityi,t + γ′ · Xhc,t + hc,t . (4)
My dependent variable yhc,t is either aggregate oil output, government spending, the
corruption perceptions index by Transparency International, or the World Bank’s Voice or
Regulatory Quality indicators. PGD Intensityhc,t is the fraction of a host country’s total
29A country is formally in delay if it did not manage to transpose a given directive into national law
within the pre-specified deadline of the European Union. The average implementation delay across all
European countries for which I have data equals 10.16 months.
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extractive revenues that is subject to payment disclosures. Xhc,t is a vector of control vari-
ables that includes the ratio of extractive revenues to GDP as well as the natural logarithm
of GDP. αh,c conditions my analysis on time-invariant host country characteristics and t
controls for global time trends across all countries.
The fraction of a host country’s extractive revenues that is subject to disclosure by Eu-
ropean oil, gas, and mining firms is not significantly related to the country’s oil production
(Table IA2). This result is in line with the notion that the reduced investment volume
by firms that are subject to PGD regulation is taken over by non-disclosing competitors.
Similarly, I do not find that extraction payment disclosures are significantly associated with
changes in voice, corruption, or total government spending. In contrast, regulatory quality
as measured by the World Bank is positively associated with PGD regulation, which is
likely a mechanical result. Finally, I document that extraction payment disclosures are
positively related to increased education expenditures, which is weak evidence that PGD
regulation improves government monitoring by civil society.
6.3 Capital Market Consequences
In this subsection, I investigate whether extraction payment disclosures impact market
liquidity and stock returns once they are published. To this end, I manually collect the
publication dates of PGD reports for a subsample of extractive companies that (i) prepared
a payment disclosure for 2015 and (ii) are listed on the main market of the London Stock
Exchange. Figure IA1 shows that roughly half of the reports were published during the
last two days of June, which is due to the fact that the majority of UK extractive firms
have their fiscal year end in December and that these companies need to provide their
payment disclosures within 6 months of the end of each financial period. The publication
dates of the remaining reports are evenly spread out over the year 2016. I merge this data
with stock market variables from Datastream and estimate the following OLS regression
model:
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yi,t = αi + αt + β · PGD[0,n]i,t + γ′ · Xi,t + i,t . (5)
The dependent variable is either the natural logarithm of the daily relative bid-ask spread
or the firm’s daily stock return. PGD[0,n] is an indicator variable which equals one at the
publication date of the extraction payment report and n trading days thereafter. In line
with prior literature (Chordia et al. (2000); Christensen et al. (2013)), my vector of control
variables X contains the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value, share turnover, and
return variability, lagged by one trading week. αi conditions my analysis on time-invariant
firm characteristics and the trading day fixed effect αt controls for concurrent but unrelated
market-wide events, such as macroeconomic shocks. To account for dependence across
observations, I use two-way clustered standard errors at the trading day and firm level.
In Table IA6, I document a decrease in equity bid-ask spreads up to one week following
the publication of an extraction payment report. In the full sample, the coefficients are not
statistically significant because the day fixed effects absorb most of the variation in PGD
due to the bunching of extraction payment reports at the end of June. Once I exclude
the end of June disclosures, the negative estimates do become significant. The increase in
liquidity by 11 to 18 percent is economically meaningful but not too large to be implausible.
These results suggest that in the short run PGD reports reduce asymmetric information
about extractive payment practices and political risk exposures between the firm and its
shareholders or among (informed and uninformed) market participants.30 In contrast, the
coefficient of PGD (indicator variable equal to one beginning at the publication date)
indicates that extraction payment disclosures do not persistently reduce bid-ask spreads.
Individually published, unaudited PGD reports might simply have too little scope to serve
as credible disclosure commitment and thereby reduce information asymmetries in the long
30In untabulated results, I investigate several cross-sectional determinants of this relation and find that
the decrease in information asymmetry is particularly strong for (complex) firms that are active in many
host countries and operate multiple projects per country.
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run (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991); Baiman and Verrecchia (1996); Leuz and Verrecchia
(2000)).
In Table IA7, I investigate stock price reactions around the publication dates of extrac-
tion payment disclosures. Prior literature documents negative abnormal returns for ex-
tractive firms upon the announcement of PGD regulation (Hombach and Sellhorn (2017);
Healy and Serafeim (2016); Johannesen and Larsen (2016)). In contrast, I do not find
significant changes in stock returns once these companies actually publish their payment
reports. My findings suggest that, on average, investors did not need to update their beliefs
about future expected cash flows since they already correctly anticipated the implications
of extraction payment disclosures at the announcement of the regulation.
7 Conclusion
Policymakers increasingly use disclosure regulation to mitigate illegitimate firm be-
havior and address socio-political policy objectives by requiring firms to publicly provide
information about corporate social responsibility. Despite its popularity as a policy tool,
we know little about the consequences of CSR disclosures on firms’ behavior in the real
economy. This paper examines the real effects of mandatory extraction payment disclo-
sures, which require European oil, gas, and mining firms to publicly disclose their payments
to foreign host governments in a granular report on their corporate website. I exploit plau-
sibly exogenous variation in the adoption of extraction payment reports across European
countries and firms’ fiscal year ends to disentangle the disclosure effects from concurrent
but unrelated macroeconomic and regulatory changes.
Using manually-collected host country data on firms’ extractive activities abroad, I find
that disclosing companies increase extractive payments but decrease investments relative
to tightly-matched, non-disclosing competitors from around the world. The effects are
stronger for firms that sell their products directly to end consumers and for large firms. I
further provide evidence that extraction payment disclosures have investment reallocation
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effects both within and across firms.
My results suggest that social responsibility disclosures can have sizeable real effects,
especially if public shaming by specialized activist groups disciplines companies not to
engage in illicit practices. In contrast, I do not find that extraction payment disclosures
are associated with improved measures of corruption at the aggregate host country level,
which casts doubt on recent unilateral efforts by Western countries to address foreign policy
objectives by imposing disclosure regulation on only a subset of companies in the global
marketplace.
The results of this paper should be interpreted with the following caveats in mind.
First, my focus on extraction payment disclosures in the oil, gas, and mining industries
may limit the external validity of my findings (Glaeser and Guay (2017)). While the
extractive sector setting enables better identification along the causal path, the themes
of CSR disclosures and public shaming apply more broadly to other accounting settings.
Second, the coefficient differences in my cross-sectional tests are economically sizeable but
many times not statistically significant. Therefore, readers should interpret these results
with caution. In a future version of this paper, I will extend my post-period sample and
isolate the shaming channel more comprehensively in additional cross-sectional tests that
focus on the role of media competition and firms’ actual media coverage. Third, extraction
payment disclosures may generate real effects through channels other than public sham-
ing. For example, the detailed payment information in PGD reports may help European
countries to enforce foreign bribery regulation more effectively. I leave the investigation of
additional channels to future research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: EU/EEA Implementation of Extraction Payment Disclosures
PGD Applicable For Unique N Mean Std. Dev.
Entry-Into- Fiscal Years Extractive Extractive Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
Country Force Date Starting On/After Firms Firms End Month End Month
Austria Jul 20, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 4 73 11.63 0.99
Belgium Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 2 21 12.00 0.00
Bulgaria Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Croatia Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 1 29 12.00 0.00
Cyprus n.a. n.a. 5 126 11.60 1.02
Czech Republic Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 2 46 12.00 0.00
Denmark Jul 01, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 2 37 12.00 0.00
Estonia Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Finland Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 0 0 n.a. n.a.
France Oct 29, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 14 271 11.67 1.57
Germany Jul 23, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 14 300 11.43 1.61
Greece Jul 07, 2016 n.a. 7 160 12.00 0.00
Hungary Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 2 24 12.00 0.00
Iceland Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Ireland n.a. n.a. 15 387 10.55 2.72
Italy Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 6 144 12.00 0.00
Latvia Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 1 9 12.00 0.00
Liechtenstein Aug 01, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Lithuania Jul 01, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Luxembourg Dec 18, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 3 40 11.45 2.42
Malta Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Netherlands Nov 10, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 4 106 12.00 0.00
Norway Jan 01, 2014 Jan 01, 2014 51 972 12.00 0.00
Poland Sep 23, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 11 234 12.00 0.00
Portugal May 26, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 1 28 12.00 0.00
Romania Jan 01, 2015 Jan 01, 2015 9 169 12.00 0.00
Slovakia Jul 01, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 2 49 12.00 0.00
Slovenia Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 0 0 n.a. n.a.
Spain Jan 01, 2016 Jan 01, 2016 3 49 12.00 0.00
Sweden Jul 20, 2015 Jan 01, 2016 34 781 11.92 0.54
Switzerland n.a. n.a. 7 127 11.91 0.97
United Kingdom Dec 01, 2014 Jan 01, 2015 291 6310 9.76 3.29
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for key variables of my empirical analysis. I report the number of
observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 10% quantile (p10), 25% quantile (p25), median (p50),
75% quantile (p75), and 90% quantile (p90). Panel A provides statistics for the variables used in the
payment (gap) regressions. Panel B reports summary statistics for the variables used in the investment
and RoA analyses. I define all variables in Table A1. I obtain payment data from the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI). I retrieve the implementation dates of PGD regulation across Europe from
the homepage of the European Commission. I collect firm fundamentals from Compustat and macroeco-
nomic variables from the International Monetary Fund. This sample covers oil, gas, and mining companies
during the time period 2010 to 2017.
Panel A: Variables used in Payment (Gap) Regressions
N Mean SD p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
PGD 881 0.064 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Extractive Payment (/TAt-1) 881 0.031 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.059
Extractive Payment (£mn.) 881 343.720 975.223 0.000 0.553 7.893 126.503 1065.713
Payment Gap 498 0.057 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.045 0.186
Ln(Total Assets) 881 9.225 2.760 4.911 7.392 10.015 11.506 12.190
PPE 881 0.530 0.198 0.307 0.405 0.527 0.689 0.806
Return on Assets 881 0.091 0.160 -0.066 0.060 0.114 0.170 0.225
Leverage 881 0.209 0.131 0.019 0.124 0.206 0.294 0.378
Q 881 1.426 1.457 0.636 0.814 1.031 1.423 2.307
Panel B: Variables used in Investment and RoA Regressions
N Mean SD p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
PGD 8153 0.025 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Investments 8153 0.035 0.045 0.001 0.007 0.020 0.046 0.084
Return on Assets 8153 -0.020 0.121 -0.131 -0.024 0.017 0.038 0.057
Ln(Total Assets) 8153 5.590 2.998 1.405 3.444 5.942 7.693 9.092
Asset Turnover 8153 0.103 0.118 0.000 0.034 0.071 0.126 0.229
PPE 8153 0.638 0.250 0.250 0.495 0.693 0.839 0.912
Leverage 8153 0.362 0.544 0.002 0.117 0.269 0.432 0.685
Q 8153 3.176 10.150 0.747 0.979 1.320 2.081 4.396
Cash 8153 0.113 0.166 0.004 0.016 0.054 0.132 0.290
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Table 3: Effect of PGD Regulation on Extractive Payments
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the effect of extraction payment dis-
closures on payments to foreign host governments by European oil, gas, and mining companies (model
(1)). The dependent variable Extractive Payment / Total Assetst-1 is the ratio of a firm’s payments to
a given host government in a given year divided by the parent company’s lagged total assets. The key
explanatory variable PGD is an indicator equal to one beginning in the year in which PGD regulation
becomes effective for the given extractive subsidiary. Ln(Total Assets) is defined as the natural logarithm
of the parent company’s total assets. PPE is the ratio of the parent company’s net plant, property, and
equipment to total assets. Return on Assets is defined as the parent company’s operating income before
depreciation divided by lagged total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the parent company’s long-term debt
plus debt in current liabilities to total assets. Q is defined as the sum of the parent company’s market
capitalization and book value of liabilities divided by total assets. In columns (1) and (2), I estimate the
OLS model for the full sample and in columns (3) and (4) I use the coarsened exact matched sample. All
specifications include host country-by-year, resource type-by-year (where resource types are defined using
the 3-digit NAICS code), and subsidiary fixed effects. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on
standard errors clustered at the level of the parent company’s headquarter country. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Extractive Payment / Total Assetst-1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PGD 0.026** 0.027** 0.011** 0.010**
(2.59) (2.34) (2.49) (2.43)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.002 0.015
(0.53) (1.33)
PPE 0.009 -0.024
(0.44) (-0.72)
Return on Assets -0.053*** -0.116*
(-3.01) (-1.96)
Leverage -0.043 -0.116**
(-1.10) (-2.89)
Q 0.002 0.001*
(1.06) (1.78)
Observations 855 791 386 350
Adjusted R-Squared 0.889 0.895 0.834 0.842
Host Country × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resource Type × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsidiary FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)
Cluster Level HQ Country HQ Country HQ Country HQ Country
Number of Clusters 30 27 22 18
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Table 4: Effect of PGD Regulation on Payment Gaps
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the effect of extraction payment
disclosures on payment gaps (model (1)). The dependent variable Payment Gap is the difference
between payments made by an extractive subsidiary and the corresponding payments officially
received by the host government in a given year, divided by the former. The key explanatory
variable PGD is an indicator equal to one beginning in the year in which PGD regulation becomes
effective for the given extractive subsidiary. Ln(Total Assets) is defined as the natural logarithm
of the parent company’s total assets. PPE is the ratio of the parent company’s net plant, property,
and equipment to total assets. Return on Assets is defined as the parent company’s operating
income before depreciation divided by lagged total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the parent
company’s long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to total assets. Q is defined as the sum
of the parent company’s market capitalization and book value of liabilities divided by total assets.
In columns (1) and (2), I estimate the OLS model for the full sample and in columns (3) and (4) I
use the coarsened exact matched sample. All specifications include host country-by-year, resource
type-by-year (where resource types are defined using the 3-digit NAICS code), and subsidiary
fixed effects. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the
level of the parent company’s headquarter country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Payment Gap / Extractive Payment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PGD 0.027 0.010 0.084 0.133
(1.48) (0.87) (0.76) (0.90)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.015 -0.013
(-0.80) (-0.12)
PPE 0.181* 0.745*
(1.93) (2.13)
Return on Assets 0.058 0.237
(0.82) (0.33)
Leverage 0.019 -1.072***
(0.16) (-3.37)
Q -0.004 -0.015
(-0.67) (-0.69)
Observations 434 395 169 152
Adjusted R-Squared 0.277 0.326 0.776 0.812
Host Country × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resource Type × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsidiary FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)
Cluster Level HQ Country HQ Country HQ Country HQ Country
Number of Clusters 26 23 16 14
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Table 5: Robustness - Payment (Gap) Regressions
This table summarizes the sensitivity of my payment (gap) results. I reestimate model (1) but use different definitions for my
dependent variables and cluster standard errors in several alternative ways. In the first column, I describe each robustness
test. N equals the number of observations and PGD is the OLS coefficient of my main variable of interest. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robustness Test N PGD
1. Alternative Clustering
Extractive Payments
– Table 3 (2) Baseline: Clustering by HQ country 791 0.027**
(2.34)
– Table 3 (2) Clustering by parent 791 0.027*
(1.85)
– Table 3 (2) Clustering by home-host country pair 791 0.027**
(2.22)
– Table 3 (4) Baseline CEM: Clustering by HQ country 350 0.010**
(2.43)
– Table 3 (4) CEM: Clustering by parent 350 0.010**
(2.22)
– Table 3 (4) CEM: Clustering by home-host country pair 350 0.010**
(2.44)
Payment Gaps
– Table 4 (2) Baseline: Clustering by HQ country 395 0.010
(0.87)
– Table 4 (2) Clustering by parent 395 0.010
(0.50)
– Table 4 (2) Clustering by home-host country pair 395 0.010
(0.46)
– Table 4 (4) Baseline CEM: Clustering by HQ country 152 0.133
(0.90)
– Table 4 (4) CEM: Clustering by parent 152 0.133
(0.88)
– Table 4 (4) CEM: Clustering by home-host country pair 152 0.133
(0.89)
2. Alternative Dependent Variable
Extractive Payments
– Table 3 (2): Ln(1+Extractive Payment) 793 0.702
(1.15)
– Table 3 (4) CEM: Ln(1+Extractive Payment) 350 1.553*
(2.11)
Payment Gaps
– Table 4 (1): 1Payment Gap>0 1,023 -0.038
(-0.57)
– Table 4 (2): 1Payment Gap>0 941 -0.042
(-0.63)
– Table 4 (3) CEM: 1Payment Gap>0 392 -0.083
(-0.86)
– Table 4 (4) CEM: 1Payment Gap>0 392 -0.083
(-0.46)
3. Alternative Resource Type Definition
Extractive Payments
– Table 3 (2): 6-Digit NAICS Code 759 0.031**
(2.38)
Payment Gaps
– Table 4 (2): 6-Digit NAICS Code 380 0.008
(0.58)
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Table 6: Channels of the PGD-Payment Relation
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the economic channel behind the effects of PGD
regulation on extractive payments and payment gaps (model (1)). The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3)
is the ratio of a firm’s payments to a given host government in a given year divided by the parent company’s
lagged total assets (Extractive Payment / Total Assetst-1). The outcome variable in columns (4) to (6) is the
difference between payments made by an extractive subsidiary and the corresponding payments officially received
by the host government in a given year, divided by the former (Payment Gap). The key explanatory variable
PGD is an indicator equal to one beginning in the year in which PGD regulation becomes effective for the given
extractive subsidiary. Large (Mid/Small) is an indicator variable equal to one if the parent company’s average
assets exceed (are below) their 66th percentile value. Higher (Lower) Corruption is a dummy variable equal to
one if the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of a given host country is higher (lower) than the median CPI in
the given year. Direct-to-Consumer (Wholesale) is an indicator variable equal to one if the extractive firm sells
its products directly to end consumers (in wholesale markets). All specifications include parent company controls
and host country-by-year, resource type-by-year (where resource types are defined using the 3-digit NAICS code),
as well as subsidiary fixed effects. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at
the level of the parent company’s headquarter country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Extractive Payment / Total Assetst-1 Payment Gap / Extractive Payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PGD * Direct-to-Consumer 0.032** -0.014
(2.20) (-0.98)
PGD * Wholesale 0.023* 0.033
(2.00) (1.23)
PGD * Large 0.030** -0.002
(2.11) (-0.18)
PGD * Mid/Small 0.024** 0.028
(2.32) (1.48)
PGD * Higher Corruption 0.022* -0.011
(1.73) (-0.81)
PGD * Lower Corruption 0.029 0.023
(1.48) (1.35)
Observations 791 791 791 395 395 395
Adjusted R-Squared 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.324 0.324 0.324
F-Test: ∆Coefficients (p-value) 0.400 0.309 0.793 0.182 0.136 0.105
Parent Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resource Type × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsidiary FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Cluster Level Parent Headquarter Country Parent Headquarter Country
Number of Clusters 27 27 27 23 23 23
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Table 7: Effect of PGD Regulation on Investments
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the effect of extraction payment disclosures
on parent-level investments by European oil, gas, and mining companies (model (2)). Investments is defined as
capital expenditures divided by lagged book assets. The key explanatory variable PGD is an indicator equal to
one beginning in the quarter in which PGD regulation becomes effective for the given extractive company. Large
(Mid/Small) is an indicator variable equal to one if the parent company’s average assets exceed (are below) their
66th percentile value. Ln(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Asset Turnover is defined as the
ratio of quarterly sales to total assets. PPE equals net plant, property, and equipment divided by total assets.
Return on Assets is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by lagged book assets. Leverage
equals long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Q is the sum of the firm’s market
capitalization and book value of liabilities divided by total assets. Cash is defined as the ratio of cash and
short-term investments to total assets. All specifications include resource type-by-quarter fixed effects (where
resource types are defined using the 3-digit NAICS code), firm fixed effects, (home) country fixed effects, and
macroeconomic controls. In columns (1), (3), and (5), I estimate the OLS model for the full sample and in
columns (2) and (4) I use the coarsened exact matched sample. In column (5), I control for lagged dependent
variables to assess whether my results are driven by mechanical mean reversion following the adoption of extraction
payment disclosures in response to a wave of scandalous but profitable extraction projects. T-statistics, reported
in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the level of the extractive company. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Investments / Total Assetst-1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PGD -0.004 -0.040***
(-1.11) (-2.94)
PGD * Large -0.007*** -0.040*** -0.007***
(-2.68) (-4.07) (-3.47)
PGD * Mid/Small -0.002 -0.040** -0.004
(-0.43) (-2.42) (-1.10)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.005** 0.011*** 0.005** 0.011*** -0.001
(2.38) (3.04) (2.38) (3.04) (-0.62)
Asset Turnover 0.009 -0.007 0.009 -0.007 -0.003
(0.96) (-0.31) (0.93) (-0.31) (-0.24)
PPE 0.024*** 0.003 0.025*** 0.003 0.026***
(4.14) (0.12) (4.15) (0.12) (2.72)
Return on Assets -0.022* 0.040 -0.022* 0.040 -0.013
(-1.85) (1.18) (-1.86) (1.18) (-0.73)
Leverage -0.003** 0.000 -0.003** 0.000 -0.005**
(-2.46) (0.17) (-2.46) (0.17) (-2.02)
Q 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.24) (-0.30) (1.22) (-0.29) (-0.67)
Cash 0.015* -0.024 0.015* -0.025 0.007
(1.86) (-0.89) (1.87) (-0.89) (0.67)
Observations 8,096 1,565 8,096 1,565 4,762
Adjusted R-Squared 0.425 0.605 0.425 0.604 0.511
F-Test: ∆PGD Coefficients (p-value) - - 0.201 0.958 0.450
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Dependent Variables No No No No Yes
HQ Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HQ Country × Quarter FE No No No No No
Resource Type × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full CEM Full CEM Full
Cluster Level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 583 172 583 172 449
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Table 8: PGD Regulation and Investments – Within Country-Year Estimator
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the effect of extraction payment disclosures on
parent-level investments using within country-year specifications (model (3)). Investments is defined as capital
expenditures divided by lagged book assets. The key explanatory variable PGD is an indicator equal to one
beginning in the quarter in which PGD regulation becomes effective for the given extractive company. Large
(Mid/Small) is an indicator variable equal to one if the parent company’s average assets exceed (are below) their
66th percentile value. All specifications include (home) country-by-quarter fixed effects, resource type-by-quarter
fixed effects (where resource types are defined using the 3-digit NAICS code), firm fixed effects, and financial
controls. In columns (1), (3), and (5), I estimate the OLS model for the full sample and in columns (2) and (4) I
use the coarsened exact matched sample. In column (5), I control for lagged dependent variables to assess whether
my results are driven by mechanical mean reversion following the adoption of extraction payment disclosures in
response to a wave of scandalous but profitable extraction projects. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based
on standard errors clustered at the level of the extractive company. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Investments / Total Assetst-1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PGD -0.005 -0.044***
(-1.14) (-3.13)
PGD * Large -0.010*** -0.047*** -0.011***
(-2.80) (-5.12) (-3.43)
PGD * Mid/Small -0.003 -0.043*** -0.007
(-0.59) (-2.71) (-1.54)
Observations 8,048 1,544 8,048 1,544 4,720
Adjusted R-Squared 0.418 0.618 0.418 0.618 0.506
F-Test: ∆PGD Coefficients (p-value) - - 0.100 0.721 0.370
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls No No No No No
Lagged Dependent Variables No No No No Yes
HQ Country FE No No No No No
HQ Country × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resource Type × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full CEM Full CEM Full
Cluster Level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 582 170 582 170 445
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Table 9: Effect of PGD Regulation on Return on Assets
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the effect of extraction payment disclosures on return on assets at the
parent level (models (2) and (3)). Return on Assets is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by lagged book assets.
The key explanatory variable PGD is an indicator equal to one beginning in the quarter in which PGD regulation becomes effective
for the given extractive company. Large (Mid/Small) is an indicator variable equal to one if the parent company’s average assets
exceed (are below) their 66th percentile value. All specifications include resource type-by-quarter fixed effects (where resource types
are defined using the 3-digit NAICS code), firm fixed effects, and financial controls. In Panel A, I report the coefficients of my between
country specifications to which I add country fixed effects and macroeconomic controls. In Panel B, I report the results of my within
country-year models in which I use country-by-quarter fixed effects (instead of country fixed effects and macro controls). In columns
(1), (3), and (5), I estimate the OLS model for the full sample and in columns (2) and (4) I use the coarsened exact matched sample.
In column (5), I control for lagged dependent variables to assess whether my results are driven by mechanical mean reversion following
the adoption of extraction payment disclosures in response to a wave of scandalous but profitable extraction projects. T-statistics,
reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the level of the extractive company. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Between Country Models
Return on Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PGD -0.003 0.010
(-0.40) (0.48)
PGD * Large -0.020*** -0.004 -0.013*
(-2.83) (-0.16) (-1.88)
PGD * Mid/Small 0.006 0.015 -0.002
(0.71) (0.70) (-0.22)
Observations 8,096 1,565 8,096 1,565 4,438
Adjusted R-Squared 0.629 0.694 0.629 0.694 0.620
F-Test: ∆PGD Coefficients (p-value) - - 0.004 0.372 0.153
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Dependent Variables No No No No Yes
HQ Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HQ Country × Quarter FE No No No No No
Resource Type × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full CEM Full CEM Full
Cluster Level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 583 172 583 172 430
Panel B: Within Country-Year Models
Return on Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PGD -0.005 0.014
(-0.54) (0.65)
PGD * Large -0.030*** 0.003 -0.023**
(-3.37) (0.13) (-2.45)
PGD * Mid/Small 0.004 0.016 -0.009
(0.40) (0.73) (-0.99)
Observations 8,048 1,544 8,048 1,544 4,394
Adjusted R-Squared 0.625 0.698 0.625 0.698 0.617
F-Test: ∆PGD Coefficients (p-value) - - 0.000 0.466 0.090
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls No No No No No
Lagged Dependent Variables No No No No Yes
HQ Country FE No No No No No
HQ Country × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resource Type × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full CEM Full CEM Full
Cluster Level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 582 170 582 170 425
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Table 10: Robustness - Investment and RoA Regressions
This table summarizes the sensitivity of my investment and RoA results. I reestimate models (2) and (3) but use different
sample specifications and cluster standard errors in several alternative ways. In the first column, I describe each robustness
test. N is the number of observations and PGD, PGD*Large, and PGD*Mid/Small are the OLS coefficients of my main
variables of interest. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
Between Country-Year (Tables 7 and 9A) Within Country-Year (Tables 8 and 9B)
PGD PGD*Large PGD*Mid/Small PGD PGD*Large PGD*Mid/Small
1. Alternative Sample Specifications
Investments
– PGD report separate from annual filings -0.003 -0.007** -0.001 -0.005 -0.010*** -0.003
ii(N = 8,048) (-0.84) (-2.52) (-0.21) (-1.08) (-2.74) (-0.53)
– Excluding non-European countries -0.005 -0.010*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.010** -0.002
ii(N = 1,420) (-1.54) (-3.13) (-0.67) (-1.07) (-2.37) (-0.51)
– Including only the United Kingdom -0.004 -0.011** -0.002
ii(N = 1,093) (-1.00) (-2.20) (-0.48)
Return on Assets
– PGD report separate from annual filings -0.001 -0.018** 0.007 -0.005 -0.029*** 0.004
ii(N = 8,048) (-0.18) (-2.54) (0.76) (-0.49) (-3.14) (0.36)
– Excluding non-European countries -0.009 -0.012* -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 -0.004
ii(N = 1,420) (-1.50) (-1.76) (-1.10) (-0.86) (-1.47) (-0.58)
– Including only the United Kingdom -0.004 0.007 -0.007
ii(N = 1,019) (-0.59) (0.74) (-0.91)
2. Alternative Clustering
Clustering at HQ Country (all/50 countries)
– Investments -0.004** -0.006* -0.002***
ii(N = 15,965) (-2.35) (-1.74) (-3.29)
– Return on Assets -0.007** -0.020*** 0.002
ii(N = 15,965) (-2.55) (-3.42) (0.39)
3. Alternative Resource Type Definition
6-Digit NAICS Code
– Investments -0.007* -0.008** -0.006 -0.011** -0.013*** -0.009
ii(N = 7,724) (-1.84) (-3.18) (-1.24) (-2.20) (-3.18) (-1.59)
– Return on Assets -0.002 -0.014 0.004 -0.003 -0.019 0.004
ii(N = 7,724) (-0.28) (-1.26) (0.46) (-0.26) (-1.28) (0.34)
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Table 11: Channels of the PGD-Investment Relation
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the channels behind the effects of PGD regulation on investments
and return on assets (models (2) and (3)). The dependent variable in Panel A is the firm’s quarterly capital expenditures divided
by lagged book assets (Investments). The outcome variable in Panel B is the firm’s operating income before depreciation divided
by lagged book assets (Return on Assets). The key explanatory variable PGD is an indicator equal to one beginning in the quarter
in which PGD regulation becomes effective for the given extractive company. Direct-to-Consumer (Wholesale) is a dummy variable
equal to one if the extractive firm sells its products directly to end consumers (in wholesale markets). PGD Published is an indicator
equal to one beginning in the quarter in which the firm publishes its first extraction payment report. All specifications include
resource type-by-quarter fixed effects (where resource types are defined using the 3-digit NAICS code), firm fixed effects, and financial
controls. The between country specifications additionally include country fixed effects and macroeconomic controls. In the within
country-year models, I use country-by-quarter fixed effects (instead of country fixed effects and macro controls). T-statistics, reported
in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the level of the extractive company. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Investments / Total Assetst-1
Between Country Within Country-Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PGD * Direct-to-Consumer -0.007** -0.010***
(-2.34) (-2.73)
PGD * Wholesale -0.003 -0.004
(-0.84) (-0.95)
PGD Published -0.007** -0.068*** -0.009** -0.085***
(-2.35) (-3.22) (-2.04) (-4.42)
PGD -0.004 -0.041*** -0.005 -0.038***
(-1.17) (-5.89) (-1.10) (-4.70)
Observations 8,096 8,036 1,542 8,048 7,997 1,517
Adjusted R-Squared 0.425 0.424 0.614 0.418 0.418 0.629
F-Test: ∆PGD Coefficients (p-value) 0.341 0.521 0.177 0.156 0.490 0.010
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
HQ Country FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
HQ Country × Quarter FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Resource Type × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full CEM Full Full CEM
Cluster Level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 583 578 170 582 577 168
Panel B: Return on Assets
Between Country Within Country-Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PGD * Direct-to-Consumer -0.032*** -0.043***
(-3.69) (-3.75)
PGD * Wholesale 0.002 -0.001
(0.24) (-0.11)
PGD Published 0.005 -0.039** 0.006 -0.050**
(0.62) (-2.32) (0.58) (-2.56)
PGD -0.005 0.015 -0.006 0.021
(-0.64) (0.63) (-0.58) (1.07)
Observations 8,096 8,036 1,542 8,048 7,997 1,517
Adjusted R-Squared 0.629 0.629 0.695 0.625 0.625 0.701
F-Test: ∆PGD Coefficients (p-value) 0.001 0.406 0.069 0.000 0.436 0.008
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
HQ Country FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
HQ Country × Quarter FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Resource Type × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full CEM Full Full CEM
Cluster Level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 583 578 170 582 577 168
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Table 12: Segment-Level Analysis
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the effect of extraction payment disclosures on
foreign investments at the segment level. The dependent variable Segment Investments is defined as the yearly
capital expenditures by a given extractive firm in a given host country, divided by the lagged total assets in that
particular segment. The key explanatory variable PGD is an indicator equal to one beginning in the year in which
PGD regulation becomes effective for the given extractive company/segment. Large (Mid/Small) is an indicator
variable equal to one if the parent company’s average total assets exceed (are below) their 66th percentile value.
Higher (Lower) Corruption is a dummy variable equal to one if the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of a given
host country is higher (lower) than the median CPI in the given year. Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe are
separate indicator variables which equal one if the host country is located on the given continent. All specifications
include host country-by-year fixed effects, resource type-by-year fixed effects (where resource types are defined using
the 3-digit NAICS code), segment fixed effects, as well as parent company controls. I collect geographic segment-level
investments from Worldscope. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the
level of the parent company’s headquarter country. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Segment Investments / Segment Assetst-1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PGD -0.042** -0.066***
(-2.41) (-3.57)
PGD * Large -0.066***
(-3.43)
PGD * Mid/Small -0.064
(-0.93)
PGD * Higher Corruption -0.068**
(-2.49)
PGD * Lower Corruption -0.064**
(-2.62)
PGD * Africa -0.158***
(-7.71)
PGD * Asia -0.084*
(-1.80)
PGD * Latin America 0.046***
(9.09)
PGD * Europe 0.027
(0.58)
Observations 2,887 2,887 2,887 2,887 2,887
Adjusted R-Squared 0.445 0.456 0.455 0.455 0.455
F-Test: ∆PGD Coefficients (p-value) - - 0.973 0.918 -
Parent Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resource Type × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Level HQ Country HQ Country HQ Country HQ Country HQ Country
Number of Clusters 40 40 40 40 40
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Figure 1: Host Country Identification Strategy
This figure illustrates the identification strategy of my extractive payment regressions. I employ a gen-
eralized difference-in-differences design based on the staggered roll out of PGD regulation. Each of my
13 host countries covers payment data from European, US, Australian, Chinese, and other multinational
extractive companies on a subsidiary - host country - year level. Given the staggered and quasi-exogenous
implementation of PGD regulation, different foreign subsidiaries of European extractive companies get
treated at different points in time. My dependent variable is either the normalized total payments or
the normalized gap between payments made by firms and payments received by governments. I fix the
host country, year, and natural resource that is extracted. I then compare the change in payments or
payment gaps of subsidiaries whose parent companies become subject to PGD regulation before and after
with that of subsidiaries whose parents are not (yet) affected by the disclosure regulation. For example,
Statoil, the largest Norwegian oil and gas company, became subject to PGD regulation in 2014. For Shell
the disclosure regulation only became effective in 2015. Chevron is never treated and forms part of the
non-disclosing control group since the United States did not implement extraction payment disclosures.
EthopiaAzerbaijan Iraq LiberiaGhana
...
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
y
PGD treatment
effect of Statoil
PGD treatment
effect of Shell
PGD effective
for Statoil
PGD effective
for Shell
Chevron not
affected by PGD
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Figure 2: Extractive Payments in Event Time
This figure reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the effect of extraction pay-
ment disclosures on payments to host governments in event time. I estimate model (1) but replace
the PGD indicator variable with 4 separate dummies, each marking one time period relative to
the entry-into-force year (t=0). I omit the indicator for year t-1, which serves as the bench-
mark period with an OLS coefficient and standard error of zero. Vertical bands represent 90%
confidence intervals for the point estimates in each time period.
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Figure 3: Investment Patterns of European Extractive Firms in Event Time
This figure reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the effect of extraction pay-
ment disclosures on parent-level investments in event time. I estimate model (3) but replace the
PGD indicator variable with 11 separate dummies, each marking one time period relative to the
entry-into-force quarter (t=0). I omit the indicator for period t-1, which serves as the bench-
mark period with an OLS coefficient and standard error of zero. Vertical bands represent 90%
confidence intervals for the point estimates in each time period. The upper (lower) panel plots
the investment patterns for large (small/medium-sized) disclosing extractive companies. Firms
are classified as large (small/medium-sized) if their average assets exceed (are below) the 66th
percentile value.
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Figure 4: Investment Reallocation From Large Disclosing to Non-Disclosing Firms
This figure illustrates the reallocation of investments from large disclosing to non-disclosing firms
once extraction payment disclosures become effective. I plot the average residualized capital
expenditures from model (3) for both types of companies over time. For ease of exposition, I also
normalize average investments by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation
of each group. In order to compare average capital expenditures within the same calendar quarter
across treatment and control groups, I focus on investment changes around the year 2015 since
the majority of European extractive firms (roughly 60%) became subject to PGD regulation at
the beginning of that year. My results are virtually identical if I compare investments in event
time and use weighted averages to construct synthetic control groups for each quarter.
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Figure 5: RoA Patterns of European Extractive Firms in Event Time
This figure reports the coefficients of OLS regressions investigating the effect of extraction pay-
ment disclosures on parent-level RoA in event time. I estimate model (3) but replace the PGD
indicator variable with 11 separate dummies, each marking one time period relative to the entry-
into-force quarter (t=0). I omit the indicator for period t-1, which serves as the benchmark period
with an OLS coefficient and standard error of zero. Vertical bands represent 90% confidence in-
tervals for the point estimates in each time period. The upper (lower) panel plots the investment
patterns for large (small/medium-sized) disclosing extractive companies. Firms are classified as
large (small/medium-sized) if their average assets exceed (are below) the 66th percentile value.
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Appendix
Table A1: Variable Definitions
This table defines all variables used in the empirical analyses and indicates their data source.
Variable Definition Data Source
PGDi,t Indicator variable equal to one beginning in
the period t in which PGD regulation
becomes effective for extractive company i,
zero otherwise.
EU Commission,
federal law gazettes,
investor relations
webpages
Extractive Paymenti,hc,t Total payments by extractive company i to
host government hc in year t.
EITI Reports
Payment Gapi,hc,t Difference between payments made by
extractive company i and payments officially
received by host government hc in year t.
EITI reports
Investmentsi,t Capital expenditures of company i in period t. Compustat
Segment Investmentsi,hc,t Capital expenditures of company i in host
country hc and period t.
Worldscope
Return on Assetsi,t Operating income before depreciation of
company i in period t divided by lagged book
assets.
Compustat
Total Assetsi,t Total book assets of company i in period t. Compustat
PPEi,t Plant, property, and equipment of company i
in period t divided by total book assets.
Compustat
Leveragei,t Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities
of company i in period t divided by total
assets.
Compustat
Qi,t Market value of assets of company i in period
t divided by book value of assets. Market
value of assets equals the book value of assets
plus the market value of equity minus the
book value of equity.
Compustat
Asset Turnoveri,t Sales of company i in period t divided by
total book assets.
Compustat
Cashi,t Cash and short-term investments of company
i in period t divided by total assets.
Compustat
Largei Indicator variable equal to one if the average
total assets of extractive company i exceed
the 66th percentile value, zero otherwise.
Compustat
Mid/Smalli Indicator variable equal to one if the average
total assets of extractive company i are below
the 66th percentile value, zero otherwise.
Compustat
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Higher Corruptionhc,t Indicator variable equal to one if the
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of host
country hc is higher than the median CPI in
a given year t, zero otherwise.
EITI Reports,
Transparency
International
Lower Corruptionhc,t Indicator variable equal to one if the
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of host
country hc is lower than the median CPI in
a given year t, zero otherwise.
EITI Reports,
Transparency
International
Direct-to-Consumeri Indicator variable equal to one if extractive
firm i sells its products directly to end
consumers, zero otherwise.
Annual filings
Wholesale i Indicator variable equal to one if extractive
firm i sells its products in wholesale
markets, zero otherwise.
Annual filings
PGD Published i,t Indicator variable equal to one beginning in
the quarter in which the firm publishes its
first extraction payment report, zero
otherwise.
Investor relations
webpages
Implementation Time PGDc Number of months it took country c to
transpose PGD regulation into national law.
European
Commission
Average Transposition Delayc Average implementation delay of European
country c across all previous directives.
Eurostat
Southern Countryc Indicator variable equal to one for Portugal,
Spain, Italy, and Greece, zero otherwise.
Christensen et al.
(2016)
Country Sizec Population of European country c at the
end of 2012 in millions.
Christensen et al.
(2016)
Implementation Time TPDc Number of months it took country c to
transpose the Transparency Directive into
national law.
Christensen et al.
(2016)
Implementation Time MADc Number of months it took country c to
transpose the Market Abuse Directive into
national law.
Christensen et al.
(2016)
Imp. of Extractive Sectorc Market value of all extractive firms in
European country c divided by the
country’s total stock market capitalization.
Compustat
Corruptionhc,t 100 - Corruption Perceptions Index of host
country hc in year t.
Transparency
International
Oil Outputhc,t Oil production of host country hc in year t
in ktoe.
World Bank
Tot. Pmt. / GDPhc,t Total extractive payments of host country
hc in year t divided by the national GDP
and multiplied by 100.
World Bank
Voicehc,t Survey measure capturing the extent to
which a host country’s citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government, as
well as freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and a free media in year t.
World Bank
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Regulatory Qualityhc,t Survey measure capturing the host government’s
ability to formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development in year t.
World Bank
Government Exp.hc,t Host government’s total consumption
expenditures in year t divided by the national
GDP and multiplied by 100.
World Bank
Military Exp.hc,t Host government’s military expenditures in year t
divided by the national GDP and multiplied by
100.
World Bank
Education Exp.hc,t Host government’s education expenditures in year
t divided by the national GDP and multiplied by
100.
World Bank
Health Exp.hc,t Host government’s health expenditures in year t
divided by the national GDP and multiplied by
100.
World Bank
Total Paymentshc,t Total extractive payments to host country hc in
year t.
EITI Reports
Discl. / Total Pmt.hc,t Fraction of extractive revenues that are subject
to PGD regulation in host country hc divided by
the country’s total extractive revenues and
multiplied by 100.
EU Commission,
federal law
gazettes, EITI
Reports
GDPhc,t Real gross domestic product of host country hc in
year t in USD bn.
World Bank
PGD[0]i,t Indicator variable equal to one on the publication
day of the extraction payment report, zero
otherwise.
LSE Regulatory
News Service
PGD[0;n]i,t Indicator variable equal to one on the publication
day of the extraction payment report and n days
thereafter, zero otherwise.
LSE Regulatory
News Service
PGDi,t Indicator variable equal to one beginning at the
publication date of the extraction payment
report.
LSE Regulatory
News Service
Bid-Ask Spreadi,t Relative equity bid-ask spread calculated as (Ask
- Bid) / ((Ask + Bid) * 0.5).
Datastream
Stock Returni,t Ln(return indext) - ln(return indext-1). Datastream
Market Valuei,t Stock price times outstanding shares. Datastream
Share Turnoveri,t Trading volume divided by number of
outstanding shares.
Datastream
Return Variabilityi,t Weekly rolling standard deviation of Stock
Return.
Datastream
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Internet Appendix A: Exogeneity of PGD Implementation Timing
Table IA1: Country-Level Determinants of PGD Adoption Timing
This table reports the coefficients of OLS regressions assessing the exogeneity of PGD’s implementation
timing across Europe. Each observation corresponds to one European country. Implementation Time
PGD captures the implementation time in months from the enactment of PGD regulation at the EU
level (23-Jun-2013) to its entry-into-force date in each country (see Table 1). Average Transposition
Delay is the country’s average implementation delay across all previous European directives. Southern
Country is an indicator variable equal to one for Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Country Size is
the country’s population in millions. Importance of Extractive Sector is defined as the market value of all
extractive companies listed in that country divided by the total market capitalization of the country’s stock
market. Implementation Time TPD (MAD) is the time in months from the enactment of the Transparency
Directive (Market Abuse Directive) at the EU level to its entry-into-force date in each country. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Implementation Time PGD (months)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Transposition Delay 0.462 0.606** 0.530* 0.615**
(1.65) (2.24) (1.84) (2.20)
Southern Country 5.976* 5.902** 5.603* 5.815*
(2.07) (2.20) (1.92) (2.09)
Country Size -0.067 -0.084* -0.069 -0.083
(-1.32) (-1.76) (-1.37) (-1.71)
Importance of Extractive Sector -0.103 -0.130 -0.130 -0.135
(-1.22) (-1.64) (-1.47) (-1.60)
Implementation Time TPD 0.254* 0.240
(2.04) (1.71)
Implementation Time MAD 0.215 0.053
(1.00) (0.23)
Observations 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R-Squared 0.145 0.262 0.144 0.223
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Internet Appendix C: Coarsened Exact Matching
Table IA3: Covariate Imbalance pre/post Coarsened Exact Matching
This table reports covariate imbalances before and after coarsened exact matching (CEM) for the variables
used in my payment, investment, and RoA regressions (Iacus et al. (2012)). The L1 distance measures the
covariate imbalance between disclosing and non-disclosing firms based on financial characteristics before
the adoption of extraction payment disclosures. L1 is bounded between zero and one and a lower value
indicates a lower imbalance. I also report differences in the mean, minimum, 25% quantile (p25), median
(p50), 75% quantile (p75), and maximum across treatment and control groups.
Panel A: Payment Regressions
L1 Distance ∆Mean ∆Min ∆p25 ∆p50 ∆p75 ∆Max
Before CEM: Multivariate L1 Distance = 0.822
Ln(Total Assetspre-PGD) 0.615 6.674 0.000 8.929 11.414 4.196 -0.787
Return on Assetspre-PGD 0.648 0.086 0.000 0.097 0.122 0.102 -0.047
After CEM: Multivariate L1 Distance = 0.245
Ln(Total Assetspre-PGD) 0.045 0.021 0.000 0.207 0.155 0.218 0.083
Return on Assetspre-PGD 0.169 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.019 -0.015
Panel B: Investment and RoA Regressions
L1 Distance ∆Mean ∆Min ∆p25 ∆p50 ∆p75 ∆Max
Before CEM: Multivariate L1 Distance = 0.891
Ln(Total Assetspre-PGD) 0.478 3.170 0.000 4.700 4.247 2.407 0.030
Asset Turnoverpre-PGD 0.396 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.044 -0.359
PPEpre-PGD 0.440 0.069 0.000 0.311 0.127 -0.133 -0.162
Cashpre-PGD 0.376 -0.008 0.000 0.026 0.046 0.010 -0.621
Leveragepre-PGD 0.295 -0.059 0.000 0.000 0.121 -0.028 -6.113
Qpre-PGD 0.208 -1.629 0.000 0.561 -0.240 -0.552 -164.127
After CEM: Multivariate L1 Distance = 0.460
Ln(Total Assetspre-PGD) 0.409 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.437 0.751
Asset Turnoverpre-PGD 0.251 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.020
PPEpre-PGD 0.018 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.023 -0.002
Cashpre-PGD 0.316 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.020
Leveragepre-PGD 0.268 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.068 -0.023
Qpre-PGD 0.434 -0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.540 -8.333
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Internet Appendix D: Additional Descriptive Statistics
Table IA4: Variables Used in Aggregate Host Country Regressions
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in my aggregate host country analyses. I
report the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 10% quantile (p10), 25% quantile
(p25), median (p50), 75% quantile (p75), and 90% quantile (p90). I define all variables in Table A1.
I obtain the corruption index from Transparency International and payment data from the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). I retrieve all remaining macroeconomic variables from the open
data library of the World Bank. This sample covers host countries during the time period 2010 to 2015.
N Mean Std. Dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Corruption 144 67.018 15.162 57.000 63.000 70.068 75.492 79.595
Voice 129 -0.341 0.745 -1.250 -0.984 -0.291 0.032 0.459
Oil Output 114 27.684 53.020 0.000 0.094 2.095 40.929 83.756
Regulatory Quality 129 -0.324 0.677 -1.055 -0.771 -0.390 -0.129 0.407
Government Expenditures 152 16.076 12.020 9.518 10.826 13.472 18.122 21.000
Military Expenditures 145 1.737 1.275 0.654 0.927 1.347 1.872 3.399
Education Expenditures 93 4.318 1.911 2.462 2.851 3.733 5.751 7.193
Health Expenditures 151 5.594 2.353 3.318 4.236 5.232 6.329 9.157
Disclosed Payments / Total Payments (×100) 158 1.189 5.855 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1Disclosed Payments>0 158 0.076 0.266 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total Payments / GDP (×100) 158 13.787 41.136 0.412 1.074 4.456 11.173 20.740
Ln(GDP) 158 23.845 1.936 21.389 22.696 23.710 24.694 26.634
Table IA5: Variables Used in Capital Market Analyses
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in my capital market analyses. I report
the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 10% quantile (p10), 25% quantile (p25),
median (p50), 75% quantile (p75), and 90% quantile (p90). I define all variables in Table A1. I obtain stock
market variables from Datastream and PGD publication dates from the extraction payment disclosures of
the respective companies. This sample covers London Stock Exchange listed extractive firms during 2016.
N Mean Std. Dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Bid-Ask Spread 8616 0.036 0.093 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.034 0.098
Stock Return 8616 0.001 0.025 -0.029 -0.012 0.000 0.014 0.032
PGD[0] 8616 0.003 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD[0,1] 8616 0.006 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD[0,2] 8616 0.008 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD[0,3] 8616 0.011 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD[0,4] 8616 0.013 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PGD 8616 0.353 0.478 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Market Valuet−5 8616 11.411 24.328 0.029 0.190 1.693 7.502 38.946
Share Turnovert−5 8616 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006
Return Variabilityt−5 8616 0.028 0.038 0.008 0.013 0.021 0.034 0.054
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Internet Appendix E: Publication Dates of PGD Reports
Figure IA1: Publication Dates of UK Extraction Payment Disclosures during 2016
This figure illustrates the publication timing of the first PGD reports by London Stock Exchange
listed extractive companies during 2016. The horizontal axis captures the year 2016. The vertical
axis depicts the number of published extraction payment reports per day.
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1 Introduction
We investigate the role of accounting and regulation for procyclical book leverage of
US commercial and savings banks.1 Understanding these determinants is important for
financial reporting, regulation, and bank management, especially in light of the recent
debate about fair value accounting and its contribution to financial (in)stability. We are
particularly interested in available for sale (AfS) securities, which is by far the largest and
for many banks the only security class that is recognized at fair value.
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 triggered a vigorous debate about the role of fair value
accounting and revived discussions about procyclicality in banking. While there is ample
evidence that fair value accounting did not play a major role during the crisis, there is still
the concern that fair value accounting contributes to instability by inflating credit bubbles
via procyclical leverage.2
By originating loans and holding debt securities, banks play an important role in the
provision of credit to the economy. Expansions and contractions of bank balance sheets
and the amount of debt that banks use to fund their assets are important for access to
credit. It is broadly recognized that banks’ ability to borrow against collateral depends
on the margin requirement and value of the asset, which can give rise to procyclicality
and detrimental effects in financial intermediation (e.g., Geanakoplos (2003), Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and Gorton and Metrick (2012)).
Banks also face implicit margin requirements when using debt to finance a portfolio of
1We refer to “procyclical book leverage” as “procyclical (bank) leverage”, “leverage procyclicality”, or
“procyclicality”.
2See, e.g., Benston (2008), Ryan (2008), Securities and Exchange Commission (2008), Laux and Leuz
(2009, 2010), Barth and Landsman (2010), Bhat et al. (2011), Badertscher et al. (2012), and Huizinga and
Laeven (2012) for the debate about the role of fair value accounting during the financial crisis including
empirical evidence. For a discussion about the significance and origin of procyclical bank leverage, see, for
example, Persaud (2008), Plantin et al. (2008), International Monetary Fund (2008), Bank for International
Settlements (2009), and Financial Services Authority (2009).
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assets on their balance sheet (Adrian and Shin (2014)). Therefore, bank balance sheets
can be subject to similar procyclicality as securities lending (collateralization).
Adrian and Shin (2010, 2014) measure procyclical bank leverage as a positive association
between changes in book leverage and changes in total book assets. Book leverage is defined
as total book assets over book equity. This approach is used in several articles (see, for
example, Damar et al. (2013) and Beccalli et al. (2015)), and regulators as well as the
business press often refer to it when arguing that fair value accounting contributes to
procyclical leverage (e.g., Panetta and Angelini (2009), Economist (2008), and Financial
Times (2008)). The concern is that if banks recognize securities at fair value on the balance
sheet, unrealized gains increase equity, which then allows a bank to raise debt and expand.
If a crisis hits, banks are in a worse position to deal with distress and the disproportional
reduction of debt further magnifies problems in the financial system. As Acharya and Ryan
(2016) point out, it is theoretically not clear why banks should change their book leverage
in the same direction as unrealized changes in fair value, when the direct effect goes in
the opposite direction. However, this lack of a theoretical underpinning generally does not
reassure opponents of fair value accounting.
We use the approach of Adrian and Shin (2010, 2014) as the starting point for our
analysis of procyclical leverage. Importantly we also adopt a banking perspective and focus
on book leverage, not market leverage. The literature on procyclical leverage is generally
interested in the leverage that banks use to finance the existing credit on their balance
sheet (loans and debt securities), for which book leverage is appropriate. We include GDP
growth as a control variable since changes in GDP might simultaneously drive book leverage
growth and total asset growth. We also follow the suggestion of Acharya and Ryan (2016)
and examine the relation between book leverage growth and GDP growth when analyzing
the determinants of procyclicality.
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We examine US commercial and savings banks (holding company level) between Q1-
1994 and Q1-2013. As drivers of procyclical leverage might vary for different types of
banks, we split our sample into three subgroups: savings banks, commercial banks with
less than 20% of total assets measured at fair value (i.e., trading assets and AfS securities),
and commercial banks with more than 20% fair value assets.
We interact total asset growth and GDP growth with several accounting and regulatory
variables to investigate whether these variables are associated with stronger procyclical
leverage. Among the accounting variables, we focus on changes in accumulated unrealized
gains and losses on AfS securities (hereafter, unrealized gains and losses on AfS securities).
Very few banks in the sample hold assets for which fair value changes directly affect net
income and regulatory capital such as trading assets. However, almost all banks hold
sizable portfolios of AfS securities that are recognized at fair value and for which changes
in fair value affect banks’ book equity. The accounting variables have a direct inverse
effect on book leverage, as book equity (mechanically) increases in net income and in
unrealized gains and losses on AfS securities. More interesting are the interaction terms
of the accounting variables with total asset growth and GDP growth. Among the bank
regulatory variables, we focus on the lagged regulatory capital ratio, changes in average
risk-weighted assets, and the lagged book leverage ratio, which is used in regulating US
banks.
We find that total asset growth and GDP growth are both positively related to book
leverage growth. Our evidence is not consistent with the notion that recognizing unrealized
gains and losses on AfS securities as stipulated by fair value accounting contributes to
procyclical leverage or that historical cost accounting reduces procyclicality. In contrast,
procyclical leverage is primarily driven by banks’ business model, their intermediation
function of providing loans and collecting deposits, and the volume of certain banking
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activities (e.g., loan sales).
Banks’ business model of providing loans and collecting deposits is inherently procycli-
cal. First, inflows and outflows of deposits directly imply a positive association between
total asset growth and leverage growth, unless banks counterbalance the direct effect by
adjusting their capital structure. Second, lending opportunities become more profitable
and less risky if GDP growth is higher, and banks might optimally respond by increasing
leverage and expanding lending.
When we look at balance sheet expansions as well as at periods of positive GDP growth,
the interaction terms of unrealized gains on AfS securities with both measures are insignif-
icant for the full sample and the different types of banks.3 For balance sheet contractions,
the interactions with unrealized gains on AfS securities are significant in some specifi-
cations. However, the signs of these coefficients are not consistent with the idea that
unrealized losses force banks to reduce their book leverage (and asset holdings). In con-
trast, realized gains on loan sales are positively associated with procyclical leverage when
commercial banks with less than 20% fair value assets expand their balance sheet, con-
sistent with banks selling whole loans for securitization purposes. Moreover, we find that
banks consider the potential obligations from off-balance sheet loan commitments as they
are associated with more conservative book leverage and weaker procyclicality for balance
sheet expansions and contractions.
The regulatory variables are associated with procyclical leverage. The interaction terms
of commercial banks’ regulatory capital (and book leverage) ratios with changes in total
assets are positive (negative) and significant for balance sheet expansions, suggesting that
3Xie (2016) finds that the correlation between GDP growth and unrealized gains on AfS securities is
weak. However, there is a direct positive relation between total asset growth and unrealized AfS gains.
Consequently, the insignificance of the interaction terms between total asset growth and unrealized gains
on AfS does not automatically follow from a lack of correlation between GDP growth and unrealized gains
on AfS securities.
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better-capitalized banks increase book leverage more when they expand. However, better-
capitalized banks also issue more equity during economic expansions, which weakens the
association between book leverage growth and positive GDP growth for these institutions.
For commercial banks, the interaction terms of changes in total assets with changes in
the average risk weight (of total assets) are consistent with the argument of Amel-Zadeh
et al. (2016) that banks which increase their balance sheet can increase book leverage if
the average risk weight decreases.
Irrespective of the change in average risk-weighted assets, banks may view liquid se-
curities as being less risky and therefore choose higher book leverage if the fraction of
liquid assets increases. In addition, when banks reduce cash and sell liquid assets with
low risk weights as a response to an outflow of deposits, both book leverage and total
assets decrease mechanically while the average risk weight increases. For savings banks,
the interaction of changes in total assets with changes in the average risk weight is positive
and significant upon balance sheet expansions. Consistent with this finding, savings banks
disproportionally increase loans, not securities, which generally have lower risk weights
during the sample period, when increasing book leverage and total assets.
Related Literature. We contribute to the literature on procyclical bank leverage.
Adrian and Shin (2010) use flow of funds data and document a positive relation between
book leverage growth and total asset growth for US investment banks, but not for US
commercial banks or US non-financial firms. Adrian and Shin (2011) and Greenlaw et al.
(2008) use bank level data and also find a strong procyclical relation for US commercial
banks.4 These papers focus on the consequences of procyclicality on aggregate liquidity,
4These studies do not look at US non-financial firms using firm level data. When we look at US firms,
excluding financials and utilities, using quarterly data from Compustat as well as the same empirical model
and time period as in our bank study, we find a positive relation between book leverage growth and total
asset growth. However, it is substantially weaker compared to our sample banks both in terms of economic
and statistical significance (see Table IA10 in the Internet Appendix).
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economic growth, and systemic risk. In contrast, our paper is the first comprehensive
analysis of the determinants of procyclical leverage for US commercial and savings banks.
Beccalli et al. (2015) find that the procyclical relation between total assets and book
leverage is stronger for US banks if they are more involved in securitization. However,
they do not consider the role of accounting or capital regulation.5 Closest to our work is
a paper by Amel-Zadeh et al. (2016), who analyze the role of changes in regulatory risk
weights and fair value accounting for procyclical leverage in the spirit of Adrian and Shin
(2010). They formally show that changes in average risk-weighted assets are necessary
for book leverage to be procyclical if banks’ regulatory capital constraint is binding and
find evidence that is consistent with their model. Like us, they do not find that fair
value accounting contributes to procyclical leverage. Our paper more broadly explores
potential sources of procyclicality. To this end, we also investigate the relation between
GDP growth and book leverage growth, include savings banks, and perform an asset- and
liability-component analysis.
Xie (2016) examines whether fair value accounting increases the procyclicality of bank
lending, which constitutes a large share of total bank assets. She uses approval/denial deci-
sions on residential mortgage applications and finds no evidence that fair value accounting
is associated with lower (higher) mortgage denial rates during expansionary (recessionary)
periods. Behn et al. (2016) and Dou et al. (2016) provide evidence that procyclical bank
regulation and consolidation of securitization entities that affect regulatory capital require-
ments can have sizeable effects on bank lending. The overall findings in these papers are
consistent with our results on the role of fair value accounting and regulation for leverage
procyclicality.
5Panetta and Angelini (2009) and Baglioni et al. (2013) analyze the relation between book leverage
growth and total asset growth for European banks. Damar et al. (2013) investigate Canadian banks.
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2 Motivation
Consider a bank that purchases debt securities with a market value (fair value) of
100 and recognizes them on the balance sheet. The bank finances the purchase with a
combination of equity and debt, equal to 10 and 90 respectively.6 In the absence of any
other business activities, and assuming that the book value of debt equals the market value
of debt, the book and market value of equity are also identical. In this example, the bank’s
market leverage equals its book leverage. The leverage ratio, defined as total assets over
equity, is 10.
According to the definition of Adrian and Shin (2010), leverage is procyclical if an in-
crease in asset growth is associated with an increase in leverage growth and vice versa. The
key question is how accounting could magnify procyclical leverage such that recognizing
an increase in the value of securities on the balance sheet magnifies the positive association
between leverage growth and total asset growth.
Let us assume that the value of securities rises by 1 to 101. Under fair value accounting
for securities, the value of the bank’s book equity also rises by 1 to 11. Thus, a 1% increase
in the value of securities leads to a 10% increase in the value of equity. This increase in
value has a direct inverse effect on the leverage ratio, which decreases from 10 to 9.18.
Whether the increase in value of the securities increases the bank’s regulatory capital
depends on how the bank classifies the securities and possible prudential filters in place.
We discuss the specific rules in Section 3.3.1 and consider only two extreme cases here.
In the US, and many other countries, unrealized gains and losses on AfS debt securities
are recognized in other comprehensive income and do not affect regulatory capital unless
the securities are sold or other-than-temporarily impaired. In contrast, unrealized gains
6This example is based on Adrian and Shin (2010).
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and losses on trading assets go through net income and affect regulatory capital. Most
banks hold very little trading assets, but even if the bank in the example had classified its
securities as trading assets, it still could not have increased its leverage above 10 with a
binding regulatory capital constraint, unless the average risk weight of new securities were
lower than that of current securities.7
Banks’ regulatory capital constraint is generally not strictly binding as banks typically
hold regulatory capital in excess of requirements. This buffer may fluctuate with economic
conditions and the risk of recognized assets.8 Moreover, margin requirements and haircuts
are generally lower in booms when asset values are high than in busts when asset values are
low (e.g., Geanakoplos (2003), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Geanakoplos (2010), and
Gorton and Metrick (2012)). Thus, the level of borrowing and the value of securities are
positively related. This procyclicality can spill over to a bank that holds these securities
on its balance sheet. Banks face explicit margin requirements when borrowing against
assets they pledge as collateral, as well as implicit margin requirements when borrowing
to finance the portfolio of assets they hold on their balance sheet.9
Assume that the bank in our example uses collateralized financing. The haircut equals
10% so that the bank can raise debt equal to 90% of the value of the assets it pledges
as collateral. The regulatory capital constraint is not binding. An increase in the market
value of securities held by the bank from 100 to 101 then allows the bank to increase both
7Amel-Zadeh et al. (2016) show formally that if a bank’s regulatory capital constraint is binding,
procyclicality as measured by Adrian and Shin (2010) can only arise if the average risk weight of assets
decreases (increases) upon balance sheet expansions (contractions).
8Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show formally that book leverage can be positively related to
prices. Adrian and Shin (2010) argue that countercyclical collateralization is a possible reason for their
finding of procyclical leverage for investment banks.
9Adrian and Shin (2014) develop a model in which the regulatory capital constraint is not binding.
Banks choose the maximum book leverage (implicitly) permitted by debt holders in the presence of con-
tracting frictions. Collateral margin requirements and risk are positively related in Geanakoplos (2003)
and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008).
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debt and total assets by 9, taking advantage of collateralized lending. However, this effect
has nothing to do with how the securities are recognized on the balance sheet as investors
care about market prices in collateralized financing, not book values. When securities are
reported at fair value, the bank’s book leverage does not change and stays at 10.10 If,
at the same time, security prices increase and the haircut decreases to 9%, the bank can
expand both debt and total assets even further. Given the lower haircut, book leverage
is procyclical. However, while fair value accounting would be associated with procyclical
leverage, it is not causal for the increase in book leverage when the bank expands its
balance sheet.11
While it is a priori not clear how unrealized gains and losses could affect the relation
between total asset growth and book leverage growth, it does not mean that such a link
could not exist. Opponents of fair value accounting might be concerned that fair value
accounting could contribute to procyclicality in ways that are not well understood and
have not yet been modeled. Xie (2016) shows that the correlation between unrealized
gains and losses on AfS securities with economic cycle variables such as GDP growth is
weak, potentially even negative. However, the same is not true for total assets and equity,
which are both positively related to unrealized gains and losses. Moreover, the correlation
with factors that could change haircuts, margin requirements, or a bank’s regulatory capital
buffer is not straightforward.
To understand the lending decision of banks and the leverage that banks use to provide
10In contrast, if securities are recognized at the historical cost of 100, book leverage increases as total
assets still increase to 109 due to the purchase of the additional securities, while book equity stays at 10.
Therefore, in our example, book leverage is procyclical under historical cost accounting, but not under fair
value accounting.
11Adrian and Shin (2014) develop a model in which the regulatory capital constraint is not binding.
Banks choose the maximum book leverage (implicitly) permitted by debt holders in the presence of con-
tracting frictions. Collateral margin requirements and risk are positively related in Geanakoplos (2003)
and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008).
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credit, it is important to look at the bank’s book leverage (see also Adrian and Shin (2014)
and Adrian et al. (2015)). Focusing on market leverage can be misleading. The market
value of a bank is highly cyclical and includes the present value of its future business
opportunities, stemming from, e.g., future securitization and market making, its business
relations and its reputation. Geanakoplos (2010) argues that focusing on market leverage
can be misleading and emphasizes the need to look at “securities leverage,” which he defines
as the “ratio of collateral values to the down payment that must be made to buy them”
(page 6). Securities leverage has a direct effect on a bank’s book leverage, in contrast to
its market leverage, and Adrian et al. (2014) and Adrian et al. (2013) provide empirical
evidence that book leverage is a good proxy for securities leverage. Thus, we focus on book
leverage in our analysis and, unless stated otherwise, mean book leverage when we write
leverage.
3 Research Questions and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Measuring Procyclical Bank Leverage
We use the approach of Adrian and Shin (2010) as the starting point for our analysis
of procyclical bank leverage and estimate the following regression model, which relates the
book leverage growth of bank i in quarter t to the growth of its total book assets:
∆Book Leveragei,t = α + β ·∆Total Assetsi,t + γi + δt + i,t . (1a)
As Adrian and Shin (2010), we define ∆Total Assetsi,t and ∆Book Leveragei,t as ln[variablei,t]
- ln[variablei,t-1]. Book leverage is the ratio of total book assets to book equity.
The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the relation between changes in total
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assets and changes in leverage. Procyclical leverage arises if this coefficient is positive
and significant. Even though total assets enter the definition of book leverage, a positive
relation between the changes in book leverage and changes in total assets is not mechanical.
If total book assets increase by 1% and the level of book equity and book debt also both
increase by 1%, the book leverage ratio (total book assets divided by book equity) does
not change. In this case, the relation between changes in book leverage and changes in
total assets is zero despite the increase in total assets. However, if book debt increases by
more than 1%, while book equity increases by less than 1%, the leverage ratio rises. Now
the regression coefficient of changes in total assets is positive.12 In model (1a), α denotes
the intercept, γi the bank fixed effect, δt the quarter-year fixed effect, and i,t the vector of
regression disturbances. We estimate our empirical models by ordinary least squares and
adjust standard errors for within-bank clusters (see Petersen (2009)).
We also investigate how changes in book leverage and changes in total assets are related
to GDP growth. As suggested by Acharya and Ryan (2016), an important alternative way
of measuring procyclical bank leverage is to link changes in leverage to changes in GDP.13
We therefore estimate the following empirical model
∆Book Leveragei,t = α + β ·∆GDPt + γi + i,t , (1b)
where ∆GDPt is defined as the log difference in real GDP between quarters t and t-1.
12We run regression models (1a) to (2) with book leverage defined as the ratio of book debt over book
equity and find the same procyclical leverage patterns (untabulated).
13We use US real GDP growth as a proxy for the economic conditions that our sample banks face.
Over our sample period, the correlations of the high yield credit spread index from BofA Merrill Lynch
and the quarterly change in the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index with the quarterly GDP growth are
-0.58 and 0.24 respectively. For the largest (smallest) banks in our sample, a global (regional) measure
of GDP growth could be a better proxy for the economic environment of these banks. However, most of
the banks in our sample are large US banks, not regional banks, and we believe that US GDP growth is a
good proxy even for large, globally active US banks.
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Since ∆GDPt is constant across banks within each quarter, we drop the quarter-year fixed
effect from regression model (1b). Going forward, we combine models (1a) and (1b) and
include both ∆Total Assets and ∆GDP as our measures of procyclical leverage:
∆Book Leveragei,t = α + β ·∆Total Assetsi,t + ζ ·∆GDPt + γi + i,t . (1c)
To understand the relation between book assets and GDP, we estimate the following
regression:
∆Total Assetsi,t = α + β ·∆GDPt + γi + i,t . (2)
3.2 Procyclical Leverage, Bank Business Model, and Bank Size
To understand how banks’ business models affect leverage procyclicality, we differen-
tiate between savings banks, commercial banks with less than 20% fair value assets, and
commercial banks with more than 20% fair value assets. The fraction of fair value as-
sets is defined as the sum of AfS securities and trading assets divided by total assets. To
test whether procyclical leverage varies for the different types of banks, we estimate the
following specifications:
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∆Book Leveragei,t = α + β ·∆Total Assetsi,t (3a)
+ ζ ·∆Total Assetsi,t · 1Savings Bank
+ η ·∆Total Assetsi,t · 1Commercial Bank>20% FV
+ θ ·∆Total Assetsi,t · Bank Sizei,t-1
+ ι′ · Zi,t + κ ·∆GDPt + i,t
∆Book Leveragei,t = α + β ·∆GDPt (3b)
+ ζ ·∆GDPt · 1Savings Bank
+ η ·∆GDPt · 1Commercial Bank>20% FV
+ θ ·∆GDPt · Bank Sizei,t-1
+ ι′ · Zi,t + κ ·∆Total Assetsi,t + i,t .
1Savings Bank and 1Commercial Bank>20% FV are indicator variables that equal one if the in-
stitution is a savings bank or commercial bank with more than 20% fair value assets, and
zero otherwise. The coefficients of the interaction terms with ∆Total Assetsi,t or ∆GDPt
quantify the difference in procyclicality between the respective bank type and commercial
banks with less than 20% fair value assets (omitted category). We do not include a bank
fixed effect since it is perfectly collinear with the bank type dummies.
The average savings bank is smaller than the average commercial bank, and commercial
banks with a high fraction of fair value assets tend to be larger than commercial banks
with a smaller fraction of fair value assets. To ensure that differences in size do not affect
our inferences about the role of bank types, we include the logarithm of lagged total assets
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(Bank Sizei,t-1) as control variable and interaction term. The vector Zi,t contains the stand-
alone values of the business model dummies as well as Bank Sizei,t-1.
3.3 The Effects of Accounting and Bank Regulation on Pro-
cyclical Leverage
3.3.1 Institutional and Regulatory Background
FAS 115, effective in Q1-1994, requires that trading assets and AfS securities are rec-
ognized at fair value. For trading assets, changes in market value are recognized in the
income statement and directly affect the bank’s Tier 1 capital. In contrast, unrealized
gains and losses on AfS securities are recognized not in the income statement, but rather
in accumulated other comprehensive income, a special component of shareholders’ equity.
A change in the fair value of an AfS security affects net income when the security is sold
or if an unrealized fair value loss is deemed other than temporary.
US bank regulators employ prudential filters that limit the effect of changes in the
value of AfS securities on banks’ regulatory capital. Unrealized gains and losses on AfS
debt securities that are recognized in accumulated other comprehensive income do not
affect regulatory capital. Therefore, changes in the value of AfS debt securities affect Tier
1 capital only if they are deemed other than temporarily impaired or are sold, in which
cases gains and losses are realized. In contrast, unrealized losses on AfS equity securities
directly reduce Tier 1 capital. On average, the AfS portfolio of our sample banks consists
of 97% debt and only 3% equity securities.
During our sample period from Q1-1994 to Q1-2013, US banks had to comply with
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the regulatory capital requirements of the Basel I Accord.14 Basel I requires that banks
have a total regulatory capital ratio of at least 8% to be considered adequately capitalized.
The total regulatory capital ratio is defined as total regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital plus
supplementary (Tier 2) capital) divided by risk-weighted assets. Individual asset amounts
are multiplied by fixed, predetermined risk weights (e.g., 0% for cash, 50% for mortgage
loans, and 100% for corporate loans) to calculate the bank’s overall risk-weighted assets.
Under Basel I, changes in average risk weights for a bank over time are mainly due to
changes in the portfolio of assets held by the bank. In addition to the Basel I rules, US
federal banking agencies require US banks to comply with a leverage ratio requirement
based on their book leverage.
3.3.2 Baseline Regression Model
To address the role of regulation and accounting, we estimate the following two speci-
fications:
∆Book Leveragei,t = α + β ·∆Total Assetsi,t (4a)
+ ζ ′ ·∆Total Assetsi,t · Accounting Itemsi,t · 1∆Total Assets>0
+ η′ ·∆Total Assetsi,t · Accounting Itemsi,t · 1∆Total Assets<0
+ θ′ ·∆Total Assetsi,t · Regulatory Itemsi,t(-1) · 1∆Total Assets>0
+ ι′ ·∆Total Assetsi,t · Regulatory Itemsi,t(-1) · 1∆Total Assets<0
+ κ′ ·Wi,t + λ′ · Xi,t + µ ·∆GDPt + γi + i,t
14The accord was released in July 1988. In the US, banks first had to adapt the full standard by the end
of 1992 (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1988)). The financial crisis and regulatory discussions
about Basel III led to a delay in the implementation of Basel II and by Q1-2013 (end of our sample period),
no US bank had implemented the Basel II rules (KPMG (2013)).
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∆Book Leveragei,t = α + β ·∆GDPt (4b)
+ ζ ′ ·∆GDPt · Accounting Itemsi,t · 1∆GDP>0
+ η′ ·∆GDPt · Accounting Itemsi,t · 1∆GDP<0
+ θ′ ·∆GDPt · Regulatory Itemsi,t(-1) · 1∆GDP>0
+ ι′ ·∆GDPt · Regulatory Itemsi,t(-1) · 1∆GDP<0
+ κ′ ·Wi,t + λ′ · Xi,t + µ ·∆Total Assetsi,t + γi + i,t .
Each interaction term measures the association between procyclical leverage and the re-
spective accounting or regulatory items. In this context, we differentiate between increases
and decreases in total assets and GDP to capture potential differing elasticities between
expansions and contractions.
In the baseline model, the vector Accounting Itemsi,t contains changes in accumulated
unrealized gains and losses on AfS securities (hereafter, unrealized gains and losses on AfS
securities) as well as net income.15 AfS securities is by far the largest reporting class that
is recognized at fair value. Therefore, we focus on AfS securities in our analysis of the role
of accounting.16 In the supplementary section, we perform additional tests that involve
splits of unrealized gains and losses on AfS securities into its debt and equity components.
We normalize all accounting items by lagged total assets and multiply them by 1000.
Unrealized gains (losses) on AfS securities and positive (negative) net income both
have a direct negative (positive) effect on leverage. Important for the understanding of
procyclical leverage are the coefficients of the interactions of these variables with ∆Total
15Once an AfS security is sold, the realized gain or loss moves from unrealized gains and losses on
AfS securities to net income. In Tables IA11 and IA12 of the Internet Appendix, we split net income
into realized gains and losses on AfS and HtM securities as well as residual net income and find that our
inferences remain unchanged.
16Only very few banks hold sizable trading assets. In untabulated results that we discuss in Section
5, we also consider trading assets and assets for which the bank chose the fair value option that FAS 159
introduced in 2008, with early adoption allowed as of 2007.
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Assetsi,t and ∆GDPt. A significant positive coefficient on an interaction term implies
that the variable is associated with procyclicality. Changes in the market values of AfS
securities could be associated with procyclicality independent of how they are recognized.
Thus, a significant positive coefficient on unrealized gains and losses on AfS securities does
not imply that recognizing these securities at historical cost would reduce procyclicality.
If the coefficient on an interaction term with unrealized gains and losses of AfS securities
is insignificant, changes in fair values (market values) of these securities are not associated
with procyclicality despite the recognition of the value changes on the balance sheet.
The vector Regulatory Itemsi,t(-1) contains the bank’s lagged total regulatory capital
ratio, the change in average risk-weighted assets, and the lagged book leverage ratio. The
average risk weight equals the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. ∆Risk Weighti,t
is defined as the difference in the log of the average risk weight. For expositional purposes,
we multiply both the total capital ratio and ∆Risk Weighti,t with 100.
If regulatory capital is high and leverage is low, banks are less constrained from in-
creasing leverage when they expand so we expect the relation between ∆Total Assetsi,t
and ∆Book Leveragei,t to be stronger. When interacting ∆Risk Weighti,t with ∆Total
Assetsi,t, it is important to distinguish between increases and decreases of the balance sheet.
If changes in average risk-weighted assets magnify procyclical leverage, the coefficient of
the interaction term should be negative and significant upon balance sheet expansions since
a decrease in average risk-weighted assets allows banks to increase leverage. In contrast,
when balance sheets contract, a positive and significant interaction term is consistent with
banks using liquid assets with low risk weights to repay debt.
The vector W contains the stand-alone values of the interacted accounting and regula-
tory items in the respective specification. X denotes the vector of control variables, which
includes Bank Sizei,t-1, qi,t-1, and ∆Goodwilli,t. qi,t-1 is defined as the lagged market-to-book
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ratio of equity to capture the bank’s market value of equity. ∆Goodwilli,t is defined as the
fraction of [Goodwilli,t - Goodwilli,t-1] to |Total Assetsi,t - Total Assetsi,t-1| and controls for
mergers & acquisitions.17
3.4 Asset and Liability Decomposition of Procyclical Leverage,
Off-Balance Sheet Obligations, and Loan Sales
To understand the drivers of procyclical leverage, we study which types of assets are
associated with procyclical expansions and contractions of the balance sheet. To do so, we
split ∆Total Assets from model (1a) into the quarterly growth rates of loans, securities, and
cash. Banks may expand via securities or loans. Expansions of securities are consistent with
a decrease in the average risk weight or a lower perceived risk and higher liquidity of these
assets. Expansions of loans are consistent with procyclical leverage being associated with
the standard business model of banks and loan origination for securitization. For balance
sheet contractions, it is interesting to examine whether cash and securities decrease.
To investigate how banks finance procyclical balance sheet expansions and which types
of liabilities banks reduce upon procyclical contractions, we replace ∆Total Assets in model
(1a) with the quarterly changes of deposits, senior debt, and subordinated debt. For both
expansions and contractions, it is illustrative to see whether they are associated with
changes in deposits or other sources of debt financing.
As discussed by Acharya and Ryan (2016), banks often hold off-balance sheet obliga-
17We use the growth of a bank’s goodwill as a control since the goodwill of the combined/surviving
entity typically increases strongly after mergers & acquisitions. The residual of the purchase price and
book value of net assets is recognized as goodwill in acquisitions since 1970 (purchase transactions; APB
Opinion No. 16) and in mergers since 2001 (previously pooling transactions; FAS 141). Many small banks
in our sample have zero goodwill on their balance sheet such that ∆Goodwill based on log differences is
not defined for these banks. To overcome this problem, we use the above definition of ∆Goodwill, which
is economically very similar, but has the benefit that |Total Assetsi, t - Total Assetsi, t-1| is positive and
typically non-zero. Our inferences remain unchanged if we do not control for ∆Goodwilli,t.
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tions that require them to provide funding upon occurrence of specific triggering events.
We look at (i) loan commitments and (ii) off-balance sheet securitized assets, where the
latter is used as proxy for credit/liquidity support in securitizations, to test whether banks
consider these off-balance sheet obligations when choosing balance sheet leverage and to
estimate how these off-balance sheet obligations interact with procyclical leverage. In ad-
dition, we investigate the relation between procyclical leverage and realized gains on loan
sales. Banks sell loans in the process of securitization and realized gains on loans sales are
related to the volume and profitability of banks’ securitization activities.
4 Data
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
We obtain our bank-level data from the bank fundamentals database of SNL Financial
and the real GDP data from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
SNL’s bank database contains detailed information about the balance sheet and income
statement of all active, acquired/defunct and listed/non-listed US financial institutions
that report to the SEC, the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, or the Comptroller of the
Currency. We focus on US commercial and savings banks at the holding company level that
file Y-9C and 10-Q reports and download data for all commercial bank holding companies
and savings and loan holding companies from SNL Financial. Our sample covers the time
period from Q1-1994 to Q1-2013.18
18Savings banks include thrifts and mutual banks. Broker-dealers that became bank holding companies
during the financial crisis (e.g., Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) are not included in the sample.
Broker-dealers acquired by commercial or savings banks are included in the sample. For example, Merrill
Lynch was a pure broker-dealer before its acquisition by Bank of America in 2009. We do not include
Merrill Lynch in our sample before 2009. However, Merrill Lynch implicitly became part of our sample
once it had been absorbed by Bank of America. There are very few such cases.
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To be included in our sample, we require that bank-quarter observations have (i) non-
missing and positive values for total assets and book equity, (ii) non-missing values for book
leverage growth and total asset growth, (iii) total assets in excess of $150 million, and (iv)
in the case of commercial banks, non-missing values for the fraction of fair value assets.
These selection criteria result in an initial sample of 41,748 bank-quarter observations for
932 banks. Focusing our attention on banks for which all regression variables in models
(4a) and (4b) are non-missing reduces our sample to 26,034 bank-quarter observations for
819 banks. To mitigate the effects of outliers, we winsorize all bank-level ratios, growth
rates, and accounting items at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the mean (average) and median of various balance sheet characteristics
and regulatory variables for our sample banks. The average total assets is $10.69 billion.
With average total assets of $1.95 billion, savings banks are smaller than commercial banks.
Among commercial banks, those with more than 20% fair value assets are significantly
larger, with average total assets of $22.42 billion. The average book leverage ratio is 11.26
and thus lower than the book leverage of large US investment banks, which Figure 16 in
Adrian and Shin (2010) indicates is in the range of 20 to 35. The average savings bank
has a higher regulatory capital ratio and a lower book leverage ratio than the average
commercial bank. Loans are the largest asset class, at 66.13% of total bank assets on
average. AfS securities are the next largest asset class, at 17.51% of total assets. HtM
securities only equal 3.67% of total assets. Trading assets play a minor role for most banks
in our sample, on average equaling 0.10% of total assets. Deposits is the dominant source
of funding, with 77.53% of total assets, followed by senior debt with 10.49% of total assets.
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Table 2 shows summary statistics for the key variables of our empirical analysis. Be-
tween Q1-1994 and Q1-2013, the average growth of GDP, total assets, and book leverage
was 0.50%, 1.87%, and 0.13% per quarter. Average realized gains on loans (0.03% of total
assets) are larger than unrealized gains on AfS securities (0.004%), but these have a higher
standard deviation.
5 Results
Figure 1 plots ∆Total Assets and ∆Book Leverage for all bank-quarter observations of
our sample and Figure IA1 in the Internet Appendix depicts the same relation for each
bank type. The graphs show strong procyclical leverage patterns. Table 3 reports the
estimation results for regression models (1a) to (2), and variations thereof. The coeffi-
cients of ∆Total Assets and ∆GDP are positive and highly statistically significant for the
stand-alone specifications as well as for the model in which both variables are included
simultaneously. Thus, banks increase (decrease) book leverage when they expand (con-
tract) their balance sheet and when economic conditions improve (deteriorate). In terms
of economic magnitude, the estimates in columns [1] and [3] imply that increases in total
asset growth and GDP growth by one standard deviation are associated with increases in
book leverage growth by 0.35 and 0.07 standard deviations, respectively. The coefficient of
the interaction term between changes in total assets and changes in GDP is not significant.
The positive relation between ∆Total Assets and ∆Book Leverage is significantly stronger
for balance sheet contractions than expansions. The difference in coefficients is 0.217 and
the p-value of the null hypothesis that this difference is zero equals 0.03%. In contrast, we
do not find that the association between ∆GDP and ∆Book Leverage is stronger during
economic contractions (difference: 0.062; p-value: 76.94%). Total asset growth and GDP
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growth are positively related. While this effect is particularly strong for quarters of positive
GDP growth, it turns negative during recessions (negative GDP growth). As we discuss in
greater detail in Section 6.1, the increase in total assets during the recent financial crisis is
mainly driven by an inflow of deposits and Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds.
In Table 4, we report the results of regression models (3a) and (3b). Compared to com-
mercial banks with less than 20% fair value assets, the procyclical relation between ∆Total
Assets and ∆Book Leverage is significantly stronger for savings banks and commercial
banks with more than 20% fair value assets. There is no statistically significant difference
in coefficients between commercial banks with more than 20% fair value assets and sav-
ings banks. The relation between ∆GDP and ∆Book Leverage is significantly weaker for
savings banks and strongest for commercial banks with more than 20% fair value assets.
The results are robust to controlling for bank size. The finding that savings banks show a
strong positive relation between ∆Total Assets and ∆Book Leverage and a weak positive
relation between ∆GDP and ∆Book Leverage could be related to their high reliance on
deposit financing and high costs of adjusting their capital structure (high cost of raising
equity and low share of short-term subordinate debt outstanding). When deposits increase,
total assets and leverage increase if savings banks do not adjust their leverage. When GDP
growth increases, savings banks might find it costly to expand or increase leverage.
In Table 5, we focus on the relation between total asset growth and book leverage
growth (model (4a)). The interaction terms of ∆Total Assets with unrealized gains and
losses on AfS securities are not statistically significant for the full sample and all subsamples
when banks expand their balance sheet. Upon balance sheet contractions, the interaction is
statistically significant and positive for the full sample and savings banks. In untabulated
results, we find that the effect is driven by unrealized gains, not losses. Overall, higher
unrealized fair value gains (losses) on AfS securities do not magnify the procyclical leverage
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pattern when banks expand (contract) their balance sheet.19
Regulatory capital (book leverage) interacts positively (negatively) with ∆Total Assets
when banks expand their balance sheets. This finding is consistent with better-capitalized
banks being less constrained from increasing leverage when they expand. For balance sheet
contractions, the interaction terms are not statistically significant. Moreover, we find that
the interaction terms of net income with ∆Total Assets are positive.
The interaction of changes in average risk-weighted assets with changes in total assets
is negative and significant upon balance sheet expansions for the full sample. This finding
is in line with the argument that the positive relation between ∆Total Assets and ∆Book
Leverage arises if an expansion of the balance sheet accompanies a decrease in the average
risk weight, e.g., because these banks hold more cash or invest in securities with low risk
weights. However, for savings banks, the coefficient is positive. This result suggests that
savings banks disproportionally increase loans when expanding their balance sheet, which
is consistent with the findings of our asset-component analysis below (Panel A of Table
7). When banks shrink their balance sheet, the interaction of ∆Total Assets with ∆Risk
Weight is positive and significant for the full sample and both types of commercial banks.
The increase in average risk weight might force banks to disproportionally reduce leverage,
given a binding leverage constraint. However, it is also possible that the coefficient captures
the mechanical effect of banks reducing cash and selling liquid assets (both have low risk
weights) as a response to an outflow of deposits, which is consistent with our findings in
19We run two separate regressions for a subsample of banks with positive trading assets. In untabulated
results we find that the interaction terms of trading income with ∆Total Assets are significant and positive
for balance sheet expansions, but insignificant for contractions. Trading income includes realized gains and
losses from the sale of trading assets and fee income from non-proprietary trading activities. Thus, trading
income is not a clean measure of unrealized fair value gains and losses. Including income from assets held
under the fair value option, which only contains unrealized gains and losses, reduces the significance of
the coefficient. We do not find that trading income or the sum of trading income and unrealized gains
and losses from assets held under the fair value option magnify the relation between ∆Book Leverage and
∆GDP.
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Panel B of Table 7.
In Table 6, we investigate the relation between GDP growth and book leverage growth.
For now, our discussion focuses on periods of positive GDP growth. We look at the
interactions for periods of negative GDP growth in Section 6.1. The interaction terms with
unrealized gains and losses on AfS securities are statistically insignificant during economic
expansions both for the full sample and all types of banks. Therefore, unrealized fair
value gains do not seem to contribute to the procyclical relation between GDP growth and
book leverage growth. These findings are consistent with Xie (2016), who shows that, if
anything, unrealized net gains on AfS securities tend to be countercyclical. The coefficients
of the interaction terms with net income are insignificant.
Interestingly, the interactions with total regulatory capital are negative and significant
for the total sample and commercial banks with less than 20% fair value assets. The signif-
icant negative coefficient for these banks suggests that book leverage increases less during
economic expansions if banks have a higher regulatory capital ratio. The coefficients of
the interaction with the leverage ratio are insignificant. One possible explanation is that
it is easier for well capitalized banks to obtain equity financing during times of higher
GDP growth. Indeed, in untabulated tests we find that if we replace ∆Book Leverage by
the amount of equity issued, the relation between equity issuance and ∆GDP is signifi-
cantly stronger for well capitalized banks. Finally, the interaction with ∆Risk Weight is
insignificant during economic expansions.
Panel A of Table 7 provides the estimation results for our asset-component analysis. For
balance sheet expansions, the coefficient of ∆Loans is the largest (highly significant) across
all banks and asset types. This result is not related to the fact that loans are the largest
asset class on the balance sheet as the regression coefficient captures the sensitivity of book
leverage to percentage changes in loans. For balance sheet contractions, the coefficient
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of ∆Loans is not significant. Consequently, banks disproportionally expand loans, not
securities, when they increase book leverage and total assets. In contrast, banks in our
sample reduce securities and cash upon procyclical balance sheet contractions. In Panel B
of Table 7, we find that the positive relation between ∆Total Assets and ∆Book Leverage
is mainly associated with disproportional expansions and contractions of deposits. Inflows
(outflows) of deposits lead to a direct increase (decrease) in total assets and book leverage.
Thus, procyclical leverage is inherently linked to inflows and outflows of deposits as part
of banks’ general business model.
In Table 8, we report our results for the effects of off-balance sheet obligations and
realized gains on loan sales on procyclical leverage. We find that banks with a higher
increase in loan commitments have a lower book leverage ratio. Similarly, an increase
in loan commitments dampens procyclicality when banks increase their balance sheet.
Therefore, banks that expand both on-balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet loan
commitments increase book leverage by less than banks that do not increase their loan
commitments. In contrast, a higher growth in loan commitments is associated with stronger
procyclical balance sheet contractions. Our findings on loan commitments suggest that
these potential obligations are taken into account by banks as they are associated with more
conservative book leverage. The interaction term of ∆Total Assets with realized gains on
loan sales is positive and highly statistically significant for balance sheet expansions. This
evidence suggests an association between liquidity in secondary loan markets, loan growth,
and leverage procyclicality. The interaction terms of loan commitments with ∆GDP as
well as the coefficients for off-balance sheet securitized assets and its interactions are not
significant.
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6 Supplementary Analyses
6.1 The Crisis of 2007-2009 and Government Interventions
We take a closer look at the inverse relation between ∆GDP and ∆Total Assets during
periods of negative GDP growth, which implies that bank assets increase during recessions.
Our analysis highlights that this result is driven by the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (Panel
A of Table IA2, where “IA” refers to tables in the Internet Appendix). If we exclude
quarters with negative GDP growth that stem from the crisis of 2007-2009, the relation
between ∆GDP and ∆Total Assets also becomes positive during recessions.
We find that it is mainly inflows of deposits but also government sponsored capital
injections in the form of TARP that explain the increase in total assets during the crisis
in quarters with negative GDP growth (Panel B of Table IA2). The results for deposits
are in line with the evidence by Acharya and Mora (2015), who document a large inflow
of funds into the banking sector in the form of deposits at the end of 2008 and in 2009.
We find a weak positive association between changes in loan commitments and changes
in total assets during this time. Therefore, increases (decreases) in loan commitments are
associated with expansions (contractions) of total assets. One possible explanation is that
banks that increased their balance sheet were able to expand loan commitments, while
banks that contracted their balance sheet experienced drawdowns and revocations of loan
commitments. Drawdowns do not result in an increase of total assets if banks use cash
or liquid securities, and not external funds, to finance the drawdowns. Off-balance sheet
securitized assets are not significantly related to balance sheet expansions or contractions
during the financial crisis.
The leverage dynamics of banks that received TARP funds after the Lehman bankruptcy
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are very different compared to institutions that did not receive TARP funds (Table IA3).
Banks that received TARP equity between Q4-2008 and Q2-2009 exhibit a strong reduc-
tion of book leverage induced by the government funds. In contrast, non-TARP banks
increased their book leverage over the same period.
When interpreting the interaction terms with ∆GDP during recessions, it is important
to distinguish between banks that received TARP funds and those that did not. We
introduce the indicator variable 1TARP BANK QRTi,t , which is equal to one if bank i received
TARP injections in quarter t, and zero otherwise. We then run a modified version of
regression model (4b), in which we estimate the interactions for negative GDP growth
(i) for quarters in which the leverage of TARP banks was affected by direct government
interventions and (ii) for all other contractionary quarters. We find that most of the
significant interaction terms during recessions stem from bank quarters that were impacted
by TARP interventions (Table IA4). For recessionary bank-quarters that were not affected
by TARP capital infusions, unrealized fair value losses on AfS securities still do not magnify
the link between ∆GDP and ∆Book Leverage. The negative and significant interaction
term for commercial banks with less than 20% fair value assets that did not receive TARP
funds is driven by large unrealized gains on AfS securities in 2009, which resulted from
a decrease in interest rates (untabulated; see also Xie (2016)). The coefficient of the
interaction with the total capital ratio is negative and significant for those recessionary
bank-quarters that are not affected by direct government intervention. This finding is
in line with the intuition that weakly-capitalized banks have to delever more quickly in
economic downturns due to binding regulatory capital constraints.
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6.2 Alternative Measures of Banks’ Business Model
We add a bank’s mortgage exposure, consumer loans exposure, and commercial real
estate exposure as well as the share of interest to non-interest income as alternative proxies
for the bank’s business model to regressions (3a) and (3b). We interact these variables with
∆Total Assets and ∆GDP to see whether the estimates are significant and whether the
coefficients of the interactions with savings banks and commercial banks with more than
20% fair value assets drop in significance when adding the alternative business model
proxies. As a reference case, we first estimate our regressions for the bank quarters in
which the business model proxy is available without including the variable. The objective
is to verify that the coefficients of the interaction terms for savings banks and commercial
banks with more than 20% fair value assets are significant and have the same sign as in
the full sample in Table 4.
When we include banks’ commercial real estate exposure as additional variable (Ta-
ble IA5), the coefficient of the interaction with ∆Total Assets is negative and significant.
Therefore, banks with a higher share of commercial real estate lending exhibit less pro-
cyclicality. Commercial real estate loans carry a high risk weight of 100%. Compared to
mortgages and securities (risk weights of 50% or less), banks that originate many commer-
cial real estate loans need to hold more capital against these assets, which weakens the
positive association between total asset growth and leverage growth. The coefficients of
the interactions with savings banks and commercial banks with more than 20% fair value
assets, which were previously positive and significant, become insignificant. This result
suggests that variation in the share of commercial real estate exposure can explain some
of the difference in procyclical leverage between commercial banks with less than 20% fair
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value assets and the other two types of banks.20 The interaction terms of our measures of
banks’ business model with ∆GDP are all insignificant.
6.3 Derivatives and AfS Equity Securities
We investigate whether there is a significant increase in procyclical leverage around
two institutional changes that imply an increased relevance of fair value accounting for
regulatory capital and the recognition of assets. First, unrealized gains on AfS equity
securities initially did not affect regulatory capital. However, since Q4-1998, the Fed
permits banks to include up to 45% of the pre-tax net unrealized holding gains on AfS
equity securities in Tier 2 capital, which is part of total regulatory capital. Second, with
a few exceptions, derivatives that banks held for hedging purposes were not recognized at
all or recognized under synthetic instrument accounting until the introduction of FAS 133,
which became effective in Q1-2001, with early adoption allowed as of Q3-1998. FAS 133
requires banks to classify derivatives held for accounting hedging purposes as fair value
hedges or cash flow hedges. The accounting treatment of fair value hedges is comparable
to the treatment of trading assets, and the treatment of cash flow hedges is comparable to
the treatment of AfS securities.
In the Internet Appendix, we test whether these two institutional changes increased
leverage procyclicality. Moreover, we rerun regression models (4a) and (4b), splitting total
unrealized gains and losses on AfS securities into their debt and equity components and
including unrealized gains and losses on cash flow hedges. Overall, our evidence does not
support the conclusion that FAS 133 and the partial removal of the prudential filter for
AfS equity securities resulted in stronger procyclicality. Moreover, we do not find that
20As a plausibility check, we verify that commercial banks with less than 20% fair value assets have a
higher exposure to commercial real estate than savings banks and commercial banks with more than 20%
fair value assets.
102
unrealized gains and losses on (i) cash flow hedges and (ii) AfS equity and debt securities
magnify procyclical leverage.
7 Conclusion
We investigate the determinants of procyclical book leverage for US commercial and
savings banks between Q1-1994 and Q1-2013, focusing on the role of accounting and regu-
lation. We follow Adrian and Shin (2010, 2014) and measure procyclical bank leverage as
the relation between quarterly book leverage growth and total asset growth. The approach
is used in several articles, and regulators as well as the business press often refer to it.
Procyclical leverage arises if an increase in the growth rate of total assets is associated
with an increase in the growth rate of book leverage. In addition, we also investigate the
relation between quarterly book leverage growth and GDP growth.
We find that total asset growth and GDP growth are both positively related to book
leverage growth. While the positive relation may capture lower risk and better lending
opportunities that result in more lending and higher leverage when economic conditions
improve, there is a concern that accounting and bank regulation could magnify these
associations.
Our evidence is not consistent with the notion that recognizing unrealized gains and
losses on AfS securities as stipulated by fair value accounting contributes to procyclical
leverage or that historical cost accounting reduces procyclicality. In contrast, procyclical
leverage is primarily driven by banks’ business models, their intermediation function of
providing loans and collecting deposits, and the volume of certain banking activities (e.g.,
loan sales).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Bank Characteristics
This table reports means and medians of various balance sheet characteristics and regulatory variables for our
sample banks. Panel A reports asset-specific variables and Panel B lists variables which are related to the
liability-side of the banks’ balance sheets. In Panel A, all figures are normalized by total assets (except for
total assets). In Panel B, all figures are normalized by total assets except for book leverage, the Tier 1 capital
ratio, and the total capital ratio. Other financial assets include cash and equivalents (marketable securities).
Other liabilities include all liabilities that cannot be classified as deposits, senior debt, or subordinated debt.
The fraction of fair value assets equals the sum of trading assets and AfS securities divided by total assets.
Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial. This sample covers US commercial and savings banks
during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013.
Commercial Banks Commercial Banks
Full Sample Savings Banks < 20% FV Assets > 20% FV Assets
Panel A: Assets Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Trading Assets [%] 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00
Available-for-Sale [%] 17.51 16.25 14.66 12.52 11.57 12.08 28.58 26.57
Held-to-Maturity [%] 3.67 0.24 5.22 0.60 4.06 0.27 2.22 0.09
Loans [%] 66.13 67.26 67.96 70.03 71.22 71.89 56.98 59.05
Other Financial Assets [%] 6.09 4.72 5.20 3.82 6.67 5.29 5.61 4.32
Total Financial Assets [%] 93.80 94.25 93.67 94.11 93.77 94.27 93.92 94.27
Risk-Weighted Assets [%] 69.63 70.05 60.91 61.64 75.17 75.76 64.96 65.30
Total Assets (US$ billion) 10.69 0.60 1.95 0.53 6.30 0.57 22.42 0.68
Commercial Banks Commercial Banks
Full Sample Savings Banks < 20% FV Assets > 20% FV Assets
Panel B: Liabilities Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Deposits [%] 77.53 79.60 71.29 72.49 79.86 81.64 77.13 78.94
Senior Debt [%] 10.49 8.70 15.49 13.90 8.39 6.90 10.67 9.32
Subordinated Debt [%] 0.87 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.09 0.60 0.79 0.00
Other Liabilities [%] 1.22 0.89 1.38 1.03 1.13 0.83 1.27 0.90
Total Liabilities [%] 90.35 90.83 88.79 89.78 90.69 90.99 90.65 90.93
Book Leverage 11.26 10.91 10.11 9.78 11.53 11.10 11.43 11.02
Tier 1 Capital Ratio [%] 13.72 12.58 17.17 15.11 12.49 11.75 14.16 13.40
Total Capital Ratio [%] 15.13 13.97 18.27 16.20 13.95 13.18 15.60 14.82
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for key variables of our empirical analysis. We report the number of
observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 1% quantile, 25% quantile (Q0.25), median, 75% quantile
(Q0.75), and 99% quantile (Q0.99). Variables are defined in Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained
from SNL Financial. Real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This
sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013.
N Mean SD Q0.01 Q0.25 Median Q0.75 Q0.99
∆GDP [%] 41748 0.50 0.68 -2.14 0.28 0.57 0.90 1.73
∆Total Assets [%] 41748 1.87 4.42 -8.10 -0.50 1.32 3.41 22.77
∆Book Leverage [%] 41748 0.13 6.52 -29.21 -2.32 -0.03 2.60 23.87
∆Risk Weight [%] 32968 0.06 3.37 -11.46 -1.60 0.18 1.82 10.53
∆Goodwill [%] 39821 0.11 2.48 -12.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.89
Unrealized Gains AfS [] 36467 0.04 1.48 -5.31 -0.54 0.01 0.68 4.65
Net Income [] 41479 1.86 2.30 -10.81 1.29 2.24 3.04 5.84
Realized Gains Loans [] 36906 0.30 0.71 -0.07 0.00 0.05 0.28 5.05
Total Capital Ratiot-1 [%] 37300 15.12 4.58 9.00 12.14 13.94 16.60 36.10
Book Leveraget-1 41748 11.25 3.19 4.52 9.23 10.93 12.82 23.39
qt-1 38434 1.39 0.72 0.17 0.88 1.30 1.79 3.89
Bank Sizet-1 41748 20.58 1.48 18.87 19.53 20.19 21.16 25.65
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Figure 1: Book Leverage Growth and Total Asset Growth
This scatter plot shows the positive and highly significant relation between ∆Total Assets and
∆Book Leverage of US commercial and savings banks between Q1-1994 and Q1-2013 (41748 bank-
quarter observations). The solid line displays the fitted values from an OLS regression of ∆Book
Leverage on ∆Total Assets. ∆Total Assets and ∆Book Leverage are defined as ln[variablet] -
ln[variablet−1] and the data is obtained from SNL Financial.
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Table 3: Measuring Procyclical Leverage
This table reports the estimation results for regression models (1a) to (2), and variations thereof.
The dependent variable is either the quarterly growth rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage)
or the quarterly growth rate of total assets (∆Total Assets). The key explanatory variables are
the quarterly growth rates of GDP (∆GDP), total assets (∆Total Assets), and their interaction.
Depending on the specification, we distinguish between upswings and downswings. Variables
are defined in Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and real GDP is
retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce).
This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013.
Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by:
*** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Total Assets 
         
∆Total Assets 0.510***    0.490*** 0.485***   
 (0.020)    (0.020) (0.023)   
         
∆Total Assets * 1∆TA>0  0.428***       
  (0.024)       
         
∆Total Assets * 1∆TA<0  0.645***       
  (0.060)       
         
∆GDP   0.643***  0.545*** 0.525*** 0.200***  
   (0.059)  (0.056) (0.065) (0.038)  
         
∆GDP * 1∆GDP>0    1.167***    0.793*** 
    (0.083)    (0.063) 
         
∆GDP * 1∆GDP<0    1.229***    -0.651*** 
    (0.190)    (0.092) 
         
∆Total Assets * ∆GDP      0.884   
      (2.081)   
         
1∆TA>0  0.007***       
  (0.001)       
         
1∆GDP>0    -0.015***    0.001 
    (0.002)    (0.001) 
         
Constant -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.011*** -0.001 -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
         
Observations 41748 41748 41748 41748 41748 41748 41748 41748 
R2 0.176 0.180 0.030 0.033 0.132 0.132 0.076 0.081 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table 4: Procyclical Leverage, Business Model, and Bank Size
This table reports the estimation results for regression models (3a) and (3b). The dependent variable is the quarterly growth
rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage). The explanatory variables are the quarterly growth rates of total assets (∆Total
Assets) and real GDP (∆GDP) as well as lagged bank size (Bank Sizet-1), a dummy for savings banks (1Savings Banks),
a dummy for commercial banks with more than 20% fair value assets (1Commercial Banks>20% FV), and several interaction
terms as discussed in Section 3. Variables are defined in Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial
and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce). This
sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered standard errors at
the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 
 
 Full Sample 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ∆Book Leverage 
       
∆Total Assets (TA) 0.490*** 0.404*** 1.612*** 0.462*** 0.460*** 1.628*** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.269) (0.019) (0.019) (0.269) 
       
    ∆TA * 1Savings Bank  0.163*** 0.158***   0.159*** 
  (0.054) (0.052)   (0.051) 
       
    ∆TA * 1Commercial Bank>20% FV  0.101*** 0.129***   0.128*** 
  (0.038) (0.039)   (0.039) 
       
    ∆TA * Bank Sizet-1   -0.059***   -0.060*** 
   (0.013)   (0.013) 
       
∆GDP 0.545*** 0.471*** 0.465*** 0.461*** -2.118*** -2.404*** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.074) (0.753) (0.712) 
       
    ∆GDP * 1Savings Bank    -0.437*** -0.412*** -0.428*** 
    (0.153) (0.154) (0.154) 
       
    ∆GDP * 1Commercial Bank>20% FV    0.288** 0.267** 0.250** 
    (0.129) (0.128) (0.127) 
       
    ∆GDP * Bank Sizet-1     0.125*** 0.140*** 
     (0.036) (0.034) 
       
Bank Sizet-1   -0.001**  -0.002*** -0.001*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
       
1Savings Bank  0.000 0.000 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
1Commercial Bank>20% FV  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.002** -0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Constant -0.021*** -0.009*** 0.006 -0.010*** 0.039*** 0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.008) 
       
Observations 41748 41748 41748 41748 41748 41748 
R2 0.132 0.103 0.109 0.102 0.104 0.110 
       
Differences:       
∆TA * 1Savings Bank – 
∆TA * 1Commercial Bank>20% FV 
 0.062 0.029   0.031 
       
∆GDP * 1Savings Bank – 
∆GDP * 1Commercial Bank>20% FV 
   -0.725*** -0.679*** -0.678*** 
       
Bank Fixed Effects Yes No No No No No 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table 5: Determinants of the Relation between Book Leverage Growth and Total Asset
Growth This table reports the estimation results for regression model (4a). The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate
of book leverage (∆Book Leverage). The key explanatory variables are the interaction terms between the quarterly growth rate of
total assets (∆Total Assets) and unrealized gains on AfS securities (Unrealized Gains AfS), net income (Net Income), the lagged
total capital ratio (Total Capital Ratiot−1), the quarterly growth rate of the average risk weight (∆Risk Weight), and the lagged
book leverage ratio (Book Leveraget−1). For each interaction term we distinguish between ∆Total Assets>0 and ∆Total Assets<0
to account for potential non-linearities in effects. Variables are defined in Table A1. For expositional purposes we multiply the
accounting items with 1000 and ∆Risk Weight as well as Total Capital Ratiot−1 with 100. Bank fundamentals are obtained from
SNL Financial and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce).
This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered standard errors at
the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample Savings Banks CB < 20% FV CB > 20% FV 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage 
        
∆Total Assets (TA) 0.719*** 1.376*** 0.439* 1.136*** 
 (0.163) (0.397) (0.230) (0.264) 
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆TA>0 -0.012 -0.020 -0.003 -0.018 
 (0.014) (0.043) (0.026) (0.017) 
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆TA<0 0.044* 0.172* 0.010 0.041 
 (0.023) (0.088) (0.043) (0.027) 
     
    ∆TA * Net Income * 1∆TA>0 0.052*** -0.000 0.058*** 0.028 
 (0.014) (0.047) (0.016) (0.023) 
     
    ∆TA * Net Income * 1∆TA<0 0.124*** 0.069* 0.144*** 0.093*** 
 (0.015) (0.040) (0.018) (0.034) 
     
    ∆TA * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆TA>0 0.012** -0.005 0.020*** 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
     
    ∆TA * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆TA<0 0.003 -0.005 0.020 -0.020 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) 
     
    ∆TA * ∆Risk Weight * 1∆TA>0 -0.009* 0.021* -0.010 -0.015** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
    ∆TA * ∆Risk Weight * 1∆TA<0 0.029*** 0.023 0.030** 0.028* 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
     
    ∆TA * Book Leveraget-1 * 1∆TA>0 -0.054*** -0.071** -0.046*** -0.063*** 
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.013) (0.016) 
     
    ∆TA * Book Leveraget-1* 1∆TA<0 0.000 -0.025 0.004 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.032) (0.013) (0.024) 
     
∆GDP 0.417*** -0.115 0.761*** 0.096 
 (0.071) (0.155) (0.093) (0.147) 
     
Unrealized Gains AfS -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
     
Net Income -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Total Capital Ratiot-1 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
∆Risk Weight 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Bank Sizet-1 -0.009*** -0.011 -0.008*** -0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
qt-1 0.003*** -0.001 0.003** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Book Leveraget-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
1∆TA>0 0.007*** 0.003 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
∆Goodwill -0.225*** -0.261*** -0.260*** -0.163*** 
 (0.020) (0.080) (0.028) (0.024) 
     
Constant 0.264*** 0.315 0.257*** 0.390*** 
 (0.037) (0.214) (0.046) (0.072) 
     
Observations 26034 3537 13487 9010 
R2 0.402 0.442 0.364 0.517 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table 6: Determinants of the Relation between Book Leverage Growth and GDP Growth
This table reports the estimation results for regression model (4b). The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of book
leverage (∆Book Leverage). The key explanatory variables are the interaction terms between the quarterly growth rate of GDP
(∆GDP) and unrealized gains on AfS securities (Unrealized Gains AfS), net income (Net Income), the lagged total capital ratio
(Total Capital Ratiot−1), the quarterly growth rate of the average risk weight (∆Risk Weight), and the lagged book leverage ratio
(Book Leveraget−1). For each interaction term we distinguish between ∆GDP>0 and ∆GDP<0 to account for potential non-linearities
in effects across up- and downswings. Variables are defined in Table A1. For expositional purposes we multiply the accounting items
with 1000 and ∆Risk Weight as well as Total Capital Ratiot−1 with 100. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and
real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce). This sample covers
US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given
in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample Savings Banks CB < 20% FV CB > 20% FV 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage 
        
∆GDP 1.387* -1.958 2.593** 0.895 
 (0.804) (1.249) (1.229) (1.431) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆GDP>0 0.006 0.044 0.153 -0.069 
 (0.065) (0.245) (0.146) (0.070) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆GDP<0 -0.170 -0.153 -0.532*** 0.168 
 (0.108) (0.257) (0.199) (0.128) 
     
    ∆GDP * Net Income * 1∆GDP>0 -0.004 0.174 -0.111 0.090 
 (0.058) (0.143) (0.078) (0.123) 
     
    ∆GDP * Net Income * 1∆GDP<0 -0.141** -0.130 -0.130 -0.205 
 (0.066) (0.105) (0.085) (0.148) 
     
    ∆GDP * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆GDP>0 -0.070*** 0.006 -0.097** -0.060 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.046) (0.042) 
     
    ∆GDP * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆GDP<0 -0.153*** -0.001 -0.163** -0.308*** 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.070) (0.074) 
     
    ∆GDP * ∆Risk Weight * 1∆GDP>0 0.001 -0.030 -0.023 0.056 
 (0.034) (0.086) (0.052) (0.052) 
     
    ∆GDP * ∆Risk Weight * 1∆GDP<0 -0.132** -0.007 -0.183** -0.040 
 (0.059) (0.127) (0.085) (0.094) 
     
    ∆GDP * Book Leveraget-1* 1∆GDP>0 -0.038 0.148 -0.078 -0.048 
 (0.043) (0.095) (0.060) (0.071) 
     
    ∆GDP * Book Leveraget-1* 1∆GDP<0 0.222*** 0.234* 0.163** 0.377*** 
 (0.060) (0.120) (0.080) (0.119) 
     
∆Total Assets 0.602*** 0.763*** 0.531*** 0.665*** 
 (0.025) (0.077) (0.033) (0.036) 
     
Unrealized Gains AfS -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Net Income -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Total Capital Ratiot-1 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
∆Risk Weight -0.001** 0.001 -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Bank Sizet-1 -0.008*** -0.010 -0.007*** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
qt-1 0.005*** -0.003 0.006*** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Book Leveraget-1 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
1∆GDP>0 -0.006*** 0.000 -0.008*** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
∆Goodwill -0.263*** -0.290*** -0.308*** -0.193*** 
 (0.022) (0.102) (0.031) (0.028) 
     
Constant 0.240*** 0.318 0.222*** 0.388*** 
 (0.040) (0.193) (0.049) (0.076) 
     
Observations 26034 3537 13487 9010 
R2 0.371 0.414 0.323 0.506 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table 7: Asset-Liability-Component Analysis of Procyclical Bank Leverage
This table reports the estimation results for a modified version of regression model (1a). The dependent
variable is the quarterly growth rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage). In Panel A, the key explanatory
variables are the quarterly growth rates of loans (∆Loans), (AfS and HtM) securities (∆Securities), as well
as cash & equivalents (∆Cash). In Panel B, the key explanatory variables are the quarterly growth rates
of deposits (∆Deposits), senior debt (∆Senior Debt) and subordinated debt (∆Subordinated Debt). For
each asset and liability component, we differentiate between balance sheet expansions and contractions
by forming interaction terms. Variables are defined in Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained from
SNL Financial. This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to
Q1-2013. Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated
by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
Panel A Full Sample Savings Banks CB < 20% FV CB > 20% FV
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage
  
∆Loans * 1∆TA>0 0.209*** 0.307*** 0.203*** 0.184***
 (0.020) (0.061) (0.028) (0.027)
   
∆Loans * 1∆TA<0 -0.038 -0.052 -0.050 0.057
 (0.033) (0.075) (0.054) (0.041)
   
∆Securities * 1∆TA>0 0.044*** 0.025* 0.024*** 0.131***
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013)
   
∆Securities* 1∆TA<0 0.031*** -0.002 0.028*** 0.094***
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.021)
   
∆Cash * 1∆TA>0 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.026*** 0.030***
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
   
∆Cash * 1∆TA<0 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.022***
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
  
Observations 40787 6790 20912 13085
R2 0.160 0.145 0.152 0.297
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank
   
 
 
Panel B Full Sample Savings Banks CB < 20% FV CB > 20% FV
 [1] [2] [3] [4]
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage
  
∆Deposits * 1∆TA>0 0.334*** 0.396*** 0.306*** 0.370***
 (0.034) (0.106) (0.046) (0.054)
   
∆Deposits * 1∆TA<0 0.501*** 0.465*** 0.536*** 0.491***
 (0.062) (0.094) (0.090) (0.113)
   
∆Senior Debt * 1∆TA>0 0.037*** 0.064*** 0.034*** 0.036***
 (0.004) (0.020) (0.005) (0.007)
   
∆Senior Debt * 1∆TA<0 0.049*** 0.079*** 0.051*** 0.040***
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.009) (0.012)
   
∆Subordinated Debt * 1∆TA>0 0.008 -0.012 0.002 0.033***
 (0.008) (0.028) (0.011) (0.011)
   
∆Subordinated Debt * 1∆TA<0 0.058*** 0.090 0.060*** 0.048***
 (0.013) (0.056) (0.019) (0.017)
  
Observations 14290 1554 8460 4276
R2 0.179 0.214 0.176 0.298
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank
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Table 8: Off-Balance Sheet Obligations, Loan Sales, and Procyclical Bank Leverage
This table reports the estimation results for modified versions of regression models (4a) and (4b). The
dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage). The key explanatory
variables are the interaction terms between the quarterly growth rate of total assets (∆Total Assets)
and GDP (∆GDP) with realized gains from the sale of loans (Realized Gains Loans) and the quarterly
growth rates of loan commitments (∆Loan Commitments) as well as off-balance sheet securitized assets
(∆Sec. Assets). For each interaction term, we distinguish between upswings and downswings to account
for potential non-linearities in effects. Variables are defined in Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained
from SNL Financial and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US
Department of Commerce). This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period
Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is
indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ∆Book Leverage 
      
∆Total Assets (TA) 0.529*** 0.566*** 0.399*** 0.356*** 0.547*** 0.489***
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.092) (0.119) (0.021) (0.027)
   
    ∆TA * ∆Loan Commitments * 1∆TA>0 -0.816***   
 (0.138)   
  
    ∆TA * ∆Loan Commitments * 1∆TA<0 1.463***   
 (0.378)   
   
    ∆TA * ∆Sec. Assets * 1∆TA>0 -0.341  
 (0.207)  
  
    ∆TA * ∆Sec. Assets * 1∆TA<0 0.092  
 (0.607)  
   
    ∆TA * Realized Gains Loans * 1∆TA>0   0.054***
   (0.020)
  
    ∆TA * Realized Gains Loans * 1∆TA<0   0.019
   (0.046)
   
∆GDP 1.027*** 1.302*** 1.247*** 1.331*** 0.779*** 1.190***
 (0.078) (0.092) (0.262) (0.375) (0.066) (0.090)
   
    ∆GDP * ∆Loan Commitments * 1∆GDP>0 0.438   
 (0.813)   
  
    ∆GDP * ∆Loan Commitments * 1∆GDP<0 -1.879   
 (1.948)   
   
    ∆GDP * ∆Sec. Assets * 1∆GDP>0 -0.893  
 (1.330)  
  
    ∆GDP * ∆Sec. Assets * 1∆GDP<0 -0.440  
 (2.083)  
   
    ∆GDP * Realized Gains Loans * 1∆GDP>0   -0.090
   (0.118)
  
    ∆GDP * Realized Gains Loans * 1∆GDP<0   0.772**
   (0.303)
   
∆Loan Commitments -0.018*** 0.015**   
 (0.003) (0.008)   
   
∆Sec. Assets -0.004 0.012  
 (0.007) (0.008)  
   
Realized Gains Loans  -0.005*** -0.005***
  (0.001) (0.001)
   
Bank Sizet-1 0.003** 0.004*** -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003**
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
  
qt-1 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.009*** -0.009***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
   
Book Leveraget-1 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004*** -0.003***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
   
1∆TA>0 0.004*** 0.011*  0.006***
 (0.001) (0.005)  (0.001)
  
1∆GDP>0 -0.008*** -0.002  -0.012***
 (0.002) (0.006)  (0.001)
   
∆Goodwill -0.282*** -0.263*** -0.264*** -0.254*** -0.272*** -0.262***
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.061) (0.060) (0.026) (0.025)
   
Constant -0.039 -0.059* 0.063 0.086 -0.013 -0.027
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.218) (0.208) (0.030) (0.030)
   
Observations 23937 23937 1664 1664 32805 32805
R2 0.180 0.191 0.171 0.185 0.180 0.184
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
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Appendix
Table A1: Variable Definitions
This table defines the variables used in our empirical analyses and indicates their data source.
Variable Data Source Definition
GDPt BEA Real US gross domestic product at the end of quarter t.
∆GDPt BEA ln(GDPt) − ln(GDPt-1).
Total Assetsi,t SNL Financial Book value of all assets recognized on the balance sheet of
bank i at the end of quarter t.
∆Total Assetsi,t SNL Financial ln(Total Assetsi,t) − ln(Total Assetsi,t-1).
Total Equityi,t SNL Financial Book value of bank i’s equity at the end of quarter t.
∆Total Equityi,t SNL Financial ln(Total Equityi,t) − ln(Total Equityi,t-1).
Total Liabilitiesi,t SNL Financial Total Assetsi,t - Total Equityi,t.
∆Total Liabilitiesi,t SNL Financial ln(Total Liabilitiesi,t) − ln(Total Liabilitiesi,t-1).
Book Leveragei,t SNL Financial Total Assetsi,t / Total Equityi,t.
∆Book Leveragei,t SNL Financial ln(Book Leveragei,t) − ln(Book Leveragei,t-1).
1∆Total Assets(TA)i,t>0 SNL Financial Indicator variable equal to one if ∆Total Assetsi,t is
positive, zero otherwise.
1∆GDPt>0 SNL Financial Indicator variable equal to one if ∆GDPt is positive, zero
otherwise.
1Savings Banki SNL Financial Indicator variable equal to one if bank i is a savings bank,
zero otherwise.
1Commercial Bank>20% FVi,t SNL Financial Indicator variable equal to one if bank i is a commercial
bank with more than 20% fair value assets at the end of
quarter t, zero otherwise.
Unrealized Gains AfSi,t SNL Financial Change in net unrealized gain on AfS securities of bank i
during quarter t / Total Assetsi,t-1.
Net Incomei,t SNL Financial Net income of bank i during quarter t / Total Assetsi,t-1.
RWAi,t SNL Financial Total risk-weighted assets of bank i at the end of quarter t.
Total Capital Ratioi,t SNL Financial Total Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital of bank i at the end of
quarter t / RWAi,t.
Risk Weighti,t SNL Financial Total risk-weighted assets of bank i at the end of quarter t
/ Total Assetsi,t.
∆Risk Weighti,t SNL Financial ln(Risk Weighti,t) − ln(Risk Weighti,t-1).
Bank Sizei,t SNL Financial ln(Total Assetsi,t).
qi,t SNL Financial Market Capitalizationi,t / Total Equityi,t.
Goodwilli,t SNL Financial Excess of purchase price paid over value of net assets
acquired of bank i at the end of quarter t.
∆Goodwilli,t SNL Financial (Goodwilli,t − Goodwilli,t-1) / |Total Assetsi,t − Total
Assetsi,t-1|.
Loansi,t SNL Financial Net loans of bank i at the end of quarter t.
∆Loansi,t SNL Financial ln(Loansi,t) − ln(Loansi,t-1).
Securitiesi,t SNL Financial Sum of available-for-sale, held-to-maturity, and trading
securities of bank i at the end of quarter t.
∆Securitiesi,t SNL Financial ln(Securitiesi,t) − ln(Securitiesi,t-1).
Cashi,t SNL Financial Cash and equivalents of bank i at the end of quarter t.
∆Cashi,t SNL Financial ln(Cashi,t) − ln(Cashi,t-1).
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Depositsi,t SNL Financial Total deposits of bank i at the end of quarter t.
∆Depositsi,t SNL Financial ln(Depositsi,t) − ln(Depositsi,t-1).
Senior Debti,t SNL Financial Senior debt of bank i at the end of quarter t.
∆Senior Debti,t SNL Financial ln(Senior Debti,t) − ln(Senior Debti,t-1).
Subordinated Debti,t SNL Financial Subordinated debt of bank i at end of quarter t.
∆Subordinated Debti,t SNL Financial ln(Subordinated Debti,t) − ln(Subordinated
Debti,t-1).
Loan Commitmentsi,t SNL Financial Total unused loan commitments outstanding of
bank i at the end of quarter t.
∆Loan Commitmentsi,t SNL Financial ln(Loan Commitmentsi,t) − ln(Loan
Commitmentsi,t-1).
Securitized Assetsi,t SNL Financial Loans held-off balance sheet for securitization
purposes of bank i at end of quarter t.
∆Securitized Assetsi,t SNL Financial ln(Securitized Assetsi,t) − ln(Securitized
Assetsi,t-1).
Realized Gains Loansi,t SNL Financial Net gains on the sale of loans of bank i during
quarter t / Total Assetsi,t-1.
TARP Injectionsi,t SNL Financial TARP preferred equity received by bank i in
quarter t / Total Assetsi,t.
TARP BANK QRTi,t SNL Financial Indicator variable equal to one if bank i received
TARP injections in quarter t.
Mortgage Exp.i,t SNL Financial Mortgage loans of bank i at end of quarter t /
Total Assetsi,t.
Consumer Loan Exp.i,t SNL Financial Consumer loans of bank i at end of quarter t /
Total Assetsi,t.
Commercial RE Exp.i,t SNL Financial Commercial real estate loans of bank i at end of
quarter t / Total Assetsi,t.
II to Non-IIi,t SNL Financial Interest income / non-interest income of bank i
during quarter t.
Derivative Exp.i,Q4-2000 SNL Financial Gross notional amount of derivatives of bank i at
the end of quarter Q4-2000 / Total Assetsi,Q4-2000.
AfS Equity Exp.i,Q3-1998 SNL Financial Amount of AfS equity securities of bank i at the
end of quarter Q3-1998 / Total Assetsi,Q3-1998.
Unrealized Gains AfS Debti,t SNL Financial Change in net unrealized gain on AfS debt sec.
of bank i during quarter t / Total Assetsi,t-1.
Unrealized Gains AfS Equityi,t SNL Financial Change in net unrealized gain on AfS equity sec.
of bank i during quarter t / Total Assetsi,t-1.
Unrealized Gains CF Hedgesi,t SNL Financial Change in net unrealized gain on cash flow hedges
of bank i during quarter t / Total Assetsi,t-1.
Unrealized Gains AfS + CF Hedgesi,t SNL Financial Change in net unrealized gain on AfS sec. and
cash flow hedges of bank i during quarter t /
Total Assetsi,t-1.
Realized Gains AfS & HtMi,t SNL Financial Net gains on the sale of HtM and AfS securities of
bank i during quarter t / Total Assetsi,t-1.
Residual Net Incomei,t SNL Financial Net Incomei,t − Realized Gains AfS & HtMi,t .
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Internet Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics by Bank Type
Table IA1: Summary Statistics by Bank Type
This table reports descriptive statistics for key variables of our empirical analysis by bank type. We report the
number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 1% quantile, 25% quantile (Q0.25), median, 75% quantile
(Q0.75), and 99% quantile (Q0.99). Panels A to C list the descriptive statistics of bank-level variables for savings
banks, commercial banks < 20% fair value assets, and commercial banks > 20% fair value assets. The fraction of
fair value assets equals the sum of trading assets and AfS securities divided by total assets. Variables are defined in
Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial. Real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994
to Q1-2013.
N Mean SD Q0.01 Q0.25 Median Q0.75 Q0.99
Panel A: Savings Banks
∆Total Assets [%] 7116 1.50 4.37 -8.17 -0.77 0.91 2.84 22.61
∆Book Leverage [%] 7116 0.24 7.12 -29.30 -1.85 0.26 2.88 22.25
∆Risk Weight [%] 4836 0.25 3.65 -11.53 -1.46 0.34 2.01 10.53
∆Goodwill [%] 6243 0.07 1.86 -5.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.39
Unrealized Gains AfS [] 6450 0.02 1.31 -5.20 -0.36 0.00 0.45 4.24
Net Income [] 7094 1.33 2.15 -9.55 0.80 1.64 2.37 5.49
Realized Gains Loans [] 6591 0.39 0.89 -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.33 5.05
Realized Gains AfS & HtM [] 7045 0.06 0.41 -1.74 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.74
Residual Net Income [] 5943 0.79 2.47 -12.05 0.37 1.25 1.96 4.91
Total Capital Ratiot-1 [%] 5421 18.21 6.77 10.08 13.15 16.13 21.34 36.10
Book Leveraget-1 7116 10.15 3.54 4.52 7.69 9.83 12.14 21.72
qt-1 6577 1.17 0.61 0.18 0.78 1.07 1.44 3.57
Bank Sizet-1 7116 20.34 1.21 18.85 19.39 20.06 20.95 23.94
Panel B: Commercial Banks < 20% FV Assets
∆Total Assets [%] 21346 2.05 4.51 -7.97 -0.39 1.49 3.67 23.51
∆Book Leverage [%] 21346 0.18 6.58 -27.44 -2.23 0.01 2.57 23.92
∆Risk Weight [%] 16949 0.02 3.28 -11.00 -1.57 0.14 1.73 10.04
∆Goodwill [%] 20711 0.10 2.58 -12.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.89
Unrealized Gains AfS [] 18390 0.03 1.01 -3.20 -0.39 0.01 0.49 2.67
Net Income [] 21180 1.83 2.50 -10.81 1.29 2.31 3.12 5.85
Realized Gains Loans [] 18760 0.32 0.74 -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.30 5.05
Realized Gains AfS & HtM [] 21101 0.04 0.33 -1.61 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.41
Residual Net Income [] 18076 1.38 2.78 -12.16 0.81 1.99 2.85 5.35
Total Capital Ratiot-1 [%] 19369 13.94 3.58 9.00 11.67 13.14 15.08 28.66
Book Leveraget-1 21346 11.51 3.10 5.32 9.60 11.11 12.97 23.46
qt-1 19535 1.41 0.73 0.17 0.89 1.33 1.81 3.87
Bank Sizet-1 21346 20.54 1.46 18.87 19.49 20.13 21.14 25.39
Panel C: Commercial Banks > 20% FV Assets
∆Total Assets [%] 13286 1.79 4.28 -8.09 -0.48 1.28 3.26 20.75
∆Book Leverage [%] 13286 -0.02 6.06 -20.84 -2.72 -0.27 2.53 21.22
∆Risk Weight [%] 11183 0.05 3.39 -11.33 -1.69 0.16 1.87 10.45
∆Goodwill [%] 12867 0.17 2.57 -10.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.20
Unrealized Gains AfS [] 11627 0.07 2.08 -5.31 -1.07 0.08 1.37 4.65
Net Income [] 13205 2.19 1.96 -7.21 1.64 2.47 3.16 5.56
Realized Gains Loans [] 11555 0.22 0.52 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.22 2.75
Realized Gains AfS & HtM [] 13172 0.11 0.42 -1.74 0.00 0.00 0.16 1.74
Residual Net Income [] 11236 1.86 1.98 -6.91 1.25 2.16 2.91 5.35
Total Capital Ratiot-1 [%] 12510 15.60 4.04 9.68 12.83 14.81 17.29 31.00
Book Leveraget-1 13286 11.42 3.00 5.62 9.42 11.03 12.86 22.37
qt-1 12322 1.49 0.73 0.18 0.96 1.40 1.89 3.89
Bank Sizet-1 13286 20.77 1.61 18.88 19.69 20.33 21.31 27.28
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Figure IA1: Book Leverage Growth and Total Asset Growth by Bank Type
This scatter plot shows the positive and highly significant relation between ∆Total Assets and ∆Book Leverage between
Q1-1994 and Q1-2013 by bank type (7116 bank-quarter observations for savings banks, 21346 bank-quarter observations for
commercial banks < 20% fair value assets, and 13286 bank-quarter observations for commercial banks > 20% fair value
assets). The solid lines display the fitted values from OLS regressions of ∆Book Leverage on ∆Total Assets. The fraction
of fair value assets equals the sum of trading assets and AfS securities divided by total assets. ∆Total Assets and ∆Book
Leverage are defined as ln[variablet] - ln[variablet−1] and the data is obtained from SNL Financial.
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Internet Appendix B: The Crisis of 2007-2009 and Government
Interventions
Table IA2: Changes in Total Assets During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009
Panel A reports the estimation results for linear regressions of the quarterly growth rate of total assets (∆Total Assets) on
the quarterly growth rate of GDP (∆GDP), distinguishing between economic expansions and contractions and focusing on
the financial crisis of 2007-2009. In column [2], the interaction term between (∆GDP) and 1∆GDP<0 only captures quarters
during the crisis that had negative GDP growth. In column [3], the interaction captures all other quarters with negative GDP
growth. In Panel B, we investigate which assets explain banks’ balance sheet expansions in recessionary quarters during the
financial crisis. The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of total assets (∆Total Assets). The key explanatory
variables are government sponsored capital injections in the form of TARP (TARP injections) and the quarterly growth rates
of deposits (∆Deposits), loan commitments (∆Loan Commitments), as well as off-balance sheet securitized assets (∆Sec.
Assets). We differentiate between balance sheet expansions and contractions by forming interaction terms. Variables are
defined in Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to
Q1-2013. Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, **
< 0.05, * < 0.10.
Panel A Full Sample 1∆GDP<0 = only Crisis of 2007-2009 
1∆GDP<0 = excl. Crisis 
of 2007-2009 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 ∆Total Assets ∆Total Assets ∆Total Assets 
    
∆GDP * 1∆GDP>0 0.793*** 0.794*** 0.783*** 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) 
    
∆GDP * 1∆GDP<0 -0.651*** -0.683*** 13.741*** 
 (0.092) (0.101) (2.403) 
    
1∆GDP>0 0.001 0.001 -0.049*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
    
Constant 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.067*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
    
Observations 41748 40098 37791 
R2 0.081 0.084 0.085 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank 
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Panel B Crisis of 2007-2009 & ∆GDP<0 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ∆Total Assets ∆Total Assets ∆Total Assets ∆Total Assets ∆Total Assets ∆Total Assets 
       
TARP Injections * 1∆TA>0  0.473**  0.666*** 0.821*** 1.287* 
  (0.206)  (0.141) (0.166) (0.681) 
       
TARP Injections * 1∆TA<0  -0.052  0.090 -0.067 -0.491 
  (0.201)  (0.181) (0.201) (0.699) 
       
∆Deposits * 1∆TA>0   0.552*** 0.554*** 0.572*** 0.652*** 
   (0.024) (0.025) (0.037) (0.089) 
       
∆Deposits * 1∆TA<0   0.186*** 0.189*** 0.171*** 0.123 
   (0.034) (0.035) (0.050) (0.160) 
       
∆Loan Commitments * 1∆TA>0     0.019* 0.032 
     (0.010) (0.043) 
       
∆Loan Commitments * 1∆TA<0     0.023** 0.034 
     (0.010) (0.090) 
       
∆Sec. Assets * 1∆TA>0      0.004 
      (0.020) 
       
∆Sec. Assets * 1∆TA<0      -0.003 
      (0.008) 
       
1∆Total Assets (TA)>0  0.055*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) 
       
Constant 0.015*** -0.023*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.029*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) 
       
Observations 3957 3648 3951 3642 1808 166 
R2 0.293 0.534 0.767 0.767 0.772 0.811 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table IA3: Relation between Book Leverage Growth and GDP Growth During the
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 This table reports the estimation results for a modified version
of regression model (1b) focusing on the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The dependent variable
is the quarterly growth rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage). The explanatory variables
are the quarterly growth rate of GDP(∆GDP), an indicator variable which is equal to one if
bank i received TARP injections in quarter t (1TARP BANK QRT), and their interaction. Variables
are defined in Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and real GDP
is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This sample covers US
commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered standard
errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** <
0.05, * < 0.10.
 
 
 
 
 
 Crisis of 2007-2009 & ∆GDP<0 
 [1] [2] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage 
   
∆GDP 1.755*** -0.395** 
 (0.230) (0.196) 
   
∆GDP * 1TARP_BANK_QRT  9.611*** 
  (0.678) 
   
1TARP_BANK_QRT  -0.003 
  (0.009) 
   
Constant 0.008*** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   
Observations 3957 3957 
R2 0.190 0.384 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank 
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Table IA4: Book Leverage Growth and GDP Growth - The Role of Recessions and Government
Interventions This table reports the estimation results for a modified version of regression model (4b). The dependent
variable is the quarterly growth rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage). The key explanatory variables are the interaction
terms between the quarterly growth rate of GDP (∆GDP) and unrealized gains on AfS securities (Unrealized Gains AfS), net
income (Net Income), the lagged total capital ratio (Total Capital Ratiot−1), the quarterly growth rate of the average risk
weight (∆Risk Weight), and the lagged book leverage ratio (Book Leveraget−1). For each interaction term, we distinguish
between ∆GDP>0 and ∆GDP<0 to account for potential non-linearities in effects across up- and downswings. During
downswings, we additionally distinguish between (i) bank-quarters in which the leverage of TARP banks was affected
by direct government interventions and (ii) all other bank-quarters. Variables are defined in Table A1. For expositional
purposes we multiply the accounting items with 1000 and ∆Risk Weight as well as Total Capital Ratiot−1 with 100. Bank
fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered
standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample Savings Banks CB < 20% FV CB > 20% FV 
 [1] [2] [3]* [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage 
        
∆GDP 1.210** -1.724 1.754* 0.644 
 (0.578) (1.056) (0.929) (0.931) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆GDP>0 -0.007 0.063 0.074 -0.057 
 (0.063) (0.240) (0.142) (0.070) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆GDP<0   -0.026 -0.212 -0.212* 0.097 
 (0.069) (0.163) (0.121) (0.081) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆GDP<0 * 1TARP_BANK_QRT -0.309* 1.550** -0.526** 0.215 
 (0.187) (0.636) (0.247) (0.228) 
     
    ∆GDP * Net Income * 1∆GDP>0 0.022 0.176 -0.066 0.082 
 (0.058) (0.141) (0.078) (0.120) 
     
    ∆GDP * Net Income * 1∆GDP<0  0.009 -0.174* -0.006 0.156 
 (0.057) (0.090) (0.078) (0.114) 
     
    ∆GDP * Net Income * 1∆GDP<0 * 1TARP_BANK_QRT -0.004 1.313 0.047 -0.071 
 (0.098) (0.866) (0.124) (0.158) 
     
    ∆GDP * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆GDP>0 -0.069*** -0.005 -0.072** -0.055** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.036) (0.027) 
     
    ∆GDP * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆GDP<0  -0.087*** 0.034 -0.087 -0.181*** 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.059) (0.057) 
     
    ∆GDP * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆GDP<0 * 1TARP_BANK_QRT -0.518*** -0.126 -0.629*** -0.557*** 
 (0.076) (0.402) (0.106) (0.147) 
     
    ∆GDP * ∆RWA * 1∆GDP>0 -0.017 -0.037 -0.065 0.060 
 (0.034) (0.083) (0.051) (0.051) 
     
    ∆GDP * ∆RWA * 1∆GDP<0  0.004 0.007 0.049 -0.064 
 (0.048) (0.085) (0.070) (0.071) 
     
    ∆GDP * ∆RWA * 1∆GDP<0 * 1TARP_BANK_QRT -0.070 1.039*** -0.084 0.024 
 (0.071) (0.282) (0.098) (0.122) 
     
    ∆GDP * Book Leveraget-1 * 1∆GDP>0 -0.022 0.148 -0.033 -0.028 
 (0.034) (0.090) (0.051) (0.053) 
     
    ∆GDP * Book Leveraget-1 * 1∆GDP<0  -0.023 0.074 -0.050 0.083 
 (0.043) (0.078) (0.051) (0.096) 
     
    ∆GDP * Book Leveraget-1 * 1∆GDP<0 * 1TARP_BANK_QRT 1.151*** 0.918*** 1.275*** 1.078*** 
 (0.076) (0.295) (0.116) (0.125) 
     
Observations 26034 3537 13487 9010 
R2 0.428 0.440 0.398 0.542 
Other Controls and Stand-Alone Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank 
 
*As we discuss in Section 6.1, the negative and significant interaction term for commercial banks with less than 20% fair value assets that did not receive TARP 
funds is driven by large unrealized gains on AfS securities in 2009, which resulted from a decrease in interest rates (see also Xie (2016)). 
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Internet Appendix C: Alternative Measures of Banks’ Business Model
Table IA5: Alternative Measures of Banks’ Business Model - Loan Portfolio Decomposition
This table reports the estimation results for extended versions of regression models (3a) and (3b). The dependent variable is the quarterly
growth rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage). The key explanatory variables are the interaction terms between the quarterly growth rate of
total assets (∆Total Assets) and GDP (∆GDP) with banks’ lagged mortgage exposure (Mortgage Exp.t-1), consumer loan exposure (Consumer
Loan Exp.t-1), and commercial real estate exposure (Commercial RE Exp.t-1) as well as the fraction of interest to non-interest income (II
to Non-IIt-1). Variables are defined in Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and real GDP is retrieved from the
homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce). This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during
the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** <
0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 ∆Book Leverage 
            
∆Total Assets (TA) 2.549*** 2.488*** 1.966*** 1.982*** 2.094*** 2.516*** 1.659*** 1.614*** 
 (0.493) (0.501) (0.321) (0.321) (0.512) (0.493) (0.275) (0.277) 
         
   ∆TA * Mortgage Exp.t-1  0.272       
  (0.225)       
         
   ∆TA * Consumer Loan Exp.t-1    0.201     
    (0.340)     
         
   ∆TA * Commercial RE Exp.t-1      -0.779***   
      (0.297)   
         
   ∆TA * II to Non-IIt-1         0.002 
        (0.003) 
         
   ∆TA * 1Savings Bank 0.225*** 0.178** 0.219*** 0.220*** 0.191*** 0.113 0.158*** 0.155*** 
 (0.070) (0.082) (0.058) (0.059) (0.073) (0.081) (0.052) (0.052) 
         
   ∆TA * 1Commercial Bank>20% FV 0.136* 0.140* 0.121** 0.122** 0.137* 0.085 0.127*** 0.129*** 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.051) (0.051) (0.070) (0.072) (0.039) (0.039) 
         
   ∆TA * Bank Sizet-1 -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.077*** -0.079*** -0.084*** -0.095*** -0.061*** -0.059*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) 
         
∆GDP -1.387 -1.283 -1.952** -1.993** -1.532 -1.706 -2.506*** -2.332*** 
 (1.578) (1.617) (0.992) (0.987) (1.499) (1.531) (0.724) (0.752) 
         
   ∆GDP * Mortgage Exp.t-1  -0.222       
  (0.827)       
         
   ∆GDP * Consumer Loan Exp.t-1    -0.698     
    (1.206)     
         
   ∆GDP * Commercial RE Exp.t-1      0.638   
      (1.002)   
         
   ∆GDP * II to Non-IIt-1        -0.008 
        (0.010) 
         
   ∆GDP * 1Savings Bank -0.069 -0.033 -0.342* -0.343* -0.316 -0.270 -0.437*** -0.428*** 
 (0.234) (0.283) (0.189) (0.189) (0.230) (0.246) (0.154) (0.155) 
         
   ∆GDP * 1Commercial Bank>20% FV 0.462* 0.461* 0.228 0.228 0.405* 0.461* 0.227* 0.217* 
 (0.244) (0.243) (0.178) (0.178) (0.230) (0.242) (0.128) (0.129) 
         
   ∆GDP * Bank Sizet-1 0.088 0.085 0.121** 0.126*** 0.099 0.100 0.145*** 0.139*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.048) (0.048) (0.074) (0.074) (0.035) (0.036) 
         
Observations 16567 16567 28152 28152 17278 17278 41322 41322 
R2 0.092 0.093 0.091 0.092 0.090 0.092 0.110 0.110 
Other Stand-Alone Variables and Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
 
126
Internet Appendix D: Derivatives and AfS Equity Securities
We investigate whether there is a significant increase in procyclical leverage around the
introduction of FAS 133 and the change in the regulatory treatment of AfS equity securities.
We define an indicator variable that equals 1 for post-change quarters and interact this
dummy with ∆Total Assets and ∆GDP respectively. We use a balanced panel of banks
for the time around the introduction of FAS 133 and the partial removal of the prudential
filter for AfS equity securities to ensure that the coefficients of the interaction terms are
not biased by the entry and exit of banks into/out of our sample. Any observable or
unobservable event that influences procyclicality and coincides with the two institutional
changes would also bias the coefficients of our estimates. To more cleanly identify effects,
we multiply the two interaction terms with the bank’s exposure to derivatives (notional)
and AfS equity securities right before the institutional change. If the institutional change
is associated with more procyclicality, the treatment effects should be positive for banks
with larger derivative or AfS equity portfolios.
We do not find any significant increase in procyclical leverage after the introduction of
FAS 133 for banks with higher derivative exposure. While the interactions with ∆Total
Assets are insignificant, the interactions with ∆GDP are even negative. These results are
robust to using different time windows around the event (Table IA6).
Similarly, the association between total asset growth and book leverage growth is not
significantly stronger after the partial removal of the prudential filter for AfS equity secu-
rities for banks with large exposures in these assets (Table IA7). In contrast, we find a
statistically significant increase in the relation between ∆GDP and ∆Book Leverage after
the change in regulatory treatment. However, looking at the effect of unrealized gains and
losses on AfS equity securities directly does not support the conclusion that these gains
magnify procyclical leverage.
In particular, we split total unrealized gains and losses on AfS securities into their debt
127
and equity components and rerun regression models (4a) and (4b) to examine the role of
AfS equity securities for procyclical leverage.21
We find a positive and weakly significant interaction term for unrealized gains and
losses on AfS equity securities upon balance sheet expansions, but the coefficient becomes
insignificant if we exclude the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (Table IA8). As we show in Sec-
tion 6.1, total assets increased because of TARP in the crisis, which resulted in a decrease
of leverage. Since unrealized gains and losses on AfS equity securities became negative at
the same time, the interaction term is positive during the crisis period. The coefficient
for balance sheet contractions and the interactions of ∆Total Assets with unrealized gains
and losses on AfS debt securities are insignificant. Including unrealized gains and losses on
cash flow hedges does not affect our results. The corresponding interaction terms are not
significant. Finally, none of the interactions with ∆GDP are significantly different from
zero (Table IA9).
21The sample period for this test starts at the end of 1998 since the Fed only required banks to report
unrealized gains on AfS equity securities after the change in regulatory treatment of these securities.
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Table IA6: FAS 133 and Procyclical Leverage
In this table we test whether the introduction of fair value accounting for hedging derivatives via FAS 133 is asso-
ciated with a significant increase in leverage procyclicality. The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of
book leverage (∆Book Leverage). The dummy variable 1Year≥2001 equals one for quarters after the effective date of
FAS 133 at the beginning of 2001 and Deriv.Exp.Q4-2000 captures a bank’s gross notional derivative exposure (fraction
of total assets) at the end of Q4-2000. The key explanatory variables are the interaction terms between 1Year≥2001,
Deriv.Exp.Q4-2000 and ∆Total Assets / ∆GDP, which capture the changes in leverage procyclicality for banks with
higher derivative exposure after the introduction of FAS 133. This sample covers a balanced panel of US commercial
and savings banks around the change in accounting rules for derivatives. Variables are defined in Table A1. Bank
fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (US Department of Commerce). Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses.
Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1999-2002 Q1-1996 ≤ Pre ≤ Q2-1998 1999-2002 Q1-1996 ≤ Pre ≤ Q2-1998 
  Q1-2001 ≤ Post ≤ Q4-2002  Q1-2001 ≤ Post ≤ Q4-2002 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage 
     
∆Total Assets * Deriv. Exp.Q4-2000 * 1Year≥2001   0.096 0.082 
   (0.105) (0.066) 
     
∆GDP * Deriv. Exp.Q4-2000 * 1Year≥2001   -0.824 -0.958*** 
   (0.715) (0.322) 
     
∆Total Assets * 1Year≥2001 0.035 0.140 -0.118 0.043 
 (0.075) (0.105) (0.090) (0.127) 
     
∆GDP * 1Year≥2001 -0.184 1.225*** -0.032 1.774*** 
 (0.265) (0.365) (0.290) (0.402) 
     
∆Total Assets 0.699*** 0.604*** 0.745*** 0.611*** 
 (0.069) (0.064) (0.074) (0.067) 
     
∆GDP 1.021*** -0.353 1.108*** -0.608** 
 (0.127) (0.246) (0.136) (0.264) 
     
1Year≥2001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
     
Deriv. Exp.Q4-2000   0.007* 0.013*** 
   (0.004) (0.003) 
     
Constant 0.336 0.150 0.015 0.011 
 (0.295) (0.149) (0.017) (0.015) 
     
Observations 3673 3009 2742 2292 
R2 0.458 0.459 0.338 0.333 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table IA7: Changes in Regulatory Treatment of Unrealized AfS Equity Gains and Procyclical
Leverage In this table we test whether the partial removal of the prudential filter for unrealized gains on AfS equity
securities in Q4-1998 is associated with a significant increase in leverage procyclicality. The dependent variable is
the quarterly growth rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage). The dummy variable 1Quarter≥Q4-1998 equals one for
quarters after the effective date of the regulatory change at the beginning of Q4-1998 and AfS. Equity Exp.Q3-1998
captures a bank’s exposure to AfS equity securities (fraction of total assets) at the end of Q3-1998. The key explanatory
variables are the interaction terms between 1Quarter≥Q4-1998, AfS. Equity Exp.Q3-1998 and ∆Total Assets / ∆GDP,
which capture the changes in leverage procyclicality for banks with higher AfS equity exposure after the partial removal
of the prudential filter in Q4-1998. This sample covers a balanced panel of US commercial and savings banks around
the regulatory change. Variables are defined in Table A1. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial
and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce).
Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** <
0.05, * < 0.10.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Q1-1997 to Q4-2000 
Q1-1994 to 
Q4-2000 
Q1-1997 to 
Q4-2000 
Q1-1994 to 
Q4-2000 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage 
     
∆Total Assets * AfS Equity Exp.Q3-1998 * 1Quarter≥Q4-1998   -16.963 -13.977 
   (11.157) (8.666) 
     
∆GDP * AfS Equity Exp.Q3-1998 * 1Quarter≥Q4-1998   62.014** 73.972*** 
   (29.904) (23.982) 
     
∆Total Assets * 1Quarter≥Q4-1998 0.083 0.077 0.295** 0.188 
 (0.089) (0.093) (0.135) (0.131) 
     
∆GDP * 1Quarter≥Q4-1998 1.905*** 0.266 1.463* -0.358 
 (0.542) (0.350) (0.747) (0.359) 
     
∆Total Assets 0.659*** 0.666*** 0.634*** 0.693*** 
 (0.081) (0.069) (0.087) (0.062) 
     
∆GDP -0.897* 0.923*** -0.894 1.037*** 
 (0.537) (0.275) (0.639) (0.260) 
     
1Quarter≥Q4-1998 -0.007 0.008 -0.014* 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) 
     
AfS Equity Exp.Q3-1998   0.203 0.136 
   (0.295) (0.228) 
     
Constant -0.254 0.128 0.011 0.002 
 (0.346) (0.242) (0.019) (0.016) 
     
Observations 2330 2256 1854 1936 
R2 0.444 0.415 0.345 0.408 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table IA8: Determinants of the Relation between Book Leverage Growth and Total Asset
Growth - Supplementary Tests on the Role of Fair Value Accounting This table reports the estimation
results for a modified version of regression model (4a). The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of book
leverage (∆Book Leverage). The key explanatory variables are the interaction terms between the quarterly growth
rate of total assets (∆Total Assets) and unrealized gains on AfS securities (Unrealized Gains AfS), unrealized gains
on AfS debt securities (Unrealized Gains AfS Debt), unrealized gains on AfS equity securities (Unrealized Gains AfS
Equity), unrealized gains on cash flow hedges (Unrealized Gains CF Hedges), and the sum of unrealized gains on
AfS securities and cash flow hedges (Unrealized Gains AfS + CF Hedges). For each interaction term we distinguish
between ∆Total Assets>0 and ∆Total Assets<0 to account for potential non-linearities in effects. Variables are
defined in Table A1. For expositional purposes we multiply the accounting items with 1000. Bank fundamentals are
obtained from SNL Financial and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US
Department of Commerce). This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to
Q1-2013. Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** <
0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample 
 [1] [2]* [3] [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage 
        
∆Total Assets (TA) 0.719*** 0.575*** 0.716*** 0.720*** 
 (0.163) (0.197) (0.163) (0.163) 
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆TA>0 -0.012   -0.011 
 (0.014)   (0.014) 
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆TA<0 0.044*   0.045* 
 (0.023)   (0.023) 
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS Debt * 1∆TA>0  -0.005   
  (0.015)   
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS Debt * 1∆TA<0  0.024   
  (0.024)   
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS Equity * 1∆TA>0  0.550*   
  (0.324)   
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS Equity * 1∆TA<0  -0.105   
  (0.616)   
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS + CF Hedges * 1∆TA>0   -0.010  
   (0.014)  
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS + CF Hedges * 1∆TA<0   0.042*  
   (0.023)  
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains CF Hedges * 1∆TA>0    0.449 
    (0.308) 
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains CF Hedges * 1∆TA<0    -0.489 
    (0.549) 
     
∆GDP 0.417*** 0.654*** 0.413*** 0.416*** 
 (0.071) (0.083) (0.071) (0.072) 
     
Unrealized Gains AfS -0.011***   -0.011*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) 
     
Unrealized Gains AfS Debt  -0.011***   
  (0.000)   
     
Unrealized Gains AfS Equity  -0.033***   
  (0.008)   
     
Unrealized Gains AfS + CF Hedges   -0.011***  
   (0.000)  
     
Unrealized Gains CF Hedges    -0.021*** 
    (0.008) 
     
Observations 26034 17796 25931 25931 
R2 0.402 0.407 0.403 0.403 
Other Controls and Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank 
 
*As we discuss in Section 6.3, the positive and weakly significant interaction term for unrealized gains and losses on AfS equity securities upon balance sheet 
expansions becomes insignificant if we exclude the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
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Table IA9: Determinants of the Relation between Book Leverage Growth and GDP Growth
- Supplementary Tests on the Role of Fair Value Accounting This table reports the estimation results
for a modified version of regression model (4b). The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of book leverage
(∆Book Leverage). The key explanatory variables are the interaction terms between the quarterly growth rate of
GDP (∆GDP) and unrealized gains on AfS securities (Unrealized Gains AfS), unrealized gains on AfS debt securities
(Unrealized Gains AfS Debt), unrealized gains on AfS equity securities (Unrealized Gains AfS Equity), unrealized
gains on cash flow hedges (Unrealized Gains CF Hedges), and the sum of unrealized gains on AfS securities and
cash flow hedges (Unrealized Gains AfS + CF Hedges). For each interaction term we distinguish between ∆GDP>0
and ∆GDP<0 to account for potential non-linearities in effects. Variables are defined in Table A1. For expositional
purposes we multiply the accounting items with 1000. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and
real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce). This
sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered standard
errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage 
        
∆GDP 1.387* 4.115*** 1.299 1.322* 
 (0.804) (1.080) (0.798) (0.800) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆GDP>0 0.006   0.007 
 (0.065)   (0.065) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆GDP<0 -0.170   -0.180 
 (0.108)   (0.109) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS Debt * 1∆GDP>0  0.084   
  (0.074)   
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS Debt * 1∆GDP<0  -0.210   
  (0.145)   
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS Equity * 1∆GDP>0  0.832   
  (1.212)   
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS Equity * 1∆GDP<0  -3.359   
  (4.243)   
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS + CF Hedges * 1∆GDP>0   -0.006  
   (0.065)  
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS + CF Hedges * 1∆GDP<0   -0.139  
   (0.107)  
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains CF Hedges * 1∆GDP>0    -0.728 
    (1.264) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains CF Hedges * 1∆GDP<0    2.061 
    (2.512) 
     
∆Total Assets 0.602*** 0.553*** 0.601*** 0.602*** 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) 
     
Unrealized Gains AfS -0.012***   -0.012*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) 
     
Unrealized Gains AfS Debt  -0.013***   
  (0.001)   
     
Unrealized Gains AfS Equity  -0.028**   
  (0.013)   
     
Unrealized Gains AfS + CF Hedges   -0.012***  
   (0.000)  
     
Unrealized Gains CF Hedges    -0.003 
    (0.011) 
     
Observations 26034 17796 25931 25931 
R2 0.371 0.376 0.371 0.372 
Other Controls and Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Internet Appendix E: Additional Tests
Table IA10: Book Leverage Dynamics of US Non-Financial Firms versus Banks
This table compares the book leverage dynamics of US non-financial firms and banks. We report
the coefficient estimates from linear regressions of the quarterly growth rate of book leverage
(∆Book Leverage) on the quarterly growth rate of total assets (∆Total Assets) and/or GDP
(∆GDP). Variables are defined in Table A1. Firm and bank fundamentals are obtained from
Compustat and SNL Financial, respectively. Real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. This sample covers the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered
standard errors at the firm or bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by:
*** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Non-Financial Firms Banks 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage 
       
∆Total Assets 0.171***  0.172*** 0.463***  0.461*** 
 (0.014)  (0.014) (0.019)  (0.019) 
       
∆GDP  -0.118 -0.275**  0.547*** 0.463*** 
  (0.112) (0.112)  (0.057) (0.055) 
       
Constant -0.002** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.007*** -0.001*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Observations 49686 49686 49686 41748 41748 41748 
R2 0.017 0.000 0.017 0.099 0.003 0.101 
Bank Fixed Effects No No No No No No 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No 
Clustering Level Firm Firm Firm Bank Bank Bank 
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Table IA11: Determinants of the Relation between Book Leverage Growth and Total
Asset Growth - Explicitly Controlling for Realized Gains This table reports the estimation results for a
modified version of regression model (4a). The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage).
The key explanatory variables are the interaction terms between the quarterly growth rate of total assets (∆Total Assets) and
unrealized gains on AfS securities (Unrealized Gains AfS), realized gains on AfS and HtM securities (Realized Gains AfS & HtM),
residual net income (Residual Net Income), the lagged total capital ratio (Total Capital Ratiot−1), the quarterly growth rate of
the average risk weight (∆Risk Weight), and the lagged book leverage ratio (Book Leveraget−1). For each interaction term we
distinguish between ∆Total Assets>0 and ∆Total Assets<0 to account for potential non-linearities in effects. Variables are defined
in Table A1. For expositional purposes we multiply the accounting items with 1000 and ∆Risk Weight as well as Total Capital
Ratiot−1 with 100. Bank fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce). This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the
time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013. Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by:
*** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample Savings Banks CB < 20% FV CB > 20% FV 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage 
        
∆Total Assets (TA) 0.700*** 1.315*** 0.432* 1.169*** 
 (0.165) (0.372) (0.235) (0.268) 
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆TA>0 -0.012 -0.016 0.000 -0.019 
 (0.014) (0.046) (0.026) (0.018) 
     
    ∆TA * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆TA<0 0.033 0.143* -0.036 0.044 
 (0.026) (0.080) (0.044) (0.033) 
     
    ∆TA * Realized Gains AfS & HtM * 1∆TA>0 0.086 -0.254* 0.154** 0.071 
 (0.056) (0.140) (0.075) (0.083) 
     
    ∆TA * Realized Gains AfS & HtM * 1∆TA<0 0.014 -0.021 -0.060 0.015 
 (0.084) (0.214) (0.098) (0.151) 
     
    ∆TA * Residual Net Income * 1∆TA>0 0.049*** -0.003 0.056*** 0.015 
 (0.015) (0.049) (0.018) (0.021) 
     
    ∆TA * Residual Net Income * 1∆TA<0 0.136*** 0.094** 0.160*** 0.093** 
 (0.016) (0.039) (0.018) (0.037) 
     
    ∆TA * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆TA>0 0.013*** -0.005 0.021*** 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
     
    ∆TA * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆TA<0 0.003 -0.001 0.016 -0.021 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
     
    ∆TA * ∆Risk Weight * 1∆TA>0 -0.009** 0.025** -0.010 -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) 
     
    ∆TA * ∆Risk Weight * 1∆TA<0 0.030*** 0.021 0.029** 0.030** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
     
    ∆TA * Book Leveraget-1 * 1∆TA>0 -0.053*** -0.062** -0.046*** -0.064*** 
 (0.010) (0.027) (0.013) (0.016) 
     
    ∆TA * Book Leveraget-1* 1∆TA<0 -0.000 -0.025 0.006 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.032) (0.013) (0.026) 
     
∆GDP 0.407*** -0.123 0.750*** 0.088 
 (0.071) (0.154) (0.094) (0.143) 
     
Unrealized Gains AfS -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
     
Realized Gains AfS & HtM -0.017*** -0.013** -0.019*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
     
Residual Net Income -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Total Capital Ratiot-1 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
∆Risk Weight 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Bank Sizet-1 -0.009*** -0.011 -0.008*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
qt-1 0.002** -0.001 0.002* 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Book Leveraget-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
1∆TA>0 0.007*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
∆Goodwill -0.227*** -0.254*** -0.259*** -0.166*** 
 (0.020) (0.072) (0.029) (0.025) 
     
Constant 0.261*** 0.306 0.262*** 0.378*** 
 (0.038) (0.215) (0.045) (0.072) 
     
Observations 25889 3521 13405 8963 
R2 0.396 0.435 0.360 0.512 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table IA12: Determinants of the Relation between Book Leverage Growth and GDP
Growth - Explicitly Controlling for Realized Gains This table reports the estimation results for a modified
version of regression model (4b). The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of book leverage (∆Book Leverage). The
key explanatory variables are the interaction terms between the quarterly growth rate of GDP (∆GDP) and unrealized gains on
AfS securities (Unrealized Gains AfS), realized gains on AfS and HtM securities (Realized Gains AfS & HtM), residual net income
(Residual Net Income), the lagged total capital ratio (Total Capital Ratiot−1), the quarterly growth rate of the average risk weight
(∆Risk Weight), and the lagged book leverage ratio (Book Leveraget−1). For each interaction term we distinguish between ∆GDP>0
and ∆GDP<0 to account for potential non-linearities in effects across up- and downswings. Variables are defined in Table A1. For
expositional purposes we multiply the accounting items with 1000 and ∆Risk Weight as well as Total Capital Ratiot−1 with 100. Bank
fundamentals are obtained from SNL Financial and real GDP is retrieved from the homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(US Department of Commerce). This sample covers US commercial and savings banks during the time period Q1-1994 to Q1-2013.
Clustered standard errors at the bank level are given in parentheses. Significance is indicated by: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.10.
 Full Sample Savings Banks CB < 20% FV CB > 20% FV 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage ∆Book Leverage 
        
∆GDP 1.482* -1.897 2.644** 1.030 
 (0.813) (1.202) (1.233) (1.459) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆GDP>0 0.042 0.138 0.220 -0.047 
 (0.066) (0.240) (0.150) (0.074) 
     
    ∆GDP * Unrealized Gains AfS * 1∆GDP<0 -0.198* -0.177 -0.589*** 0.114 
 (0.107) (0.261) (0.206) (0.120) 
     
    ∆GDP * Realized Gains AfS & HtM * 1∆GDP>0 0.993*** 1.037 1.216** 0.929** 
 (0.282) (0.869) (0.491) (0.378) 
     
    ∆GDP * Realized Gains AfS & HtM * 1∆GDP<0 0.019 -0.308 0.107 -0.396 
 (0.339) (0.829) (0.497) (0.495) 
     
    ∆GDP * Residual Net Income * 1∆GDP>0 -0.014 0.152 -0.105 0.063 
 (0.059) (0.132) (0.079) (0.127) 
     
    ∆GDP * Residual Net Income * 1∆GDP<0 -0.191*** -0.137 -0.247*** -0.066 
 (0.068) (0.111) (0.090) (0.144) 
     
    ∆GDP * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆GDP>0 -0.075*** 0.004 -0.101** -0.066 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.047) (0.043) 
     
    ∆GDP * Total Capital Ratiot-1 * 1∆GDP<0 -0.150*** 0.003 -0.161** -0.329*** 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.068) (0.074) 
     
    ∆GDP * ∆Risk Weight * 1∆GDP>0 0.006 -0.036 -0.023 0.075 
 (0.034) (0.087) (0.053) (0.052) 
     
    ∆GDP * ∆Risk Weight * 1∆GDP<0 -0.138** 0.000 -0.169* -0.100 
 (0.059) (0.128) (0.087) (0.088) 
     
    ∆GDP * Book Leveraget-1* 1∆GDP>0 -0.042 0.145 -0.083 -0.051 
 (0.043) (0.093) (0.060) (0.072) 
     
    ∆GDP * Book Leveraget-1* 1∆GDP<0 0.225*** 0.231* 0.171** 0.392*** 
 (0.060) (0.118) (0.080) (0.116) 
     
∆Total Assets 0.601*** 0.764*** 0.529*** 0.667*** 
 (0.025) (0.079) (0.033) (0.034) 
     
Unrealized Gains AfS -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Realized Gains AfS & HtM -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Residual Net Income -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Total Capital Ratiot-1 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
∆Risk Weight -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Bank Sizet-1 -0.008*** -0.009 -0.008*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
qt-1 0.004*** -0.004 0.006*** 0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Book Leveraget-1 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
1∆GDP>0 -0.007*** -0.001 -0.008*** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
∆Goodwill -0.265*** -0.297*** -0.308*** -0.195*** 
 (0.023) (0.102) (0.031) (0.029) 
     
Constant 0.241*** 0.311 0.231*** 0.363*** 
 (0.040) (0.198) (0.048) (0.076) 
     
Observations 25889 3521 13405 8963 
R2 0.367 0.401 0.322 0.503 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects No No No No 
Clustering Level Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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We provide novel evidence of banks establishing lending relationships with presti-
gious firms to signal their quality and attract future business. Using survey data
on firm-level prestige, we show that lenders compete more intensely for prestigious
borrowers and offer lower upfront fees to initiate lending relationships with presti-
gious firms. We also find that banks expand their lending after winning prestigious
clients. Prestigious firms benefit from these relations as they face lower costs of
borrowing even though prestige has no predictive power for credit risk. Our results
are robust to matched sample analyses and a regression discontinuity design.
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1 Introduction
A large literature examines the economic benefits of private information production by
banks within lending relationships (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Ra-
jan, 1994). However, lending relationships are also valuable to banks outside of specific
firm-creditor ties. In practice, lenders frequently advertise their participation in syndi-
cated loan transactions through “tombstone announcements” in financial magazines to
raise their public profile (Carter and Manaster, 1990) and use existing lending relation-
ships as a marketing tool to attract new borrowers.1 Despite anecdotal evidence that
banks value the public recognition from high profile transactions, we know little about
how lending relationships with prestigious firms shape debt contracting.
In this paper, we examine the economic consequences of borrower prestige in the
U.S. syndicated loan market. If firms have difficulties in assessing lenders’ underwriting
abilities, banks may use lending relationships with prestigious firms as credentials to
signal their quality (e.g. Nelson, 1974; Bagwell and Ramey, 1994). Since lenders compete
for high profile credentials, they may trade-off loan terms against the public recognition
of their relationships and provide cheaper loans to prestigious firms. Our empirical tests
provide strong support for this channel. We find that lenders compete more intensely
for prestigious clients and offer lower upfront fees to initiate lending relationships with
prestigious firms. After winning a prestigious borrower, banks expand their lending (to
new firms) relative to otherwise similar institutions. Prestigious borrowers benefit from
these relationships as they face lower costs of borrowing even though prestige has no
predictive power for credit risk.
We use Fortune’s Most Admired Companies survey to quantify borrower prestige.
Since 1982, Fortune Magazine annually asks close to 15,000 analysts, outside directors,
and executives to evaluate the public admiration of firms in the Fortune 1,000. To quantify
1Figure 1 shows US syndicated loan credentials that Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) used in client
presentations in 2009. Figure 2 shows European syndicated loan credentials for UniCredit in 2013.
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prestige, survey participants rate firms in their industry based on how much they admire
them using a score between 0 (poor) and 10 (excellent). The questionnaire explicitly
states that prestige ratings should be based on “respondents’ firsthand knowledge of
the companies or on anything they may have observed or heard about them.” Using
this particular survey to quantify prestige has the advantage that firms cannot actively
influence their position in the final ranking since respondents are not directly affiliated
with the firms they evaluate (Focke et al., 2017). Moreover, survey questions and variables
are determined by a third party and do not change over time. We manually collect our
prestige data from printed editions of the Fortune survey and use firms’ overall score as
our main measure of borrower prestige.
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating the impact of borrower prestige
on firms’ financing costs. We document that more prestigious firms face lower (total)
costs of borrowing (Berg et al., 2016). The effect holds for different loan types and cost
components and is robust to controlling for a large set of borrower characteristics, loan
features, and (high-dimensional) fixed effects. The coefficient magnitude in our most
conservative specification implies that a one standard deviation increase in prestige is
associated with a reduction in total borrowing costs of 4.85% for the median loan.
Next, we show that borrower prestige is not associated with firms’ credit ratings,
credit default swap spreads, and implied recovery rates over the life of the loan. Thus,
the cheaper financing for prestigious firms does not seem to be justified by a lower default
probability, loss given default, or systematic risk. These results mitigate the concern that
firm prestige does not causally impact borrowing costs but is rather associated with loan
pricing because prestige is a proxy for credit risk capturing unobservable, time-varying
firm characteristics.
We address the endogeneity of firm prestige more explicitly by exploiting discontinuous
changes in prestige around rank 100 of the Fortune survey. The print media only focuses
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on the top 100 firms in the prestige ranking. For example, the New York Times and
the Wall Street Journal do not print the entire ranking, but only include information
on the top 100. The additional media coverage for firms within the top 100 leads to a
positive, discontinuous jump in borrower prestige. Local changes in prestige are plausibly
exogenous since random factors determine whether a firm is ranked just below or above
100 (e.g., mood of survey participants at the day of evaluation). We focus on firms
with ranks 80 to 120 and make sure that loans on either side of the cutoff are virtually
identical in terms of other borrower and loan characteristics. Consistent with our baseline
results, we find a negative, significant jump in loan pricing but no break in credit risk for
borrowers ranked below 100.
We validate the inferences from our regression discontinuity design by employing
matched sample regressions as an alternative identification approach. Again, we consider
firms as prestigious if they are included in the top 100 of the Fortune survey. Inclusion
in the top 100 is likely based on criteria such as profitability or size and therefore not
random. We alleviate this endogeneity concern by using (i) coarsened exact matching, (ii)
nearest-neighbor matching, and (iii) propensity score matching to construct appropriate
control samples based on a large set of pre-treatment financial characteristics. The results
mirror those of our previous analyses.
Having established our main results, we next provide evidence that signaling by banks
is a likely channel for the observed effects. First, we document that loan originations for
prestigious firms experience fiercer bank competition. Holding everything else constant
(including loan volume and firm size), borrower prestige is positively associated with
both syndicate size and the portion of the loan that lead arrangers retain on their books.
Moreover, the inverse effect of prestige on firms’ financing costs is particularly strong for
large syndicates, suggesting that banks’ competition for prestigious clients drives down
the cost of credit. Second, we document that prestigious firms pay lower upfront fees
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when they contract with a lead arranger for the first time. Thus, banks seem to make up-
front fee concessions to initiate lending relationships with prestigious borrowers. Finally,
banks that start lending to prestigious firms attract new borrowers and underwrite more
syndicated loans afterwards.2 We show that this result is not driven by an expansion
strategy of the bank or concurrent but unrelated macroeconomic or regulatory changes.
Related Literature. We make two contributions relative to the existing literature.
First, we contribute to the literature on firm-creditor relationships.3 If there are infor-
mational frictions between investors and firms, banks generate private information by
monitoring firms and thereby become inside creditors (Rajan, 1992; Berger and Udell,
1995; Stein, 2002; Berger et al., 2005). The informational advantage of banks creates
value for firms by reducing agency conflicts and allowing for more efficient contracting
(von Thadden, 1995; Rajan, 1992). Empirically, Bharath et al. (2011) find that repeated
borrowing from the same lender yields lower spreads (in particular when borrower trans-
parency is low), while banks are more likely offer further fee generating services to existing
relationship borrowers (e.g., Drucker and Puri, 2005; Yasuda, 2005; Burch et al., 2005;
Bharath et al., 2007). Fama (1985) and Diamond (1991) argue that bank relationships
also generate value to borrowing firms outside the relationship since the renewal of bank
loans serves as a positive signal to other lenders. By comparison, we document that
financing a prestigious borrower creates value for the lender outside of the relationship
since it serves as a credential which helps to compete for future clients.
Second, we contribute to a growing body of research that investigates the economic
consequences of intangible assets. Edmans (2011) finds that companies with high levels
of employee satisfaction generate superior long-run returns. Guiso et al. (2015) document
that performance is stronger when employees view their top managers as trustworthy and
2In our bank-level analysis, we focus on lead arrangers since these institutions initiate, arrange, and
manage the loan. It is the lead arranger that is primarily associated with the loan and most likely
benefits from lending to a prestigious borrower.
3We refer to Ongena and Smith (1998) for a survey of this literature.
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ethical. Both of these studies rely on surveys conducted among employees (insiders). In
contrast, we study whether a company’s perception by outsiders affects debt contracting.
Hong and Liskovich (2015) find that socially responsible firms pay lower fines for bribing
foreign government officials although corporate social responsibility is uncorrelated with
bribe characteristics and judicial cooperation. The authors show that this bias is a halo
effect and not prosecutorial conflict of interest. Our results are similar in spirit since the
lower spreads and upfront fees that banks charge to prestigious borrowers are not justified
by a lower credit risk over the life of the loan. We argue that bank-level incentives are the
main driver of our results. Malmendier and Tate (2009) and Focke et al. (2017) examine
the role of prestige in executive compensation. Malmendier and Tate (2009) show that
prestigious CEOs with superstar status extract compensation benefits. Focke et al. (2017)
document that the reverse also holds. They find that CEOs accept lower pay to work for
prestigious firms because of status preferences and better subsequent career prospects.
In contrast, we investigate the impact of firm prestige on loan contracting and show that
prestige matters for the pricing of debt instruments over and above credit risk because
lenders value relationships with prestigious firms.
2 Economic Mechanism and Empirical Predictions
Information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers is at the core of financial inter-
mediation. Lenders invest in costly information production to assess the creditworthiness
of potential borrowers, thereby reducing inefficiencies that arise from adverse selection.
After loan contracting, lenders monitor borrowers to alleviate agency conflicts between
managers and shareholders. Bank monitoring yields borrower-specific information that is
durable, reusable (Boot and Thakor, 2000), and valuable if borrowers and lenders engage
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in repeated interactions.4 Relationship borrowers may even be locked in due to the infor-
mation asymmetries between outside lenders and the relationship lender (Sharpe, 1990;
Rajan, 1992).
Lenders differ in their ability to underwrite and structure a loan for potential bor-
rowers in a cost-efficient and timely manner. This heterogeneity in lenders’ quality is
particularly prevalent among lead arrangers in the syndicated loan market. Structuring a
syndicated loan requires experience and a reliable network of other lenders that trust the
lead arranger and are thus willing to timely commit to the syndicate. Potential borrowers
might be less informed and therefore worry about the lender’s quality. In this setting of
asymmetric information, prestige can serve a signal about lenders’ quality and thereby
enhance the efficiency of lending (e.g. Nelson, 1974; Bagwell and Ramey, 1994).
Prestige is publicly observable, firm-specific information over which lenders compete
to signal their quality to potential borrowers. The scarcity of lending relationships with
prestigious borrowers equips them with bargaining power vis-a`-vis lenders. Lenders in
turn offer fee concessions to initiate high profile relationships. In the syndicated loan
market, this translates into a higher number of participants in a deal and the lead arranger
retaining a higher fraction of the loan.5 For high-quality lenders, the benefit of signaling
their quality to other clients is higher relative to low-quality lenders and they are willing
to offer lower upfront fees to prestigious firms. The prestige of borrowers thus acts as a
marketing tool that reveals lenders’ quality and thereby reduces the inefficiency in lending
due to asymmetric information.
This economic mechanism leads to the following empirical predictions. First, acquiring
prestige as a valuable signal is costly and implies lower cost of borrowing for prestigious
4The association between past lending relationships and future bank business has been examined
by Bharath et al. (2007) for the syndicated loan market, Drucker and Puri (2005) for seasoned equity
offerings, and Yasuda (2005) and Burch et al. (2005) for public debt underwritings. They all find that
existing lending relationships translate into a higher probability of repeated interaction.
5Ivashina (2009) shows that a higher lead bank’s ownership of a loan also reduces asymmetric infor-
mation between the lead and participants.
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companies. Prestige is thus negatively related to the cost of borrowing. Second, prestige
is unrelated to the creditworthiness of the borrower. Thus, prestige does not predict
credit risk over the life of the underlying loan. Third, lenders compete for underwriting
loans with prestigious borrowers. Prestige is thus positively related to the size of the
syndicate and to the percentage retained by the lead arranger. Fourth, lenders use loans
with prestigious borrowers as credentials and benefit by attracting more business with
other clients. Underwriting loans with prestigious firms is therefore positively associated
with the lead arranger’s loan volume afterwards.
3 Data and Sample Selection
3.1 Measuring Borrower Prestige
We collect data on borrower-level prestige from Fortune’s Most Admired Companies
(MAC) survey. This survey is conducted once a year during fall among approximately
15,000 financial analysts, senior executives, and outside directors in the U.S. since 1982.
Fortune magazine publishes the results in spring the following year and widely-read busi-
ness newspapers such as the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal also provide
coverage of the survey. To quantify firm-level prestige, Hay Group (on behalf of For-
tune) asks survey participants to rate 10 companies in their industry among the Fortune
1000 based on how much they admire them in 8 different categories using a scale from
0 (poor) to 10 (excellent). The 8 categories are: (1) quality of management, (2) quality
of products or services, (3) ability to attract, develop, and retain talented people, (4)
wise use of corporate assets, (5) financial soundness, (6) innovativeness, (7) community
and environmental responsibility, and (8) long-term investment. These attributes did
not change since the inception of the survey in the 1980s. They were developed through
interviews with executives and industry analysts to determine the qualities that make a
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company worthy of admiration. In the survey, only the attribute names are listed with-
out any additional explanation or interpretation. Fortune asks survey participants to rate
companies based on their firsthand knowledge or on anything they may have observed
or heard about them. Therefore, the interpretation of the meaning of attributes is left
to the respondents. The average of the 8 attribute scores determines the overall score
of a company, which Fortune publishes every spring. In 2010, however, Fortune stopped
reporting scores and only publishes industry ranks ever since.
Using Fortune’s MAC ranking to define and quantify prestige has the advantage that
firms cannot actively influence their inclusion or position in the survey (Focke et al.,
2017). First, respondents are not directly affiliated to the companies they evaluate.
Second, survey questions and variables are determined by a third party (Hay Group) and
do not change over time. Third, it is arguably impossible for companies to find out the
names of all survey respondents and to influence them accordingly. The number of firms
included in the survey ranges from 183 to 535 per year with an average of 352.6 We
hand-collect the MAC surveys from printed editions of Fortune magazine between 1982
and 2009 and manually match them to our loan-level data.
3.2 Loan, Borrower and Bank Data
We obtain data on all dollar-denominated syndicated loans issued by U.S. firms from
the Dealscan database maintained by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC).7 We collect
information on loan pricing, fees, size, maturity, seniority, type, collateral, covenants, and
lenders. The unit of observation in the Dealscan database is a facility (or loan tranche). A
syndicated loan package (or deal), however, typically consists of multiple potentially very
6Focke et al. (2017) point out that this variation is mainly driven by the number of industries included
in the pool. Although the survey covers most industries, a significant fraction of companies comes from
industries such as manufacturing, business equipment, and materials.
7We refer to Carey et al. (1998) and Chava and Roberts (2008) for a detailed description of the
Dealscan database.
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different facilities initiated at the same time. When we analyze the pricing implications
of prestige on various fee and loan types, we use the loan-level information. We augment
the Dealscan loan-level data by merging it with the comprehensive total cost of borrowing
measure of Berg et al. (2016).8
For analyses that are based on variables determined at the deal level (syndicate size,
lead share and measures for borrower-lender relationships), we follow the literature and
choose the largest tranche to represent the deal. Carey et al. (1998) and Ivashina (2009)
show that this selection procedure does not significantly affect the distribution of loans.
Using the Dealscan-Compustat Linking Database of Chava and Roberts (2008), we
collect annual financial statement information for each borrower from Compustat. We
use data from the fiscal year prior to the calendar year of loan origination to ensure that
we only use accounting information that is publicly available at loan origination. For
our bank level analysis, we also match annual financial statement information for lenders
using the linking table provided by Schwert (2017) to our sample. We only focus on
deals where we can identify a single lead arranger.9 We define all variables we use in our
empirical analysis and their respective data sources in Table A1.
3.3 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Our merged sample covers the time period 1982 to 2009. We exclude loans without an
existing link to borrower information or missing borrower characteristics. We also exclude
loans with non-positive facility amounts and maturities. We winsorize all continuous and
unbounded variables at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the effects of outliers. We are left
with 45,837 loans to 7,328 U.S. borrowers between 1982 and 2009. Our key explanatory
8We are grateful for Tobias Berg providing the data on his homepage. We provide a detailed descrip-
tion of this measure in Section 4.
9Similar to Bharath et al. (2011) and Berg et al. (2016), we define a lender as a lead arranger if the
lender is the sole lender or the lender role is reported as “Agent”, “Admin Agent”, “Arranger”, or “Lead
bank”.
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variable – the prestige score – is only defined for companies that are featured in Fortune’s
MAC survey. Therefore, our final sample consists of 4,285 loans to 540 borrowers. We
draw on the larger initial sample, when we perform matching analyses between companies
that are ranked among the top 100 MAC and those that are not featured in the survey.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample. The average prestige score in our
sample is 6.28 with a standard deviation of 0.99. About 3% of all loans in our sample
are granted to borrowers which belong to the top 100 MAC. Figure 3 shows that the
distribution of the prestige score is bell-shaped with a small negative skew. There is
substantial variation in borrower prestige. Specifically, the range of the prestige score
equals 6.76 with a minimum of 1.99 and a maximum of 8.75.
The average loan in our sample has a total cost of borrowing of about 140 basis points
and a maturity of 47.72 months. The total cost of borrowing measures is available for
about 48% of all loans in the sample. Approximately 24% of all loans have a reported
upfront fee, 37% have a reported commitment fee, and 18% have a reported facility fee.
The facility amount is skewed towards large loans with a mean of USD 321.21 million
and a median of USD 100 million. 49% of all loans are secured and 42% feature financial
covenants.
The average borrower in our sample has total assets of USD 11.67 billion. The distri-
bution of assets is widely spread, in particular, the first and last decile of total assets are
USD 0.05 billion and USD 16.91 billion, respectively. Thus, our sample covers both small
and large borrowers. The average coverage is 34 with a median of 4.87 which is similar to
Bharath et al. (2011). The average borrower has a leverage ratio of 34%, a profitability
of -7%, tangibility of 35%, a current ratio of 61%, and a market-to-book ratio of 169%.
About a third of all loans belong to borrowers with an investment grade rating, while
53% of all borrowers have no rating at all.
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4 Borrower Prestige, Loan Pricing, and Credit Risk
We take a first look at the relation between borrower prestige and the cost of bank debt in
Figure 4. The horizontal axis of the three scatter plots reports the prestige score and the
vertical axes show the logarithm of the total cost of borrowing, the interest spread over
LIBOR, and the upfront fee. The fitted lines indicate a strong negative unconditional
relationship between borrower prestige and all three measures for the cost of borrowing.
We use three approaches to identify the effect of borrower prestige on outcome vari-
ables related to loan pricing. First, we apply fixed effects regressions with lagged firm
controls to isolate the effect of borrower prestige on the cost of borrowing. Second, we
exploit exogenous variation around rank top 100 of firms in the MAC rankings in a regres-
sion discontinuity analysis. Third, we use different matching estimators to evaluate the
average treatment effect on a firm being ranked among the top 100 in the MAC ranking.
4.1 Fixed-Effects Regressions
To formally study the effect of borrower prestige on loan pricing, we estimate the following
panel regression model
yl,i,t = α + β · Prestigel,i,t−1 + γ ·Xl,i,t(−1) + δ · Fixed Effectsl,i,j,t + εl,i,t, (1)
where subscripts l, i, j, and t(−1) denote the loan, borrowing firm, industry, and (lagged)
time period respectively. The dependent variable y is the logarithm of different measures
for the cost of borrowing.10
Berg et al. (2016) show that the pricing structure of loan commitments is complex and
includes a variety of fees. The most important fee types are the spread (interest margin
above LIBOR paid on drawn portion of loan), the upfront fee (one-time fee paid at loan
10We use the logarithm to account for skewness in the data. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged
if we use the level instead.
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closing date), the commitment fee (one-time fee paid on unused loan commitments),
and the facility fee (annual fee paid on total committed amount regardless of usage).11
Importantly, different fees are used to price options embedded in loan contracts. For
instance in credit lines, borrowers do not have to pay the committed spread until they
actually choose to use the credit line. Furthermore, different fees can be used to screen
borrowers’ private information about the likelihood of future credit line usage. Lenders,
therefore, typically use a combination of these fee types depending on borrower risk and
loan type.
The total cost of borrowing (TCB) measure of Berg et al. (2016) reflects the option
characteristics of bank loans and takes the likelihood of exercising these options as well
as the different fees into account. The measure is defined as
TCB = Upfront Fee/Expected Loan Maturity in Years
+ (1− PDD) · (Facility Fee + Commitment Fee)
+ PDD · (Facility Fee + Spread)
+ PDD · Prob(Utilization > Utilization Threshold | Usage > 0) · Utilization Fee
+ Prob(Cancellation) · Cancellation Fee,
where PDD is the likelihood that a credit line is used, Prob(Utilization > Utiliza-
tion Threshold |Usage > 0) is the probability that the utilization of the credit line is
higher than the threshold specified in the contract conditional on observing usage, and
Prob(Cancellation) is the probability that the loan will be canceled. We use TCB as the
main measure of loan pricing throughout the most part of our analysis.
Our measure of prestige is the borrower’s overall score in Fortune’s MAC survey. Our
main coefficient of interest is β, which captures the relation between borrower prestige and
11Unfortunately, we do not have enough observations to test the effect of borrower prestige on other
less common fee types such as utilization and cancellation fees.
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the cost of borrowing. We lag the prestige score by one year to ensure that our measure
captures survey results prior to loan origination. This timing convention implies that
the variable does not reflect elements that result from the issuance of the loan (reverse
causality). For example, it might be the case that survey participants (e.g., financial
analysts) take into account recent news on loan contracting when evaluating the prestige
of a particular borrower.
X denotes the vector of control variables. It includes loan and borrower characteristics
that directly affect the cost of bank loans or simultaneously drive borrower prestige and
loan pricing. On the loan level, we follow the literature and control for loan size, maturity,
number of facilities, whether the loan is secured, has financial covenants, prime as base
rate, or performance pricing. On the borrower level, we control for firm size, the coverage
ratio, leverage, profitability, tangibility, the current ratio, and the market-to-book ratio.
All borrower characteristics are lagged by one year to avoid an overlap with the period
of loan issuance. Throughout most of our analysis and following the literature on loan
pricing, Fixed Effects is a vector of loan type, loan purpose, rating, industry, as well as
year dummies.  denotes the vector of regression disturbances.
We estimate the above regression model with multi-level fixed effects by applying
the feasible and computationally efficient estimator of Correia (2016). Importantly, the
estimator eliminates singleton observations which typically arise in model with multi-
level fixed effects and which might overstate statistical significance. As loans to the
same borrower might be correlated with each other, we adjust standard errors for within
firm-clusters (e.g., Petersen, 2009; Valta, 2012; Hertzel and Officer, 2012).
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates of model (1) for TCB with the prestige
score as the key explanatory variable. In the first column, we report our main regression
specification – controlling for loan features and borrower characteristics, including rating,
industry, year, loan type and purpose fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the
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firm level. We find that the coefficient of the lagged prestige score is negative and highly
statistically significant (coefficient: -0.049, t-statistic: -3.11). To alleviate concerns, that
the time fixed-effect does not appropriately account for industry dynamics, we include
industry-year fixed effects. The results remain virtually the same (coefficient -0.048,
t-statistic: 3.24). Similarly, results do not change either when we include loan-purpose-
year and loan-type-year fixed effects (coefficient: -0.042, t-statistic: 2.70) to account for
purpose and type specific invariant unobservables. We also replace rating fixed effects by
firm fixed effects in our baseline specification to control for firm-specific time-invariant
observables which yields a lower point estimate (coefficient: -0.072, t-statistic: 3.77). We
also employ state-level clustering for some specifications which, however, does not impair
the significance of our estimates.
Overall, the coefficient estimate is similar across most of the specifications. In our
main regression specification, the coefficient of the prestige score equals -0.049 and is
significant at the 1% level. Importantly, the negative relation between borrower prestige
and the cost of borrowing is also economically significant. An increase in borrower prestige
by one standard deviation (0.99) reduces the TCB by 4.85% on average. For the median
loan in our sample, this translates into an annual reduction of the TCB by about 5 basis
points.
The estimates of the control variables have the expected sign. The coefficient of
the loan amount is negative and statistically significant which suggests that firms with
larger financing needs receive cheaper funding due to positive economies of scale. In
contrast, the number of facilities is positively related to the TCB. One likely explanation
might be that loans with a higher number of tranches are more difficult to structure and
arrange for banks. Consequently, the lender demands higher spreads from the borrower as
compensation. Surprisingly, secured loans have significantly higher borrowing costs. As
discussed by Hertzel and Officer (2012), this is a common finding in nearly all empirical
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studies using Dealscan data. It is the result of this variable capturing variation in credit
risk that is not picked up by the other control variables. The coefficient of the prime base
rate dummy is negative and weakly statistically significant which suggests that loans
which are based on the U.S. prime rate have lower borrowing costs compared to loans
which are tied to LIBOR. In line with the existing literature, the TCB is higher for
loans with shorter maturities, loans with financial covenants and loans which feature a
performance pricing schedule. Moreover, the costs of borrowing are significantly higher
for borrowers with high leverage, consistent with structural models of credit risk (e.g.
Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974). Borrowers with higher interest coverage and
market-to-book ratios (i.e. higher growth opportunities), on the other hand, face lower
borrowing costs.
Next, we investigate the impact of borrower prestige on alternative measures for the
cost of borrowing and individual fee types in Table 3. In Panel A, we find that the
coefficients of prestige are negative and highly statistically significant for the spread
(interest spread over LIBOR), AISD (spread plus facility fee), AISU (commitment fee
and facility fee). On the fee level, we find a statistically significant negative impact of
borrower prestige on upfront fees and the facility fee in Panel B. We do not find strong
evidence that prestigious borrowers pay lower commitment fees (i.e. fees on unused loan
commitments).
As discussed above, loan contracts differ substantially with respect to embedded op-
tion characteristics. In particular, the spread of term loans and credit lines are funda-
mentally different objects – in term loan contracts, borrowers have to pay the spread
on a regular basis, while in credit line contracts, borrowers pay the spread only when
they decide to exercise the option to draw on the credit line. We test whether there
are significant differences between the effect of prestige on term loans and credit lines.
Therefore, we restrict our sample to loans that we can identify as either of the two loan
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types. The results are reported in Table 4. We find evidence for lower TCB, loan spreads,
and upfront fees for credit lines of prestigious borrowers compared to term loans. We do
not find that facility fees are significantly different between the two loan types. We also
perform F -tests to test whether the effect of prestige is also negative and significant for
credit lines overall. Indeed, we find that prestige negatively affects all four measures of
borrowing costs for credit lines.
We have established that prestigious borrowers face lower costs of borrowing. How-
ever, borrower prestige might just capture unobservable firm characteristics that banks
take into account when negotiating loan contracts. Our measure of borrower prestige
would thus pick up unobserved heterogeneity across firms and time which we cannot con-
trol for in our baseline panel regression model. If this channel is driving our result, we
expect borrower prestige to have predictive power for companies’ credit risk. The credit
risk channel has at least three components which should matter for loan contracting –
the probability of default, the recovery in default, and a firm’s systematic risk.
We use three measures for credit risk to account for these three dimensions – the av-
erage S&P long-term rating from loan issuance to maturity (Rating), the average Markit
implied recovery from loan issuance to maturity (Recovery), and the average five year
Markit CDS spread from loan issuance to maturity (CDS Spread).12 We take averages
over a loan’s life to account for the different paths these variables might have over time.13
The model specification is essentially the same as in (1). We also add the loan spread as
an additional control variable to take into account the mechanical effect of interest rate
payments on credit risk. Without controlling for the loan spread, the coefficients of our
prestige variables are downward biased since borrower prestige and spreads are negatively
related, while spreads and credit risk are positively related. However, this bias does not
12While S&P ratings are available for the whole sample period, Markit CDS spreads and implied
recoveries are only available from 2001 on.
13As a robustness, we conduct the same analysis using values at maturity and changes from issuance
to maturity. The results are the same and are available in the Internet Appendix Table IA1.
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affect our inference since it only makes it more difficult not to find an effect of borrower
prestige on default risk.
Table 5 presents the results of our credit risk analysis. The coefficients of our prestige
measure are insignificant for all three measures of credit risk and irrespective of whether
we include the spread as a control. The lower costs of borrowing thus do not seem to be
justified by lower credit risk over the life of a loan.
The results of our credit risk analysis imply that the effect of borrower prestige on loan
pricing is not driven by asymmetric information either. If prestige served as a signal of
borrower quality at loan issuance, we should find an inverse relation between prestige and
default ex-post due to adverse selection. Overall, banks seem to provide prestigious firms
with better pricing terms for reasons that are unrelated to default-relevant fundamentals.
4.2 Regression Discontinuity Design
To support the results of the fixed effects regressions, we perform a regression discontinu-
ity analysis around rank 100 to exploit locally exogenous changes around this threshold.14
Fortune magazine publishes its MAC ranking every spring and widely-read business news-
papers then provide coverage on the survey. In this context, the print media focuses on
the top 100 firms in the ranking. For example, the New York Times and the Wall Street
Journal do not print the entire ranking but only include information on the top 100.
Moreover, companies themselves frequently issue press releases if they are ranked among
the top 100 most admired companies. We argue that the additional media and press
coverage for companies within the top 100 leads to a discontinuous, positive jump in
borrower prestige. Importantly, local changes in borrower prestige are exogenous around
rank 100 since random factors (e.g., mood of survey participants at the time of evaluation)
14We adopt this approach from Focke et al. (2017), who perform a regression discontinuity analysis
around rank 100 using Fortune’s list of the Best Companies to Work for and Fortune’s Most Admired
Companies ranking.
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determine whether a company is ranked just below or just above 100.
In our regression discontinuity analysis, we focus on firms ranked between 80 and
120. These companies are differentially affected by the treatment but very similar with
respect to other firm characteristics (e.g., profitability, size, etc.). If borrower prestige
has a causal effect on loan pricing, we should find a discontinuous jump in the TCB
around rank 100. We have to ensure that the estimates of the treatment effect are not
biased by heterogeneity in other firm characteristics. Therefore, we perform our analysis
not only for the raw outcome variables but also for their residuals, which we obtain from
linear regressions that control for these fundamentals. We only consider loans that are
originated between April and December because Fortune magazine publishes its MAC
survey between January and March each year.
Figure 5 provides graphical evidence for our regression discontinuity analysis. Con-
sistent with our previous analysis, we see a discontinuous, negative jump in the total
cost of borrowing for loans ranked below 100. In contrast, we do not find any statis-
tically and economically significant jump in credit risk around rank 100.15 In Table 6
we report the corresponding point estimates. We find a negative statistically significant
coefficient for the total cost of borrowing both without controlling for any firm or loan
characteristics and with including covariates. The results are still significant when we
apply the bias-corrected robust variance estimator of Calonico et al. (2017). For credit
risk, we find a significant negative coefficient without controlling for firm and loan char-
acteristics, however, the effect vanishes once we include covariates. To corroborate our
findings, we perform placebo tests around rank 150. Borrower prestige should not change
exogenously since there is no media effect at this threshold. Indeed, we find that there
is either a positive effect for the total cost of borrowing, or no effect at all for all other
models.
15We use the average borrower rating over a loan’s life as our measure of credit risk. Unfortunately,
we do not have enough observations to perform the analysis on our other measures of credit risk, i.e.
CDS spreads and implied recovery.
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Taken together, the results support out notion that borrower prestige reduces the
cost of borrowing, but does not predict credit risk. Next, we use the top 100 cutoff to
construct a further measure of prestige – a dummy variable which indicates whether a
company is in the top 100 of the MAC ratings.
4.3 Matched Sample Analyses
Because being in the top 100 was not randomaly assigned, the pretreatment covariates
differ between treated and control groups. To account for this endogeneity problem, we
apply several matching estimators.
The first class of matching estimators we use is coarsened exact matching (CEM)
(Iacus et al., 2012). CEM is a matching method where the balance between treated
and control group is chosen ex ante through coarsening. The CEM algorithm coarsens
variables into groups and assigns them the same numerical value. Then, exact matching is
applied to the coarsened data to determine matches and prune unmatched observations.
Only uncoarsened values of the matched data are then used in regressions. The CEM
procedure thereby automatically restricts the matched data to areas of common empirical
support.
As a fist step, we calculate the imbalance between treated and untreated observations
by computing the L1 distance which is a measure of imbalance bounded between 0 (perfect
balance) and 1 (complete separation). Table 7 shows the imbalance and the differences
in mean and median between treated and control groups before and after CEM. The
imbalance is largest with respect to total assets, coverage, leverage and market-to-book
ratio. We first apply the CEM algorithm on total assets and leverage and use the resulting
matches in our baseline regressions specification. Table 8 shows the regression results on
the coarsened-exact matched samples. We find a significant negative effect of the top 100
dummy on the total cost of borrowing (coefficient: -0.081, t-statistic: -3.26). We then
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apply the CEM algorithm on total assets, coverage, leverage, and market-to-book ratio
to further reduce the imbalance. The estimate remains essentially unchanged (coefficient:
-0.085, t-statistic: -3.39).16 Also consistent with our previous results, we do not find any
effect of the top 100 dummy on credit risk as measured by the average rating for both
matched samples.
The second class of matching estimators belongs to approximate matching methods
which specify some metric to find a control group that is close to the treated observations.
We apply two commonly used approximate matching methods as robustness checks –
nearest-neighbor matching (NNM) and propensity score matching (PSM). In both cases,
we are interested in the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) of firms ranked
in the top 100 of the MAC.
NNM uses some distance metric between covariate patterns of treated firms to find
the closest matches among control firms. Since using more than one continuous covariate
in NNM introduces a large sample bias, we employ the bias-adjustment proposed by
Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011). Panel A of Table 9 shows the ATET for different NNM
specifications. We match on borrower characteristics in all models and find a negative
significant coefficient on the top 100 dummy for 1 or 10 neighbors. Since there might
also be an endogeneity problem with respect to the loans prestigious companies actually
issue, we also match on loan features in addition to firm characteristics. The results are
statistically significant and consistent with our previous analyses across all models. When
we also match on loan features, the magnitudes are similar to previous point estimates.
PSM matches on the estimated probability of being treated (propensity score). Esti-
mating the ATET only requires finding matches for the treated observations. Since the
typical derivative-based standard error estimators cannot be used in this case, we rely on
the non-parametric method derived in Abadie and Imbens (2016) to compute standard
16Matching on all borrower characteristics unfortunately does not yield enough observations for mean-
ingful statistical inference.
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errors. Again, we apply different models – matching on firm characteristics only, match-
ing on loan features and firm characteristics, using different number of neighbors – and
find a statistically significant negative coefficient on the top 100 dummy in Panel B of
Table 9. However, the results for the PSM are quantitatively lower by a magnitude of
two compared to our previous analyses and should therefore interpreted with caution.
5 Why Does Prestige Affect Loan Pricing?
5.1 Borrower Prestige and Bank Competition
After having established that prestigious borrowers get better terms in their loan con-
tracting, we investigate which channel drives these results. Our third hypothesis states
that lenders compete for prestigious borrowers. Since the additional key variables are
determined at the deal level, we focus on the largest facility of each package to represent
the deal in the following analyses.
Competition for prestigious borrowers creates a tension between the number of lenders
able to participate in a deal and the allocation the lead bank retains. Prestigious bor-
rowers attract more (potential) lenders who value the participation in a deal with these
companies and therefore compete for being part of the syndicate. Prestige should there-
fore positively predict the syndicate size (i.e. the number of participating lenders). The
lead bank, however, might have an incentive to retain a larger allocation of a deal with a
prestigious company for various reasons, e.g. build up a lending relationship or strengthen
the signal that it is a high quality lender. Indeed, we find that prestige positively predicts
the syndicate size and the lead share in Table 10.
Table 10 also provides evidence that lenders are willing to accept concessions for being
part of a deal as measured by including the interaction of prestige and syndicate size in
our main regression specification – deals with a larger syndicate have higher total cost
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of borrowing, but prestigious companies seem to get a rebate when they contract with a
larger syndicate. We do not find significant evidence for a similar effect for higher lead
shares.
5.2 The Role of Lending Relationships
If lending to prestigious borrowers is valuable to lenders, then lenders might offer extra
favorable pricing terms in order to attract prestigious borrowers. We thus define the
variable New Relation as a dummy variable equal to one if the lead bank lends to the
borrower for the first time, and zero otherwise.17 It quantifies whether the effect of
borrower prestige on loan pricing is stronger for new bank relationships.
In Table 11, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and sta-
tistically significant for upfront fees but insignificant for the total cost of borrowing.
Therefore, banks seem to make upfront fee concessions to start new lending relationships
with prestigious firms. This results is consistent with the competition channel we high-
light above – lenders use lower upfront fees to compete for lending relationships with
prestigious borrowers. The insignificant interaction term for the total cost of borrowing
implies that lenders only use a rebate in upfront fees rather than a reduction in the overall
cost.
We also examine how lending relationships with prestigious companies evolve over
time. We construct the relationship lending variables in the spirit of Bharath et al. (2011)
who find that repeated borrowing from the same lender translates into lower spreads. The
measures of relationship lending include a dummy variable equal to one if a borrower and
a lender interacted in the last five years before a deal (Old Relation (Dummy)), the share
of the number of loans between a borrower and a lender as a fraction of the total number
17Since our sample starts in 1982, we cannot observe the entire lending history of our borrowers. We
do not define the relationship dummy variables for the first loan of every borrower to make sure that
they are not artificially equal to one. Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we start defining these
variable at each borrower’s third or fourth loan instead.
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of loans of a borrower in the last five years before a deal (Old Relation (Number)), and the
share of the loan amount between a borrower and a lender as a fraction of the total loan
amount of a borrower in the last five years before a deal (Old Relation (Amount)). We
find that existing relationships reduce the average upfront fees paid by lenders, prestigious
companies, however, pay higher upfront fees in repeated interactions. We do not find any
statistically significant evidence for the effect of lending relationships on the total cost of
borrowing.
Taken together, these results indicate that lenders are willing to make price conces-
sions to establish a relationship with a prestigious borrower. These borrowers then pay
relatively higher upfront fees in the following deals. This is consistent with our hypothesis
that lending to prestigious companies yields attractive future lending opportunities.
5.3 Future Bank Business
As we have established above, incentives at the bank level might provide an explanation
of the effect of borrower prestige on loan pricing. It is common practice that banks use
loans with prestigious borrowers as a marketing tool in client presentations to attract
future business (see Figures 1 and 2). The reduction in borrowing costs resembles the
value that banks attach to the value of relationships with prestigious companies.
In this analysis, we collapse the deal-level data to bank-year level variables and exam-
ine whether lending to prestigious companies in a given year leads to higher bank business
in subsequent years. We consider four different measures of annual bank business – the
total annual loan volume underwritten, the average volume per loan, the total number
of loans per year, and the number of unique borrowers a lead bank contracted with. The
key explanatory variable Top 100 Loans is defined as the number of loans that a lead
bank has underwritten for borrowers ranked among the top 100 most admired compa-
nies. We control for banks’ total assets, market-to-book ratios, and deposits over assets
159
ratios.18 See Table 12 for descriptive statistics of the bank-level sample. We include bank
fixed-effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant within banks and
year fixed-effects to control for macroeconomic conditions.
We report the results of our bank-level analysis in Panel A of Table 13. Consistent
with our hypothesis, we find that the effect of the number of top 100 loans on the total
loan volume in subsequent years is positive and statistically significant. We further show
that this increase in deal volume is not driven by an increase in the average volume per
loan, but rather by an increase in the number of loans that the lead bank underwrites. The
insignificant estimate for the volume per loan is in line with borrowers having financing
needs that are unrelated to the intensity with which banks lend to prestigious companies.
Interestingly, not only the number of loans but also the number of unique borrowers –
a measure of the broadness of a bank’s customer base – increases after banks lend to
prestigious firms. In Panel B of Table 13, we show that these findings hold up to a two
year lag. One explanation for the lack of persistence in the effect might be that banks
mainly use credentials with prestigious firms from recent deals to attract new business.
Overall, our findings support the idea that prestigious firms receive cheaper funding
because the associated lending relationship helps banks to establish valuable credentials
they use to successfully compete for future business.
6 Conclusion
Despite anecdotal evidence that banks value the public recognition from high profile
transactions, we know little about how lending relationships with prestigious firms shape
debt contracting. In this paper, we provide novel evidence of banks establishing lending
relationships with prestigious firms to signal their quality and attract future business.
18The results remain qualitatively unchanged if we include tier 1 ratios as a measure of banks’ financial
constraints. The results can be found in Internet Appendix Tables IA2 and IA3.
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Using survey data on firm-level prestige, we show that lenders compete more intensely
for prestigious clients and offer lower upfront fees to initiate lending relationships with
prestigious firms. We also find that banks expand their lending after winning prestigious
borrowers. Prestigious firms benefit from these relationships as they face lower costs of
borrowing even though prestige has no predictive power for credit risk.
Our results should be interpreted with the following caveats in mind. First, although
the negative association between firm prestige and financing costs is statistically signif-
icant across our different econometric approaches, its economic magnitude varies and
readers should therefore interpret the corresponding coefficients with care. Second, firm
prestige might have sizeable volume effects on other financial services. For instance, banks
may use credentials from the syndicated loan market to cross-sell equity underwritings or
M&A advisory and vice-versa (e.g., Laux and Walz, 2009). Finally, firm prestige might
also matter in other service industries such as auditing. We leave the investigation of
these other settings to future research.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Facility-Level Sample
This table reports descriptive statistics for key variables of the empirical analysis. For each variable, the number
of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 10% quantile (Q0.10), 25% quantile (Q0.25), median (Q0.50),
75% quantile (Q0.75), and 99% quantile (Q0.99) are reported. Prestige variables are obtained from Fortune’s Most
Admired Companies surveys. Loan and borrower characteristics are collected from Dealscan and Compustat,
respectively. The overall sample covers 45,837 loans to 7,328 US borrowers between 1982 and 2009. We define
all variables in Table A1.
N Mean SD Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90
Prestige Variables
Prestige [0-10] 4,285 6.28 0.99 5.05 5.66 6.34 6.97 7.50
Top 100 [0/1] 45,837 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Loan Characteristics
TCB [bps] 22,207 139.56 124.19 26.94 49.15 102.94 187.05 308.95
AISD [bps] 37,957 200.09 148.43 37.50 75.00 175.00 275.00 380.00
AISU [bps] 22,237 31.44 23.93 8.00 13.00 25.00 50.00 50.00
Spread [bps] 31,522 170.00 130.95 27.50 62.50 150.00 250.00 325.00
Upfront Fee [bps] 11,350 63.22 82.70 9.00 16.66 38.05 87.50 150.00
Commitment Fee [bps] 16,767 36.88 54.74 12.50 25.00 37.50 50.00 50.00
Facility Fee [bps] 8,115 19.27 24.25 6.00 8.00 12.50 22.22 37.50
Amount [USD mn.] 45,837 321.21 864.30 6.00 24.96 100.00 300.00 750.00
Maturity [months] 45,837 47.72 33.46 12.00 23.00 47.00 60.00 84.00
Facilities [number] 45,837 1.90 1.25 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00
Secured [0/1] 45,837 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Financial Covenants [0/1] 45,837 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Prime Base Rate [0/1] 45,837 0.58 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Performance Pricing [0/1] 45,837 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Credit Line [0/1] 45,837 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Term Loan [0/1] 45,837 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Number of Lenders 45,720 7.09 8.75 1.00 1.00 4.00 9.00 18.00
Lead Share [0-1] 14,572 0.58 0.39 0.10 0.19 0.50 1.00 1.00
New Relation [0/1] 36,439 0.64 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Old Relation (Dummy) [0/1] 36,439 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Old Relation (Number) [0-1] 26,070 0.34 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 1.00
Old Relation (Amount) [0-1] 26,069 0.36 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 1.00
Average Rating [1-15] 18,909 10.16 3.55 5.86 7.67 10.00 13.00 14.46
Average Recovery [number] 4,036 0.39 0.04 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Average CDS Spread [number] 3,971 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Borrower Characteristics
Total Assets [USD bn.] 45,837 11.67 70.32 0.05 0.16 0.72 3.56 16.91
Coverage [number] 45,837 34.06 813.58 0.81 2.38 4.87 10.56 24.93
Leverage [number] 45,837 0.34 0.26 0.07 0.18 0.32 0.46 0.62
Profitability [number] 45,837 -0.07 9.36 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.22 0.36
Tangibility [number] 45,837 0.35 0.24 0.06 0.14 0.29 0.52 0.73
Current Ratio [number] 45,837 0.61 6.17 0.07 0.16 0.31 0.52 0.89
Market-to-Book [number] 45,837 1.69 1.73 0.95 1.09 1.36 1.84 2.66
Investment Grade [0/1] 21,655 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Not Rated [0/1] 45,837 0.53 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Table 2: Impact of Borrower Prestige on Total Cost of Borrowing
This table provides results for linear regressions of the total cost of borrowing (TCB) on the prestige score,
loan features, and borrower characteristics. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the TCB. The key
explanatory variable is the lagged prestige score from Fortune’s Most Admired Companies surveys, which can
take any value between 0 and 10. Column (1) shows results for our main regression model with rating, industry
(one-digit IC code), year, loan type and loan purpose fixed effects. In column (2), we replace industry and year
fixed effects by industry-year fixed effects. In column (3), we replace loan type and purpose fixed effects by
loan-type-year and loan-purpose-year fixed effects. Column (4) shows the results for firm fixed effects instead
of rating fixed effects. In column (5), we use industry-year, loan-type-year, loan-purpose-year, and firm fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level in columns (1)-(5). Columns (6)-(8) show the results
for state-level clustering of the specifications used in columns (1), (2) and (5). The sample is based on loans in
the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The prestige data is manually collected from printed
editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and Compustat,
respectively. We define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at
the firm or state level in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***.
Log(TCB)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Prestiget−1 -0.049∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗
(-3.11) (-3.24) (-2.70) (-3.77) (-5.38) (-2.52) (-2.85) (-6.18)
Log(Amount)t -0.066
∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(-4.39) (-4.97) (-4.47) (-4.27) (-2.98) (-4.74) (-5.82) (-3.44)
Log(Maturity)t -0.274
∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗
(-8.05) (-8.54) (-7.00) (-8.24) (-7.24) (-9.03) (-8.92) (-5.72)
Facility Numbert 0.054
∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.058∗
(3.78) (3.85) (3.77) (3.09) (2.44) (4.04) (4.12) (1.89)
Securedt 0.539∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗
(13.28) (14.07) (12.25) (12.10) (11.25) (14.32) (14.93) (10.66)
Financial Covenantst 0.065∗∗ 0.047 0.040 0.000 -0.012 0.054∗ 0.035 -0.021
(2.06) (1.46) (1.17) (0.01) (-0.30) (1.84) (1.06) (-0.55)
Prime Base Ratet -0.056∗ -0.050 -0.061∗ -0.007 -0.011 -0.046 -0.041 -0.008
(-1.66) (-1.50) (-1.73) (-0.19) (-0.25) (-1.45) (-1.29) (-0.23)
Performance Pricingt -0.211
∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(-6.73) (-6.73) (-5.76) (-6.53) (-5.78) (-7.62) (-8.05) (-6.35)
Log(Total Assets)t−1 0.024 0.022 0.017 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.013 -0.038
(1.55) (1.55) (1.14) (0.28) (0.19) (1.16) (1.11) (-0.74)
Coveraget−1 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.002 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.002
(-2.32) (-2.40) (-2.65) (-0.98) (-1.48) (-2.29) (-2.47) (-1.27)
Leveraget−1 0.343∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(3.62) (3.33) (3.65) (2.85) (3.46) (3.64) (4.70) (3.06)
Profitabilityt−1 -0.120 -0.133 -0.189 -0.547∗ -0.536 -0.129 -0.189 -0.594∗
(-0.88) (-1.05) (-1.42) (-1.83) (-1.61) (-0.95) (-1.28) (-1.78)
Tangibilityt−1 0.082 0.087 0.087 -0.125 0.014 0.099 0.089 -0.032
(1.03) (1.12) (1.17) (-0.59) (0.07) (1.29) (1.23) (-0.15)
Current Ratiot−1 0.008 0.012 0.014 -0.029 -0.035 0.024 0.018 -0.034
(0.22) (0.34) (0.37) (-0.57) (-0.58) (0.60) (0.45) (-0.56)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.051∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.038∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗
(-2.75) (-2.47) (-1.84) (-3.39) (-2.15) (-2.84) (-2.43) (-2.76)
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes No No No No Yes No No
Year FE Yes No No No No Yes No No
Loan Type FE Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry x Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Loan Type x Year FE No No Yes No Yes No No Yes
Loan Purpose x Year FE No No Yes No Yes No No Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Observations 2,278 2,269 2,217 2,194 2,140 2,133 2,124 1,991
Adjusted R2 0.855 0.862 0.872 0.882 0.894 0.860 0.867 0.896
Cluster Variable Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm State State State
Number of Clusters 394 392 388 311 307 42 42 38
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Table 3: Borrower Prestige and Different Financing Cost Components
This table provides results of linear regressions of individual components of the total cost of borrowing on
lagged prestige score and control variables. Panel A shows the results for the all-in-spread-drawn (AISD), the
all-in-spread-undrawn (AISU), and the interest rate spread over LIBOR. Panel B shows the results for upfront
fees, commitment fees, and facility fees. All dependent variables are log-transformed. The sample is based
on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The prestige data is manually collected
from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and
Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and
***.
Panel A: Alternative Measures for the Cost of Borrowing
Log(AISD) Log(AISU) Log(Spread)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prestiget−1 -0.163∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(-4.47) (-3.53) (-4.79) (-4.13) (-4.21) (-3.72)
Loan Features No Yes No Yes No Yes
Borrower Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan Type FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan Purpose FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,239 3,232 2,375 2,366 2,974 2,968
Adjusted R2 0.438 0.744 0.507 0.763 0.469 0.778
Cluster Variable Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 504 503 469 466 481 480
Panel B: Fee Types
Log(Upfront Fee) Log(Commitment Fee) Log(Facility Fee)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prestiget−1 -0.157∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.080∗ -0.025 -0.102∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(-1.96) (-2.11) (-1.75) (-0.81) (-4.97) (-3.18)
Loan Features No Yes No Yes No Yes
Borrower Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan Type FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan Purpose FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 812 801 956 950 1,688 1,678
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.581 0.279 0.592 0.525 0.742
Cluster Variable Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 254 252 324 323 335 332
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Table 4: Impact of Borrower Prestige on Pricing of Credit Lines and Term Loans
This table provides results of linear regressions of the total cost of borrowing (TCB), and the three most
commonly used fee types – spread over LIBOR, facility, and upfront fee – on prestige score and the a credit
line dummy. We only look at loans that can be classified as either credit line or term loans. Including the loan
type fixed effects leads to omission of the credit line dummy in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8). All dependent
variables are log-transformed. The sample is based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and
2009. The prestige data is manually collected from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower
characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1.
We report t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses for the top three rows
of controls. We report values of the F -test of the null of zero in the fourth row. Significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***.
Log(TCB) Log(Loan Spread) Log(Facility Fee) Log(Upfront Fee)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Prestiget−1 -0.056 0.006 -0.013 0.008 -0.005 0.022 0.047 0.041
(-1.17) (0.21) (-0.24) (0.21) (-0.03) (0.13) (0.50) (0.46)
Prestige * Credit Line -0.112∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.105 -0.070 -0.280∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(-2.27) (-2.65) (-4.04) (-3.84) (-0.64) (-0.42) (-3.24) (-2.66)
Credit Line -0.723∗∗ - 0.379 - 0.234 - 0.936∗ -
(-2.59) (1.29) (0.21) (1.87)
Prestige + Prestige * Credit Line -0.168∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(46.80) (16.72) (49.07) (22.19) (28.26) (9.85) (8.82) (9.39)
Loan Features No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Borrower Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan Type FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan Purpose FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,278 2,274 2,785 2,781 1,641 1,636 737 729
Adjusted R2 0.665 0.856 0.578 0.784 0.544 0.749 0.257 0.580
Cluster Variable Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 394 394 474 474 332 330 246 244
168
Table 5: Borrower Prestige and Credit Risk
This table provides results of linear regressions of measures of credit risk on borrower prestige and control
variables. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the average S&P rating of a borrower over the loan
maturity. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the average implied recovery from Markit CDS
spreads of a borrower over the loan maturity. In columns (5) and (6), we use the average 5-year Markit CDS
spread of a borrower over the loan maturity as a dependent variable. The sample is based on loans in the US
syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The prestige data is manually collected from printed editions of
Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and Compustat, respectively.
We define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level
in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***.
Rating Recovery CDS Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prestiget−1 0.034 0.052 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006
(0.54) (0.80) (1.24) (0.93) (0.52) (0.84)
Log(Spread) 0.374∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(4.18) (-2.27) (1.99)
Loan Features Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,660 2,590 993 781 991 779
Adjusted R2 0.899 0.901 0.221 0.240 0.282 0.313
Cluster Variable Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 452 402 179 169 179 169
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Table 6: Regression Discontinuity Analysis
This table presents non-parametric estimates for a regression discontinuity (RD) analysis with a kernel regression
using a triangular kernel as implemented by Calonico et al. (2017). We report two different models – conventional
RD estimates with conventional variance estimator (Conventional), and bias-corrected RD estimates with robust
variance estimator (Robust). A sharp RD design is assumed in which the treatment variable – ranking in Fortune
Magazine’s Most Admired Companies – jumps from one to zero at rank 100. We run the analysis for all firms
ranked between 80 and 120 (Panel A) and a placebo test for a hypothetical cutoff set to 150 and all firms ranked
between 130 and 170 (Panel B). In columns (1) and (3), we report results without including any covariates. In
columns (2) and (4), we report results with the covariates facility amount, maturity, total assets, leverage and
market-to-book. The sample is based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The
prestige data is manually collected from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics
are obtained from Dealscan and Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1. Significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***.
Panel A: Threshold Value of 100
Log(TCB) Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conventional -0.638∗ -0.825∗∗ -3.091∗∗ -0.167
(-1.93) (-2.17) (-2.23) (-0.18)
Robust -0.709∗ -1.008∗∗ -3.811∗∗ -0.633
(-1.75) (-2.14) (-2.33) (-0.59)
Observations 280 280 494 494
Panel B: Threshold Value of 150 (Placebo)
Log(TCB) Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conventional 1.883∗∗∗ -0.177 -0.485 -1.435
(2.84) (-0.43) (-0.33) (-1.26)
Robust 2.342∗∗∗ -0.258 -0.865 -1.500
(2.99) (-0.48) (-0.50) (-1.06)
Observations 197 197 402 402
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Table 7: Covariate Imbalances Before and After Coarsened Exact Matching
This table reports measures of imbalance before and after applying the coarsened exact matching (CEM)
algorithm of Iacus et al. (2012). L1 measures the unidimensional imbalance between firms ranked in the top
hundred of Fortune Magazine’s Most Admired Companies (treated) and firms that are not (untreated) where
L1 is bounded between zero and one. A lower L1 statistic indicates lower imbalance. We also report differences
in means and medians between treated and untreated groups. CEM (1) refers to matching on total assets and
leverage. CEM (2) refers to matching on total assets, leverage, market-to-book, and coverage. Matching on all
borrower characteristics does not yield enough observations for meaningful statistical inference. The sample is
based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The prestige data is manually collected
from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and
Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1.
Before CEM After CEM (1) After CEM (2)
L1 ∆Mean ∆Median L1 ∆Mean ∆Median L1 ∆Mean ∆Median
Log(Total Assets) 0.711 3.011 3.110 0.548 1.687 1.894 0.400 1.016 0.060
Coverage 0.301 0.692 3.883 0.200 3.252 2.965 0.191 3.735 1.284
Leverage 0.291 -0.076 -0.074 0.209 -0.024 -0.039 0.221 -0.035 -0.047
Profitability 0.183 0.023 0.024 0.120 0.005 0.010 0.130 -0.013 -0.007
Tangibility 0.217 0.004 0.020 0.205 -0.014 -0.003 0.163 -0.023 -0.021
Current Ratio 0.123 -0.054 0.006 0.123 -0.021 0.006 0.132 -0.020 -0.006
Market-to-Book 0.257 0.452 0.271 0.245 0.475 0.283 0.220 0.275 0.132
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Table 8: Matched Sample Regressions
This table provides results of linear regressions of the total cost of borrowing (TCB) and the average borrower
rating over loan maturity on a dummy variable indicating whether a company is ranked among the top 100
companies in Fortune Magazine’s Most Admired Companies and control variables. Columns (1) and (4) show
the results without applying any matching algorithm. In columns (2) and (5), we apply the coarsened exact
matching (CEM) algorithm of Iacus et al. (2012) on borrowers’ total assets and leverage to reduce the imbalance
between observations which are among the top 100 companies (treated) and those that are not (untreated).
In columns (3) and (6), we match on total assets, leverage, market-to-book, and coverage. Matching on all
borrower characteristics does not yield enough observations for meaningful statistical inference. The sample is
based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The prestige data is manually collected
from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and
Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and
***.
Log(TCB) Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top 100t−1 -0.021 -0.081
∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ 0.092 -0.011 0.049
(-0.75) (-3.26) (-3.39) (0.83) (-0.10) (0.56)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Features Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,864 9,989 5,012 10,531 7,315 4,227
Adjusted R2 0.835 0.855 0.850 0.912 0.895 0.905
Cluster Variable Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 3,842 1,772 1,010 1,583 1,149 814
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Table 9: Average Treatment Effect for Alternative Matching Estimators
This table provides matching results for different set of control variables and numbers of neighbors. The
variable of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated of firms ranked among the top 100 most
admired companies. In Panel A, we apply nearest neighbor matching including the bias-adjustment of Abadie
and Imbens (2006, 2011) to correct for the bias that arises due to the use of continuous control variables. In
Panel B, we apply propensity score matching including standard errors derived in Abadie and Imbens (2016)
to account for the fact that the propensity score is an estimated quantity. We use a probit model to estimate
propensity scores. We drop observations if they violate the overlap assumption for a specific model. The
sample is based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The prestige data is
manually collected from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are obtained
from Dealscan and Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1.
Panel A: Nearest Neighbor Matching
Log(TCB)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 100t−1 -0.121
∗∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(-2.17) (-2.22) (-7.20) (-4.31)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Features No Yes No Yes
Neighbors 1 1 10 10
Observations 22,207 19,752 22,207 17,064
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching
Log(TCB)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 100t−1 -0.339
∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.476∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗
(-6.67) (-5.12) (-12.14) (-6.81)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Features No Yes No Yes
Neighbors 1 1 10 10
Observations 22,207 22,207 22,207 22,207
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Table 10: Borrower Prestige and Bank Competition
This table provides results for linear regressions with measures of competition. In columns (1) and (2) we regress
syndicate size (i.e. the number of participants in a deal) on borrower prestige and lead share (i.e. percentage
of loan retained the lead arranger at loan origination). In columns (3) and (4), we regress the lead share on
borrower prestige and syndicate size. In columns (5)-(8), the dependent variable is the total cost of borrowing
(TCB). The sample is based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. For each deal
in the sample, we select the the largest facility to represent the deal. The prestige data is manually collected
from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and
Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and
***.
Syndicate Size Lead Share Log(TCB)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Prestiget−1 1.143∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗ 4.183∗ 2.645∗∗ -0.061 0.010 -0.069 -0.063∗
(2.66) (2.06) (1.96) (2.29) (-1.23) (0.48) (-1.17) (-1.82)
Prestige * Syndicate Size -0.003 -0.003∗∗∗
(-1.49) (-2.78)
Syndicate Size -1.268∗∗∗ -0.432∗∗∗ 0.010 0.012∗∗
(-6.39) (-3.65) (0.75) (2.04)
Lead Share -0.249∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.006
(-16.34) (-4.36) (4.56) (0.84)
Prestige * Lead Share -0.005∗∗∗ -0.001
(-3.71) (-0.98)
Loan Features No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Borrower Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan Type FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan Purpose FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 698 694 698 694 1,651 1,645 521 515
Adjusted R2 0.359 0.580 0.400 0.639 0.415 0.824 0.373 0.825
Cluster Variable Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 266 266 266 266 389 388 211 211
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Table 11: Borrower Prestige and Lending Relationships
This table provides results for linear regressions of measures of loan pricing on borrower prestige and control
variables with a focus on bank relationship variables. The dependent variable is either the total cost of borrowing
(TCB) in columns (1)-(4) or the upfront fee in columns (5)-(8). The key explanatory variables are the interaction
terms of lagged prestige score with variables related to the relationship between a borrower and a lender. In
columns (1) and (5), the relevant variable is a dummy which indicates whether a borrower and a lender interact
for the first time in a given deal (New Relation). In columns (2) and (6), the relevant variable is a dummy
which indicates whether a borrower and a lender interacted in the last five years before a deal (Old Relation
(Dummy)). In columns (3) and (7), we use the share of the number of loans between a borrower and a lender as
a fraction of the total number of loans of a borrower in the last five years before a deal (Old Relation (Number)).
In columns (4) and (8), we use the share of the loan amount between a borrower and a lender as a fraction of
the total loan amount of a borrower in the last five years before a deal (Old Relation (Amount)). The sample is
based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. For each deal in the sample, we select
the the largest facility to represent the deal. The prestige data is manually collected from printed editions of
Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and Compustat, respectively.
We define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level
in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***.
Log(TCB) Log(Upfront Fee)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Prestige * New Relation -0.026 -0.287∗∗
(-1.04) (-2.54)
Prestige * Old Relation (Dummy) 0.021 0.238∗∗
(0.85) (2.13)
Prestige * Old Relation (Number) 0.006 0.358∗∗
(0.19) (2.02)
Prestige * Old Relation (Amount) -0.001 0.197
(-0.03) (1.18)
Prestiget−1 -0.026 -0.049∗∗ -0.034 -0.032 -0.102 -0.337∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗
(-1.60) (-2.00) (-1.46) (-1.32) (-1.12) (-3.55) (-2.91) (-2.39)
New Relation 0.172 1.911∗∗∗
(1.07) (2.77)
Old Relation (Dummy) -0.138 -1.616∗∗
(-0.86) (-2.35)
Old Relation (Number) -0.040 -2.144∗∗
(-0.19) (-2.02)
Old Relation (Amount) -0.009 -1.207
(-0.04) (-1.20)
Loan Features Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,236 1,236 1,168 1,168 222 222 191 191
Adjusted R2 0.842 0.842 0.848 0.848 0.580 0.576 0.523 0.515
Cluster Variable Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Number of Clusters 337 337 320 320 153 153 133 133
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Bank-Level Sample
This table reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the bank level analysis. For each variable, the
number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), 10% quantile (Q0.10), 25% quantile (Q0.25), median
(Q0.50), 75% quantile (Q0.75), and 99% quantile (Q0.99) are reported. Loan volume, loan number, average loan
volume and the number of unique borrowers are based on aggregating deals from Dealscan to an annual level.
Top 100 loans refers to the number of loans originated for companies ranked among the top 100 companies
according to Fortune’s Most Admired Companies surveys. The remaining bank characteristics are collected
from Compustat. The panel of yearly bank level observations spans from 1982 to 2009. We define all variables
in Table A1.
N Mean SD Q0.10 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.90
Loan Volume [USD bn.] 1,187 6.05 20.63 0.02 0.08 0.54 3.33 12.07
Loan Number 1,187 17.68 34.85 1.00 2.00 6.00 18.00 38.00
Average Loan Volume [USD mn.] 1,187 210.42 493.67 10.00 25.00 82.50 234.64 497.63
Unique Borrowers [number] 1,187 16.21 31.56 1.00 2.00 6.00 16.00 36.00
Top 100 Loans [number] 1,187 0.69 2.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
Total Assets [USD bn.] 946 227.13 442.66 9.46 21.82 58.62 219.23 632.57
Market-to-Book [number] 862 1.06 0.07 0.99 1.01 1.04 1.09 1.14
Deposits/Assets [number] 946 0.67 0.13 0.55 0.62 0.68 0.75 0.80
Tier 1 Ratio [0-100] 596 8.82 1.80 7.10 7.68 8.44 9.54 10.92
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Table 13: Bank-Level Regressions
This table provides results for linear regressions of lead arrangers’ business activities on a measure that captures
the lending to prestigious borrowers and control variables. The dependent variable is the future loan volume
in columns (1) and (2), average volume per loan in columns (3) and (4), the number of loans underwritten in
columns (5) and (6), and the number of unique borrowers in columns (7) and (8). The key explanatory variable
is the Log(1+ Top 100 Loans) variable which is based on Fortune’ Most Admired Companies survey. In all
regression specification, we include bank and year fixed effects. Depending on the column, we also control for
the bank’s total assets, market-to-book ratio and deposits over assets ratio. The sample is based on loans in
the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The main results are displayed in Panel A. Panel B
shows the results for up to 5 lags in the key explanatory variable. The prestige data is manually collected from
printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and bank characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and Compustat,
respectively. We define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at
the bank level in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***.
Panel A: Main Bank-Level Analysis
Log(Volume)t Log
(
Volume
Loans
)
t
Log(Loans)t Log(Borrowers)t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−1 0.483
∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.076 -0.059 0.407∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(4.21) (2.13) (0.85) (-0.50) (7.15) (6.17) (6.49) (5.85)
Log(Total Assets)t−1 1.044
∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(4.03) (2.87) (4.39) (4.34)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -1.193 -1.356∗∗ 0.163 0.037
(-1.18) (-2.13) (0.23) (0.05)
Deposit/Assetst−1 1.320 -0.073 1.392
∗∗ 1.317∗∗
(1.30) (-0.10) (2.38) (2.27)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,186 860 1,186 860 1,186 860 1,186 860
Adjusted R2 0.772 0.815 0.688 0.696 0.766 0.810 0.770 0.814
Cluster Variable Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Number of Clusters 100 75 100 75 100 75 100 75
Panel B: Bank-Level Analysis With Additional Lags
Log(Volume)t Log
(
Volume
Loans
)
t
Log(Loans)t Log(Borrowers)t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−1 0.456
∗∗∗ 0.187∗ 0.079 -0.063 0.377∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(3.61) (1.70) (1.01) (-0.77) (5.06) (4.41) (4.51) (4.08)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−2 0.258
∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.099∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(3.16) (2.46) (2.39) (1.68) (2.58) (2.45) (2.64) (2.32)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−3 -0.132 0.137 -0.061 0.041 -0.071 0.096 -0.063 0.092
(-1.06) (1.50) (-0.89) (0.61) (-0.95) (1.60) (-0.90) (1.62)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−4 -0.011 -0.034 -0.041 -0.078 0.030 0.044 0.032 0.039
(-0.09) (-0.31) (-0.53) (-1.24) (0.44) (0.60) (0.50) (0.55)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−5 -0.106 -0.099 -0.091 -0.111 -0.015 0.013 -0.010 0.014
(-0.75) (-0.75) (-1.10) (-1.37) (-0.20) (0.19) (-0.14) (0.22)
Log(Total Assets)t−1 1.026
∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(3.97) (2.85) (4.30) (4.26)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -1.152 -1.369∗∗ 0.217 0.086
(-1.14) (-2.09) (0.31) (0.12)
Deposit/Assetst−1 1.411 -0.111 1.521
∗∗ 1.438∗∗
(1.33) (-0.15) (2.60) (2.49)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,186 860 1,186 860 1,186 860 1,186 860
Adjusted R2 0.772 0.815 0.688 0.696 0.766 0.812 0.770 0.815
Cluster Variable Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Number of Clusters 100 75 100 75 100 75 100 75
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Figures
Figure 1: U.S. Syndicated Loan Credentials
This figure illustrates the common practice of banks using loans with prestigious borrowers as a marketing
tool to win future business (credentials). The graph shows US syndicated loan credentials that Royal Bank of
Canada (RBC) used in client presentations in 2009.
6
Notable Recent Transactions
U.S. Syndicated Finance Credentials
US$180 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
June 2007
Refinancing of existing facilities
US$3.5 billion
Sr. Credit Facilities
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
June 2007
Acquisition of Texas State 
Highway 121
US$1.23 billion
Sr. Credit Facilities
& Sub. Facility
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
July 2007
Acquisition by RREEF
US$325 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
1st / 2nd Lien
Lead Arranger, Joint 
Bookrunner & Synd Agent
June 2007
LBO by Quadrangle Group
US$950 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Lead Arranger, Joint 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
August 2007
Acquisition of Wild Oats
US$115 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
1st / 2nd Lien
Lead Arranger,  Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
September 2007
LBO by HM Capital Partners
US$85 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
September 2007
LBO by Macquarie
American Water 
Heater Rentals
US$635 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
OpCo / HoldCo
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
November 2007
LBO by Lindsay Goldberg
Cap Rock Holding
US$60 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
April 2008
Refinancing
US$157 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Joint Lead Arranger, Joint 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
March 2008
Refinancing
US$195 million
Sr. Credit Facility
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
January 2008
Upsizing of facility for Growth 
Capital Expenditures
US$575 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Lead Arranger,  Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
February 2008
Acquisition of MarkWest
Hydrocarbon
US$150 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Joint Lead Arranger, Joint 
Bookrunner & Synd. Agent
April 2008
Upsizing to Support Capital 
Expenditures and Acquisitions
US$270 million
Sr. Credit Facility
& 2nd Lien Bridge
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
July 2008
Acquisition of PetroEdge
(Borrowing Base Increased)
US$435 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
November 2007
Acquisition of Enbridge’s 
Kansas Pipeline System and 
Refinancing & Spin-Off of 
Upstream Assets
US$510 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
1st / 2nd Lien
LBO by Apax Partners
Joint-Lead Arranger, Joint-
Bookrunner & Synd Agent
August 2007
US$675 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Joint Lead Arranger, Joint 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
January 2009
Acquisition of Public Service 
Company in New Mexico
US$27.5 billion
Sr. Credit Facilities
Senior Managing Agent
March 2009
Acquisition of Wyeth
US$12.5 Billion
Sr. Credit Facilities
Participant
December 2008
Acquisition of Alltel Corp.
US$220 million
Sr. Credit Facilities
Joint Lead Arranger, Joint 
Bookrunner & Synd. Agent  
April 2009
Refinancing
US$1.8 billion
Sr. Credit Facilities
Joint Lead Arranger, Joint 
Bookrunner & Synd. Agent
April 2009
Refinancing
US$2.3 billion
Sr. Credit Facilities
Joint Lead Arranger, Joint 
Bookrunner & Synd. Agent
January 2008
Acquisition of Lamamco Drilling 
Co.
US$1.8 billion
Sr. Credit Facility
Lead Arranger, Sole 
Bookrunner & Admin Agent
August 2007
Acquisition of Dominion’s 
exploration & production assets
US$8.5 billion
Sr. Credit Facilities
Senior Lender                      
April 2009
Acquisition of               
Schering-Plough
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Figure 2: European Syndicated Loan Credentials
This figure illustrates the common practice of banks using loans with prestigious borrowers as a marketing tool
to win future business (credentials). The graph shows European syndicated loan credentials for UniCredit in
2013.
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SYNDICATED LOANS: CORPORATE STRUCTURED FINANCE – SELECTED CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS FY 2013 
Carlsberg
EUR 2,510,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Bookrunner & MLA
Denmark, Dec 2013
Telefonica CR
EUR 2,288,000,000
Acquisition Term
Facilities & RCF
Underwriter, 
Bookrunner & MLA
Czech Rep., Dec 2013
MAHLE
EUR 1,250,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Dec 2013
Trelleborg
EUR 1,200,000,000
Revolving Credit 
Facilities
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Sweden, Dec 2013
Borsig
EUR 220,000,000
Term Loan Facility
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Dec 2013
Slovnaft
EUR 200,000,000
Term Loan Facility
MLA & Facility Agent
Slovakia, Dec 2013  
Lillo S.p.A
EUR 185,000,000
Term Loan and 
Revolving
Credit Facilities
Bookrunner & MLA
Italy, Dec 2013
E.ON
EUR 5,000,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Nov 2013
Gazprom Neft
USD 2,150,000,000
Term Loan Facility
MLA
Russia, Nov 2013
Emergency Oil
Stocks Agency
EUR 520,000,000
Term Loan Facility
Bookrunner, MLA 
Security Agent
Slovakia, Nov 2013
 
  
 
   
  
 
  
Arnoldo Mondadori
Editore
EUR 270,000,000
Term Loan, Revolving
Credit Facility
Bookrunner, MLA &
Facility Agent
Italy, Nov 2013
Vitol
USD 7,000,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Bookrunner & MLA
Switzerland, Oct 2013  
OMV
EUR 1,500,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Austria, Oct 2013
Bomin
EUR 400,000,000
Borrowing Base Facility
Coordinator, 
Bookrunner, MLA & 
Facility Agent
Germany, Oct 2013
MTU Aero Engines
EUR 400,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Oct 2013
Glas Trösch
EUR 240,000,000
CHF 100,000,000
Term Loan Facility
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Switzerland, Oct 2013
Daimler
EUR 9,000,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Sep 2013
Evonik
EUR 1,750,000,000
Revolving Credit 
Facilities
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Sep 2013  
REWE
EUR 1,750,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Sep 2013
MMK
USD 500,000,000
Term Loan Facility
Coordinator, MLA & 
Agent
Russia, Sep 2013
Kathrein Gruppe
EUR 150,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Sep 2013
GEA
EUR 650,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Aug 2013
X5 Retail Group
RUB 20,000,000,000
Term Loan Facility
Coordinator, MLA & 
Agent
Russia, Aug 2013
Juwi
EUR 240,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Aug 2013  
Linde
EUR 2,500,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, July 2013
Amprion
EUR 1,800,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Jul 2013
K+S
EUR 1,000,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator, 
Bookrunner & MLA 
Germany, July 2013
Dräxlmaier
EUR 520,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, July 2013
GlencoreXstrata
USD 17,340,000,000
Revolving Credit 
Facilities
Bookrunner & MLA
Switzerland, June 2013
Polkomtel
PLN 7,950,000,000
Term & Revolving
Credit Facilities
Global Coordinator,
MLA & Agent
Poland, June 2013  
Norilsk Nickel
USD 2,325,000,000
Term & Revolving
Credit Facilities
Initial MLA & Agent
Russia, June 2013
Steinhoff
EUR 860,000,000
Extended Revolving 
Credit Facility
Bookrunner & MLA
Austria, June 2013
Belectric
EUR 130,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility,
Guarantee Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, June 2013
Ojer Telekomünikasyon
USD 4,750,000,000
Term Loan Facility
Revolving Credit Facility
MLA
Turkey, May 2013
WDFG
EUR 1,250,000,000
Term Loan, Revolving 
Credit Facilities
Bookrunner & MLA
Spain, May 2013
Klöckner & Co
EUR 360,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Coordinator,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, May 2013  
Osram GmbH
EUR 1,250,000,000
Term Loan Facility
Revolving Credit Facility
Underwriter,
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Apr 2013
Gazprom Neft
USD 1,000,000,000
Term Loan Facility
Revolving Credit Facility
MLA
Russia, Apr 2013
MVM
EUR 290,000,000
Term Loan Facility
MLA
Hungary, Apr 2013
Farmafactoring
EUR 143,000,000
Term Loan Facility
Bookrunner, MLA & 
Facility Agent
Italy, Apr 2013
BASF
EUR 3,000,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility
Bookrunner & MLA
Germany, Mar 2013
Telecom Italia
EUR 3,000,000,000
Forward Start Revolving 
Credit Facility
Bookrunner & MLA
Italy, Mar 2013  
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Figure 3: Distribution of Borrower Prestige
This histogram shows the distribution of the prestige score from Fortune’s Most Admired Companies surveys
between 1982 and 2009 for borrower with loan data in Dealscan. The horizontal axis reports the prestige score
which can take any value between zero and ten. The vertical axis shows the frequency of the respective bin in
percent. The prestige data is manually collected from printed editions of Fortune Magazine.
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Figure 4: Borrower Prestige and the Cost of Borrowing
These figures illustrate the strong negative relationship between borrower prestige and the cost of borrowing.
The scatter plot in the top shows the relation for the total cost of borrowing (TCB) of Berg et al. (2016). The
graph in the middle illustrates the relationship for the loan spread over LIBOR. The bottom plot shows the
relation for upfront fees. In all plots, the horizontal axis reports the prestige score, which can take any value
between zero and ten. The solid lines represent fitted values from an OLS regressions. Loan spreads and upfront
fees are obtained from Dealscan and the prestige score is manually collected from printed editions of Fortune
Magazine. The sample covers the time period 1982 to 2009.
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Figure 5: Regression Discontinuity around Rank 100 of Prestige Survey
This figure shows non-parametric estimates of two local polynomial regressions using a triangular kernel as
implemented by Calonico et al. (2015). The dependent variables are the residuals of the regression of the total
cost of borrowing (TCB) and the average rating over loan maturity on facility amount, maturity, total assets,
leverage and market-to-book. The cutoff equals rank 100 in Fortunes’ Most Admired Companies survey. We
only consider companies with ranks between 80 and 120. In both charts, the horizontal axis reports the rank
based on the prestige score as reported in the survey. The vertical lines represent 90% confidence intervals for
each bin. The sample is based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The prestige
data is manually collected from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are
obtained from Dealscan and Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variable [Units] Source Definition
Prestige Variables
Prestige [0-10] Fortune Prestige score of the borrower as defined by Fortune’s Most
Admired Companies survey.
Top 100 [0/1] Fortune Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower is ranked among
the top 100 firms in the Fortune’s Most Admired Companies
survey (by score).
Loan Characteristics
TCB [bps] Dealscan Total Cost of Borrowing (TCB) developed and provided by
Berg et al. (2016). The TCB measure reflects option char-
acteristics of loans, differentiates between credit lines and term
loans, and takes various fees paid to lenders into account.
AISD [bps] Dealscan All-in-spread-drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LI-
BOR plus the facility fee.
AISU [bps] Dealscan All-in-spread-undrawn, defined as the sum of the facility fee
and the commitment fee.
Spread [bps] Dealscan Spread over LIBOR paid on drawn amounts on credit lines.
Upfront Fee [bps] Dealscan Fee paid upon completion of syndicated loan deal.
Commitment Fee [bps] Dealscan Fee paid on the unused amount of loan commitments.
Facility Fee [bps] Dealscan Fee paid on the total committed amount independent of usage.
Amount [USD mn.] Dealscan Facility amount as indicated in the field FacilityAmt in the
Dealscan facility table.
Maturity [months] Dealscan Facility maturity in months as indicated in the field Maturity
in the Dealscan facility table.
Facilities [number] Dealscan Number of facilities in a package.
Secured [0/1] Dealscan Dummy variable equal to one if facility is secured as indicated
by the field Secured in the Dealscan facility table.
Financial Covenants [0/1] Dealscan Dummy variable equal to one if the loan has financial covenants
as indicated by appearing the Dealscan financial covenants ta-
ble.
Prime Base Rate [0/1] Dealscan Dummy variable equal to one if the base rate is prime as in-
dicated by the field Baserate in the Dealscan current facility
pricing table.
Performance Pricing [0/1] Dealscan Dummy variable equal to one if the loan has performance pric-
ing as indicated by appearing in the Dealscan performance pric-
ing table.
Credit Line [0/1] Dealscan Loans with type ”364-Day Facility”, ”Revolver/line < 1 Yr.”,
”Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.”, or ”Revolver/Term Loan” as indi-
cated in the field Loantype in the Dealscan facility table.
Term Loan [0/1] Dealscan Loans with type ”Term Loan”, ”Term Loan A”-”Term Loan
K”, and ”Delay Draw Term Loan” as indicated in the field
Loantype in the Dealscan facility table.
Syndicate Size [number] Dealscan Number of lenders (lead arranger and participants) of a syndi-
cated loan facility as indicated by the Dealscan lender shares
table.
Lead Share [0-1] Dealscan Share of the loan that is retained by the lead bank at loan origi-
nation as indicated by the field BankAllocation in the Dealscan
lender shares table.
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New Relation [0/1] Dealscan Dummy variable equal to one if the lead banks lends to the
borrower for the first time. The variable is set to missing for
the first loan of each company in our sample.
Old Relation (Dummy) [0/1] Dealscan Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower and lender had
at least one lending relationship in the last 5 years before loan
origination.
Old Relation (Number) [0-1] Dealscan Number of loans by bank j to borrower i in the last 5 years
before loan origination divided by the total number of loans by
borrower i in the last 5 years.
Old Relation (Amount) [0-1] Dealscan Amount of loans by bank j to borrower i in the last 5 years
before loan origination divided by the total amount of loans by
borrower i in the last 5 years.
Rating [1-15] Compustat Average S&P rating over loan maturity.
Recovery [number] Markit Average implied recovery over loan maturity.
CDS Spread [number] Markit Average 5-year CDS spread over loan maturity.
Borrower Characteristics
Total Assets [number] Compustat Total book assets (at) in USD million.
Coverage [number] Compustat Ratio of EBITDA (ebitda) to interest expenses (xint).
Leverage [number] Compustat Ratio of book value of total debt (dltt + dlc) to book value of
assets (at).
Profitability [number] Compustat Ratio of EBITDA (ebitda) to sales (sale).
Tangibility [number] Compustat Ratio of property, plant, and equipment (ppent) to total assets
(at).
Current Ratio [number] Compustat Ratio of current assets (aco) to current liabilities (lco).
Market-to-Book [number] Compustat Ratio of book value of assets (at) - book value of equity (ceq)
+ market value of equity (csho*prcc f ) to book value of assets
(at).
Investment Grade [0/1] Compustat Dummy variable equal to one if the S&P rating is BBB- or
higher and missing for non-rated borrowers.
Not Rated [0/1] Compustat Dummy variable equal to one if no S&P rating for the borrower
exists.
Bank Level Variables
Loan Volume [USD bn.] Dealscan Total volume of all loans underwritten by lead bank in a given
year.
Loans [number] Dealscan Total number of loans underwritten by lead bank in a given
year.
Loans / Volume [number] Dealscan Average loan volume issued by lead bank in a given year.
Unique Borrowers [number] Dealscan Number of unique borrowers that the lead bank provided with
loans during the year.
Top 100 Loans [number] Dealscan Number of loans underwritten for borrowers that are ranked
among the top 100
firms in the Fortune’s Most Admired Companies survey.
Total Assets [USD bn.] Compustat Total book assets (at).
Market-to-Book [number] Compustat Ratio of book value of assets (at) - book value of equity (ceq) +
market value of equity (csho*price) to book value of assets (at)
where price is the month-end price from CRSP at the fiscal-year
end.
Deposits/Assets [number] Compustat Deposits (dptc) over total assets (at).
Tier 1 Ratio [0-100] Compustat Risk-adjusted tier 1 capital ratio (capr1 ).
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A Robustness Tests for Credit Risk Regressions
Table IA1: Borrower Prestige and Credit Risk at Loan Maturity
This table provides results of linear regressions of measures of credit risk on borrower prestige and control
variables. In Panel A, the dependent variables describe credit risk at maturity. In columns (1) and (2), the
dependent variable is the S&P rating of a borrower at loan maturity. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent
variable is the implied recovery from Markit CDS spreads of a borrower at loan maturity. In columns (5) and
(6), we use the 5-year Markit CDS spread of a borrower at loan maturity as a dependent variable. In panel B,
we use the changes in these variables from origination to maturity as dependent variables. The sample is based
on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The prestige data is manually collected
from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and borrower characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and
Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and
***.
Panel A: Credit Risk at Maturity
Ratingm Recoverym CDS Spreadm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prestiget−1 0.065 0.081 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.52) (0.66) (1.20) (0.62) (-0.68) (-0.20)
Log(Spread) 0.524∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(3.41) (-2.17) (2.38)
Loan Features Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3626 2555 811 640 804 634
Adjusted R2 0.725 0.731 0.224 0.302 0.381 0.376
Cluster Variable bgvkey bgvkey bgvkey bgvkey bgvkey bgvkey
Number of Clusters 454 411 164 154 162 152
Panel B: Changes in Credit Risk
∆Rating ∆Recovery ∆CDS Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scoret−1 0.094 0.104 -0.003 -0.004∗ -0.001 -0.002
(0.76) (0.85) (-1.65) (-1.91) (-0.88) (-1.43)
Log(Spread) 0.501∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.009∗∗∗
(3.21) (0.59) (-2.76)
Loan Features Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3492 2474 639 482 629 474
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.358 0.539 0.599 0.463 0.529
Cluster Variable bgvkey bgvkey bgvkey bgvkey bgvkey bgvkey
Number of Clusters 439 392 112 103 110 101
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B Robustness Tests for Bank-Level Analyses
Table IA2: Baseline Regressions with Additional Controls
This table provides results for linear regressions of lead arrangers’ business activities on a measure that captures
the lending to prestigious borrowers and control variables. The dependent variable is the future loan volume
in columns (1) and (2), average volume per loan in columns (3) and (4), the number of loans underwritten in
columns (5) and (6), and the number of unique borrowers in columns (7) and (8). The key explanatory variable
is the Log(1+ Top 100 Loans) variable which is based on Fortune’ Most Admired Companies survey. In all
regression specification, we include bank and year fixed effects. Depending on the column, we also control for
the bank’s total assets, market-to-book ratio, deposits over assets, and the tier 1 capital ratio. The sample
is based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. The prestige data is manually
collected from printed editions of Fortune Magazine, loan and bank characteristics are obtained from Dealscan
and Compustat, respectively. We define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard
errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *,
**, and ***.
Log(Volume)t Log
(
Volume
Loans
)
t
Log(Loans)t Log(Borrowers)t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−1 0.483
∗∗∗ 0.245∗ 0.076 -0.012 0.407∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(4.21) (1.88) (0.85) (-0.14) (7.15) (4.18) (6.49) (3.96)
Log(Total Assets)t−1 0.722
∗∗ 0.230 0.492∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(2.25) (1.36) (2.77) (2.82)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.630 -1.346∗∗ 0.717 0.703
(-0.67) (-2.61) (1.02) (1.02)
Deposit/Assetst−1 0.471 -0.718 1.189
∗ 1.183∗
(0.44) (-0.98) (1.86) (1.93)
Tier 1 Ratiot−1 -0.039 0.002 -0.041 -0.047
(-0.79) (0.08) (-1.03) (-1.22)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,186 542 1,186 542 1,186 542 1,186 542
Adjusted R2 0.772 0.857 0.688 0.750 0.766 0.855 0.770 0.859
Cluster Variable Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Number of Clusters 100 66 100 66 100 66 100 66
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Table IA3: Baseline Specification with Longer Lag Structure
This table provides results for linear regressions of lead arrangers’ business activities on a measure that captures
the lending to prestigious borrowers and control variables. The dependent variable is the future loan volume
in columns (1) and (2), average volume per loan in columns (3) and (4), the number of loans underwritten in
columns (5) and (6), and the number of unique borrowers in columns (7) and (8). The key explanatory variable
is the Log(1+ Top 100 Loans) variable which is based on Fortune’ Most Admired Companies survey. In all
regression specification, we include bank and year fixed effects. Depending on the column, we also control for
the bank’s total assets, market-to-book ratio, deposits over assets, and the tier 1 capital ratio. The sample
is based on loans in the US syndicated loan market between 1982 and 2009. This table shows the results for
up to 5 lags in the key explanatory variable. The prestige data is manually collected from printed editions of
Fortune Magazine, loan and bank characteristics are obtained from Dealscan and Compustat, respectively. We
define all variables in Table A1. We report t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the bank level in
parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***.
Log(Volume)t Log
(
Volume
Loans
)
t
Log(Loans)t Log(Borrowers)t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−1 0.456
∗∗∗ 0.202∗ 0.079 -0.031 0.377∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(3.61) (1.68) (1.01) (-0.41) (5.06) (3.55) (4.51) (3.33)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−2 0.258
∗∗∗ 0.122 0.133∗∗ 0.090 0.125∗∗ 0.032 0.126∗∗∗ 0.022
(3.16) (1.59) (2.39) (1.63) (2.58) (0.61) (2.64) (0.40)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−3 -0.132 0.087 -0.061 0.028 -0.071 0.059 -0.063 0.053
(-1.06) (0.79) (-0.89) (0.36) (-0.95) (0.84) (-0.90) (0.80)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−4 -0.011 0.000 -0.041 -0.005 0.030 0.006 0.032 0.007
(-0.09) (0.00) (-0.53) (-0.09) (0.44) (0.07) (0.50) (0.08)
Log(1 + Top 100 Loans)t−5 -0.106 -0.065 -0.091 -0.084 -0.015 0.019 -0.010 0.028
(-0.75) (-0.46) (-1.10) (-0.99) (-0.20) (0.26) (-0.14) (0.40)
Log(Total Assets)t−1 0.712
∗∗ 0.230 0.482∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(2.18) (1.32) (2.70) (2.75)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.623 -1.328∗∗ 0.705 0.691
(-0.66) (-2.52) (1.01) (1.01)
Deposit/Assetst−1 0.468 -0.711 1.179
∗ 1.173∗
(0.43) (-0.96) (1.85) (1.93)
Tier 1 Ratiot−1 -0.043 0.002 -0.045 -0.050
(-0.89) (0.07) (-1.11) (-1.30)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,186 542 1,186 542 1,186 542 1,186 542
Adjusted R2 0.772 0.856 0.688 0.748 0.766 0.854 0.770 0.858
Cluster Variable Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Number of Clusters 100 66 100 66 100 66 100 66
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